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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

COMMUNICATION AT SUPERFUND SITES AND
THE REIFICATION OF DIVISION:
TOWARD A CONVERGENCE-BUILDING MODEL OF RISK COMMUNICATION
This case study evaluates government communication practices at Superfund
sites. I describe agency communication practices in Superfund communities, paying
particular attention to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Seven Cardinal Rules
of Risk Communication and its role as a model for federal agencies engaged at these sites.
Situating the study within a theoretical milieu that includes sensemaking and symbolic
interactionism, I examine whether current practices deepen divisions among stakeholders,
reducing the possibility for communicative convergence.
I implement textual analysis and narrative inquiry to examine written and spoken
communication about the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant National Priorities List
Superfund site. Through crystallized analysis of media coverage, public comments, focus
group transcripts, and local blogs, I address the following research questions:
RQ1: How does the enactment of accepted agency risk communication practices
affect relationships among stakeholders, specifically:
•
•

how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize
past and present agency risk communication practices, and
how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize
each other in relation to these communicative practices?

RQ2: What are the related implications for improving agency risk communication
approaches?
The study concludes with recommendations for improving existing agency risk
communication guidelines, as well as the creation of a new communication model to
promote convergent communication at Superfund sites.
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Chapter One: Introduction
In the mid-1980s, several high-profile environmental crises pointed to the need
for government agencies to communicate better with the public about the environmental
and health risks of exposure to specific contaminants (Perrow, 1984; Shrivastava, 1987;
Weick, 1988; National Research Council [NRC], 1989). From this need, the field of risk
communication emerged, with scholars and practitioners developing strategies for
disseminating information to and receiving information from risk-bearing communities.
One of the first and most enduring products of this field is the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's [U.S. EPA] Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication (Covello
& Allen, 1988). These guidelines, which appear in various forms across numerous best
practices documents, include: "1) accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner; 2)
plan carefully and evaluate your efforts; 3) listen to the public's specific concerns; 4) be
honest, frank, and open; 5) coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources; 6)
meet the needs of the media; and 7) speak clearly and with compassion" (U.S. EPA,
1988).
For almost a quarter of a century, these rules have guided the development and
implementation of scores of stakeholder communication efforts by U.S. EPA and other
federal agencies engaged at hazardous waste sites (ATSDR, 1994; Tinker, 1996;
Keystone Center, 2005). The approach delineated by the Seven Cardinal Rules and
similar governmental best practices guides represents an enormous advance from the
sparse risk communication efforts that preceded them (Covello & Sandman, 2001).
However, further evaluation is needed concerning the long-term impacts of this
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framework on relationships among agencies, community members, and other
stakeholders.
While U.S. EPA, specifically, has based its risk communication efforts on the
Seven Cardinal Rules, these guidelines also have provided a model of public
communication for other federal agencies, including the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry [ATSDR] (ATSDR, 1994; Tinker, 1996) and the U.S. Department
of Energy [U.S. DOE] (Keystone Center, 2005). That these three organizations
essentially use the same framework for communicating with riskbearers has been
particularly important in Superfund communities, which bear significant environmental
and health burdens that sometimes require both individual and community-level actions
to mitigate. In addition to being guided by the Seven Cardinal Rules, federal agencies
often contract strategic issues management or public relations consultants to help craft
risk communication primers and conduct training for employees (Keystone Center, 2005;
Center for Risk Communication, 2012). As a result, agency communicative policies and
procedures tend to be based on guidelines drawn from the best practices literature,
including Seven Cardinal Rules.
Superfund communities present particularly challenging environments for
enacting the Rules. In these settings, citizens often find themselves embedded within a
complicated and confusing network of similar but disconnected governmental activities
and communication efforts. By federal law, U.S. EPA investigates, designates, and
oversees environmental cleanup activities associated with Superfund sites, while ATSDR
investigates and reports about potential public health impacts related to contamination
(U.S. EPA, 2011). Because of its role in the production of nuclear energy and waste
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products since the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Energy itself is responsible for the
cleanup of some 21 Superfund sites, constituting "the world's largest nuclear cleanup"
(U.S. DOE, 2011). Further, a 1997 report to Congress indicated some level of
environmental contamination at all ninety-six of the agency's nuclear facilities (de
Saillan, 2008).
Despite increased U.S. DOE attempts to engage local communities directly in risk
communication, both the large scale of the agency’s environmental management efforts
and numerous revelations about its prior waste mismanagement (Bruce & Becker, 2007;
Taylor, B. C., Kinsella, W. J., Depoe, S. P., & Metzler, M. S., 2005) have contributed to
high levels of distrust among many community stakeholders (Flynn, Slovic, Mertz, &
Toma, 1990; Slovic, 2000). Even as U.S. DOE attempts to engage its publics, implement
more inclusive processes, and provide assistance to affected communities, stakeholders
tend to remain dubious of motives and desired outcomes (KRCEE, 2011). As Gaetke,
Gaetke, and Bowen (2008) put it, "people who have been affected by Superfund sites are
often, legitimately, not inclined to trust offers of help from strangers, particularly from
outside of their communities" (p. 279). Further, across the U.S. DOE complex,
community members have indicated that they are greatly concerned about both their
inability to help set site-related priorities and the community’s perceived lack of
influence on U.S. DOE decision making in general (Battelle, 2003).
Among the sites that U.S. DOE currently is remediating is the Paducah Gaseous
Diffusion Plant [PGDP], a National Priorities List (NPL) Superfund site in western
Kentucky. Currently, the PGDP is the only operating uranium enrichment facility in the
United States (Kaoutzanis, 2011). Initially charged with producing fuel for the military-

3

industrial complex, the PGDP transitioned in the 1960s to focus on uranium enrichment
for electricity-generating commercial reactors (USEC, 2010). The PGDP was owned and
operated by U.S. DOE until 1992, when operations were leased to the United States
Enrichment Corporation [USEC]. Although USEC continues to manage enrichment
activities, U.S. DOE retains responsibility for PGDP site clean-up and environmental
management.
In 1988, technetium-99 and trichloroethylene contamination from the plant were
discovered in nearby private drinking wells. Subsequently, U.S. EPA launched an
investigation that resulted in the PGDP's addition to the Superfund National Priorities
List in 1993 (U.S. EPA, 2007). In fulfilling its oversight duties at the facility, U.S. EPA
works closely with such state agencies as the Kentucky Energy and Environment
Cabinet’s Department for Environmental Protection and Division of Waste Management,
as well as the Cabinet for Health and Family Services’ Radiation Control Branch. The
Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife is directly affected by PGDP activities
through its lease of the wildlife management area surrounding the plant. In addition, U.S.
DOE established a Citizens Advisory Board, or CAB, in compliance with community
right-to-know laws to "facilitate the flow of various kinds of technical information from
experts to community residents and to open channels of commentary between them"
(Heath & Palenchar, 2009, p. 316).
Since the PGDP's addition to the NPL, U.S. DOE has conducted numerous siterelated information campaigns and community meetings; however, local stakeholders
have continued to express strong distrust of the agency while voicing concerns about the
goals of PGDP-related engagement projects (KRCEE, 2011). In one recent study, focus
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group participants were asked to rate their preferred levels of public engagement in
PGDP-related matters, as well as perceptions of their actual engagement. To gauge
stakeholder opinion, researchers utilized the Arnstein Ladder (1969). This tool assesses
perceived and desired participation levels via an eight point scale ranging from nonparticipation to citizen power, as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Manipulation
Therapy
Informing
Consultation
Placation
Partnership
Delegated Power
Citizen Control

Although participants in seven focus groups indicated that their preferred level of
PGDP-related engagement with agencies would be partnership, they placed their actual
engagement levels between being informed and being consulted, marking a full two-point
difference on the eight-point scale (KRCEE, 2011). Importantly, the KRCEE (2011)
study also noted that stakeholder groups who perceived themselves as experiencing the
lowest levels of participation on the Arnstein Ladder desired higher participation levels
than other groups, leading the investigators to ask, "[D]o higher ideal levels of
engagement negatively influence perceptions of real-world engagement activities, or do
unsatisfactory past experiences increase the desire for achieving a higher ideal level of
involvement" (p. 111)?
This "Arnstein Gap" (Bailey, Blandford, Grossardt, & Ripy, 2011) between
experienced and desired levels of public participation, along with the lack of community
trust, both in the agency's waste management practices and in the veracity of its risk
communications, raises the question of whether more than twenty years of risk
5

communication activities derived in part from U.S. EPA's Seven Cardinal Rules have
improved U.S. DOE's relationship with the community or if, in fact, these guidelines
might have contributed to further deterioration of already-damaged relationships. The
Rules have informed the design and implementation of numerous federal communicative
actions for more than two decades; however, as Weick (1988) notes, while action can
facilitate mutual understanding "action [also] affects events and can make things worse"
(p. 306). In practice, has adhering to the Rules reified existing divisions between agencies
and their stakeholders? Do the Rules implicitly marginalize community concerns as less
valid than technical assessments of risk?
Paducah provides a fascinating case for addressing these important questions.
Through the years, complex relationships among federal and state governmental
agencies, community stakeholders, myriad activist and advocacy groups, and the media
have presented opportunities for both communication and miscommunication. Individuals
and groups have spent decades making sense of the PGDP, of its role(s) in the
community, and of the potential consequences of the plant's physical presence in the
region. These sensemaking activities have contributed to a process known as
"enactment," which results in an "enacted environment" (Weick, 1988, 1995).
Weick (1988, 1995) describes enactment as an ongoing, iterative process through
which people shape their environment, which then constrains the very people who
created that environment. In describing the enactment perspective, Weick (1988) states
that "when people act, they bring events and structures into existence and set them in
motion" (p. 306). Three mediating factors potentially constrain this important process.
Capacity limits enactment through the number and diversity of potential actors, as when
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fewer individuals are available to jointly make sense of a situation or all individuals
interacting share a similar perspective; commitment affects enactment through the
formation of "blind spots" in the "tenacious justification" of particular positions, as when
individuals hold tightly to beliefs in spite of evidence to the contrary; expectations
constrain capacity through the creation of assumptions that become "self-fulfilling
prophecies," as when an individual's negative past experiences inform negative reactions
to a new situation, thus creating challenges for interactions that further deteriorate in the
new situation (Weick, 1988).
In short, numerous stakeholders -- ranging from residents in contaminated areas to
plant employees to CAB members to environmental activists to local government and
economic development leaders -- have disparate stakes in and distinct, often competing,
perspectives about PGDP-related issues. The various stakeholder groups receive
information about the site from numerous other site-related actors, generating frequent
and often conflicting messages from which sense must be made. Further, each
stakeholder group and the individuals who comprise it have differing levels of technical
knowledge and emotional investment in the plant and its activities. However, current risk
communication paradigms pit broad-brush characterizations of "technical hazard" against
"community outrage," often missing distinct but important nuances among stakeholders
in favor of a binary view that places agencies on one side of risk communication and
community stakeholders on the other.
Through a sensemaking lens, this case study examines the ways in which agencies
and their multiple stakeholders describe each other, as well as the ways in which
individuals with disparate stakes perceive previous agency risk communication and

7

community engagement efforts. Using a qualitative multi-method analytic process, this
study brings together models and theoretical concepts from the risk and participatory
communication fields to inform strategic issues management practices for federal
agencies. The findings support the development of a new communication model that
balances the lived experiences of those affected directly by environmental exposures with
the technical knowledge of agency personnel.
Statement of Purpose
More and more, federal agencies are seeking to adapt long-standing, prescriptive
risk communication guidelines to create collaborative paradigms that promote shared
understanding. If sensemaking is an interactive, situated process in which individuals
work together to create shared meaning (Blumer, 1966), then it stands to reason that to be
successful, new risk communication approaches should feature collaborative
sensemaking activities involving stakeholders with diverse perspectives. To develop
these approaches, however, we first must identify where current models might be
problematic to ensure appropriate adaptation of existing practices.
This study seeks to improve our understanding of the long-term impacts of past
and current federal risk communication activities on stakeholder relationships through a
case study of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant National Priorities List Superfund
site. Specifically, I attempt to identify constraints that agency risk communication
policies place upon enactment, including the role that specific communicative practices
could be playing in provoking or sustaining adversarial relationships. I do this by
analyzing written and spoken communication from multiple datasets to explore the ways
in which agency risk communication policies and practices could be affecting stakeholder
8

relationships. For clues, I examine how multiple stakeholders, including both community
members and agency personnel, characterize previous and ongoing federal risk
communication activities. I further seek to identify instances in which these perceptions
of risk communication experiences influence stakeholder perceptions of other actors,
both from agencies and within the community.
Thus, I analyze written and spoken communication from several quarters to
address the following research questions:
RQ1: How does the enactment of accepted agency risk communication practices
affect relationships among stakeholders, specifically:
•

how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize
past and present agency risk communication practices, and

•

how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize
each other in relation to these communicative practices?

RQ2: What are the related implications for improving agency risk communication
approaches?
Exploring these questions will improve our understanding of whether and how the
risk communication framework currently used by federal agencies working at Superfund
sites could be creating new or reifying existing divisions between government entities
and community stakeholders. After identifying the nature of the existing framework's
impacts on relationships, I propose stakeholder-centered amendments to The Seven
Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication, establishing a new model for federal agency
interactions with riskbearing communities at Superfund sites. The practical issue of
promoting communicative convergence is central to these recommendations.
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Building a collaborative framework for risk communication requires deepening
the current understanding of risk as a socially- and linguistically-constructed
phenomenon. As Murdock (2010) argues, improving contemporary risk communication
requires "a research effort that is resolutely interdisciplinary, that mobilizes expertise
from outside the communications and risk communities, and that is matched by a policy
response that ‘joins up’ hitherto separate domains" (p. 174). By deepening our
understanding of how current federal risk communication practices create, reify, and/or
challenge stakeholder perceptions, I identify spaces in which convergence may be
possible, leading to policy recommendations for a collaborative, empowering model of
risk communication that can be implemented jointly by agencies and risk-bearers.
Organization of Dissertation
In achieving the goals set forth for this study, I have organized the dissertation in
five distinct chapters.
In Chapter One, I briefly introduce both the problem and the scene. I provide a
cursory overview of federal risk communication at Superfund sites and introduce the
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant as the site of study. Finally, I provide the goals and
research questions for the study.
Chapter Two presents the study’s background and rationale. I begin with an
examination of the history of risk communication, followed by an analysis of four distinct
approaches to risk communication: research translation, policy-oriented, stakeholderbased, and participatory. The chapter then discusses the particular political dynamics and
challenges for Superfund site communication before describing the history of the PGDP
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and its status as a National Priorities List site. I close the chapter by explicating the
challenges that this study addresses.
In Chapter Three, I provide an in-depth discussion of study methodology. I
discuss the epistemological paradigm of the researcher, including overviews of
sensemaking and symbolic interactionism. The chapter provides a detailed description of
research design, including discussions of constant comparative analysis and narrative
inquiry, as well as the role of crystallization in bringing these different analytical forms
together. I describe data collection through a discussion of selection and sampling, as
well as detailed descriptions of each of the four datasets. In the data analysis section, I
provide details regarding coding activities. I then discuss specific challenges for the
study, including the ways in which qualitative research specifically addresses traditional
social scientific constructs like generalizability, reliability, validity, objectivity, and
researcher reflexivity.
In Chapter Four, I provide study results, specifically identifying five cross-cutting
themes found in the datasets: 1) The Government; 2) The Public; 3) Delays; 4) Secrecy,
Deception, and Manipulation; and 5) Competing Risk Perceptions. I discuss the ways in
which each theme relates to enactment, specifically how it informs and is informed by
sensemaking constraints for capacity, commitment, and expectations. Each thematic
section closes with a narrative vignette intended both to exemplify and to enhance the
preceding constant comparative analysis.
After briefly synthesizing the evidence in Chapter Five, I delineate the study’s
implications for future risk communication efforts at Superfund sites. Specifically, I
make recommendations regarding the rhetorical adaptation, operationalization, and
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implementation of Seven Cardinal Rules and other best practices-oriented risk
communication guides specifically for use at Superfund sites. I also suggest a
convergence-promoting model for Superfund site communication that incorporates
elements of research translation, policy, stakeholder-based, and participatory approaches.
The dissertation closes with discussions of study limitations and future directions.

Copyright © Anna Goodman Hoover 2013
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Chapter Two: Background and Rationale
A Brief History of Risk Communication
Risk communication came into its own in the late-1970s and early-1980s, an
event-driven outgrowth of risk management (Murdock, 2010). These years saw a slew of
domestic and international environmental crises, including illnesses related to toxic
chemicals at New York's Love Canal, the partial nuclear meltdown at Pennsylvania's
Three Mile Island facility, the tragic death of thousands in Bhopal, India, following a
Union Carbide pesticide plant's leakage of methyl isocyanate, and massive contamination
from the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident in the then-Soviet Union. With each of these
events, it became increasingly clear that both government and industry officials needed to
inform the public about existing and emerging environmental and health risks (Perrow,
1984; Weick, 1988; NRC, 1989; Heath & O'Hair, 2010).
As Murdock (2010) states, the field’s earliest iterations "saw [risk
communication] as a technical practice in which experts attempted to allay public
concerns by underlining the statistical improbability of risks becoming crises and
affirming that effective preventative and emergency controls were in place" (p. 160).
Horlick-Jones and Farre (2010) refer to this approach as a "deficit model" in which
communication efforts were "driven by an attempt to explain scientific facts about risk
issues to what were seen as uncomprehending lay audiences: to ‘fill up their heads’, as it
were, with authoritative knowledge" (p. 132). Thus, an increasingly concerned public’s
perceived information needs drove the development of a paradigm in which experts
provided probabilistic risk information to a homogeneous public. According to Heath and
O'Hair (2010), "The logic of this scientific (actuarial or epidemiological) approach is that
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as people understand the causes, randomness/predictability of, and effects of risks, certain
measures can be taken on a personal and societal level to alter the occurrence, impact,
and magnitude of the damage" (p. 15).
As implied by this initial expert-source-to-lay-receiver model, risk
communication began as what Heath & O'Hair (2010) call "a discipline whereby experts
could be brought together with lay audiences to explain and compare risks" (p. 9).
However, it soon became apparent that this approach was inadequate. Subsequent
evolution of the field was driven in part by the continued erosion of public confidence in
risk management and in part by what Murdock (2010) describes as "the emergence of
new lobbying and campaigning groups that articulated popular fears around nuclear
power and environmental degradation" (p. 160). As the concerns of non-technical
stakeholders were brought into starker relief, the unidirectional model was increasingly
found wanting. According to Sellnow and Sellnow (2010), "The general tenet of
communication studies [is] that simple exposure to information does not translate to
understanding" (p. 115); this tenet became a key component of the risk management
dilemma. Technical information about risks seemed to influence neither attitudes about
nor behaviors related to those risks, and both governmental agencies and industry were
left asking what was "wrong" with their efforts.
Recognizing that better risk communication models were needed, the National
Research Council (1989) weighed in on the side of communicative bidirectionality when
it released Improving Risk Communication. Sometimes referred to as the Orange Book,
the report highlights the challenges that lay audiences experienced in trying to make
sense of probabilistic hazard assessments, as well as the lack of attention technical
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experts paid to lay concerns that could not be incorporated into such assessments (Slovic,
1999; Thompson, 2012). The seminal NRC (1989) publication specifically called for risk
communication approaches to include "democratic dialogue," to be "interactive," and to
incorporate the public’s "concerns, opinions, or reaction to risk messages" (p. 21). Often,
the implementation of these suggestions by government agencies has focused on the
development and implementation of what essentially are standard operating procedures
for the conduct of risk communication.
One of the first and most enduring products in this genre is the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's [U.S. EPA] Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk
Communication (Covello & Allen, 1988). Released just prior to the NRC report, the
Rules establish a laundry list of guidelines for U.S. EPA risk communicators to follow.
As Tinker (1996) notes, "The Cardinal Rules were designed to serve as guidelines for
federal efforts to define communications objectives, organize and manage decisions, and
measure performance in health risk communications planning, implementation, and
evaluation" (p. 201)
The U.S. EPA (1988) rules are:
1) accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner;
2) plan carefully and evaluate your efforts;
3) listen to the public's specific concerns;
4) be honest, frank, and open;
5) coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources;
6) meet the needs of the media; and
7) speak clearly and with compassion
By acknowledging the existence of public concerns, this approach represents an
improvement over the sparse risk communication efforts that preceded it (Covello &
Sandman, 2001). However, as Heath and Nathan (1990) point out, the Rules still reflect a
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model that "features experts as sources, messages as information about risk, channels as
media reporters and editors, and receivers [as] an amorphous public..." (p. 16). According
to Boholm (2009), such approaches indicate that "the role of the [risk communicator] is
to steer laypeople’s (incorrect) mental models toward convergence with the scientific
(correct) model" (p. 339). In essence, such critics claim the Rules continue to reflect a
more or less persuasion-based approach to risk communication.
With high-profile events like Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and Chernobyl keeping
environmental crises in the news (Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & Slovic, 2003), it
stands to reason that U.S. EPA would be at the forefront of best practices development.
As Horlick-Jones and Farre (2010) note, "[T]he use of risk communication as a
regulatory, policy and operational tool has become increasingly important for
institutional attempts to optimize resource allocation, and to inform and influence the
behaviour of target audiences" (p. 131). Thus, once a set of guidelines had been
developed, numerous other agencies subsequently looked to the Rules for creating their
own policies, procedures, and activities. Among the governmental organizations that
followed U.S. EPA’s lead were the US Department of Energy (Keystone Center, 2005)
and numerous agencies within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(ATSDR, 1994; Tinker, 1996).
Examples of other government agencies utilizing the Seven Cardinal Rules
abound. For example, early adaptations are evident in a U.S. Public Health Service
[USPHS] Report on Risk Communication and Education, generated by a Subcommittee
of the Environmental Health Policy Committee (Tinker, 1996). Within its report, the
subcommittee defined health risk communication as "the purposeful exchange of
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information about the existence, nature, form, severity, or acceptability of risks" (p. 201).
The subcommittee bounded the discipline as involving "individuals, groups,
communities, or institutions; the level, significance, or meaning of health or
environmental risks; assessments, models, and procedures on which risk estimates are
made; and decisions, actions, or policies aimed at managing or controlling health or
environmental risks" (p. 200). Tinker (1996) makes clear the linkage between US DHHS
and the Cardinal Rules by stating that most Public Health Service agencies "either were
familiar with or had applied in varying degrees the model standards of risk
communication developed by EPA" (p. 201).
In addition to US DHHS usage of the guidelines, a recent risk communication
primer created for U.S. DOE makes clear how the Rules have permeated other federal
efforts. The primer, created by the Keystone Center (2005), states:
Do not make assumptions about what people know, think, or want done about
risks. Recognize that people’s values and feelings are a legitimate aspect of
environmental health issues and that such concerns may convey valuable
information. When people are speaking passionately they are responding to their
emotions. It is both ineffective and often inappropriate to simply follow with data.
Show respect by developing a system to both acknowledge and respond promptly
to concerns raised by community residents without becoming 'technocratic.' (p.
22)
From the Department of Health and Human Services to the Department of Energy, it is
clear that U.S. EPA's groundwork provided the foundation on which many subsequent
federal risk communication policies have been built.
According to Sellnow and Sellnow (2010), the years since the Rules creation have
seen "risk management and crisis planning [evolve] far beyond any linear form of
communication where subject matter experts establish standards and priorities for risk
management" (p. 113). Instead, stress increasingly has been placed on communicative
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bidirectionality, with many groups -- both outside and inside government -- calling for
risk communication to feature "collaborative decision making that includes risk bearers,
including those who can be affected by a crisis" (Heath & O’Hair, 2010, p.7).
While Seven Cardinal Rules and related government risk communication
guidelines certainly represent improvements over the earlier unidirectional information
dissemination model, this approach also carries with it its own difficulties, many
centering on the inherent normatization of scientific risk and the continued
conceptualization of communication almost exclusively as message transmission
(Stratman et al., 1995; Boholm, 2008; Endres, 2009; Stratman et al., 1995). As Palenchar
(2005) states,
Some risk communication studies and prescriptions take an atheoretical approach
… Such prescriptions, while important, do not address issues of conflict and
negotiation, or see risk from the perspective of concerned members of the
community who often believe they have reason not to trust any statement
regarding risks. (p. 5)
In fact, Heath and Nathan (1990) have criticized the Rules as "a linear, source-oriented
model that relies on paternalistic and platitudinous suggestions" (p. 16). In other words,
while such rules as "accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner" and "listen to
the public's specific concerns" appear to be more concerned with stakeholder perceptions
than previous risk communication efforts, these guidelines in fact mask what essentially
is a continuation of the source-receiver model without providing substantive ways in
which publics can become invested in the communication process.
In contrast, some have argued that evolving models of risk communication should
include a more active role for riskbearers. As Heath and O’Hair (2010) put it, "This logic
suggests that infrastructures within a society arise or are specifically created to discuss,
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challenge, and make decisions relevant to risk and crisis tolerance, mitigation, and
communication" (p. 7). Dunsby (2004) explicitly connects these processes to risk
management success by stating, "Typically, Americans are wary of investing their trust in
a group of experts; thus, for a method to have legitimacy, it must be supported by a
system of accountability that enables the public to judge the entrance of subjectivity or
bias into the process" (p. 285-286). Through such discourse, the field of risk
communication has changed substantially during the last three decades, transitioning
from a positivistic approach that privileged scientific knowledge to a more nuanced
approach that attempted to acknowledge non-scientific perspectives to a more recent
focus on dialogue and collaborative decision-making processes (Renn, 1992; Palenchar &
Heath, 2007).
Approaches to Risk Communication
Heath and O'Hair (2010) describe risk communication as an area in which
"science, policy, management philosophy and culture meet, collide, and reinforce one
another in what can be an unhappy confluence" (p. 7). To understand the challenges risk
communicators face in sorting through potential processes and outcomes, it is helpful to
begin by examining what each of these distinct perspectives brings to the field. From the
scientific perspective, for example, risk communication can be thought of as a problem of
research translation. Risk communication policy, in contrast, sees a challenge for dealing
directly with publics regarding technical hazards. Management studies might see risk
communication as benefitting from the application of stakeholder theory. Finally, the
recognition of culture's role in risk communication speaks to a need for participatory and
action-based approaches. Each of these perspectives points to different underlying
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assumptions about the ultimate goals of risk communication, ranging from
straightforward information dissemination to some level of bidirectionality to
partnership-building to citizen empowerment (Chess, Salomone, Hance, & Saville, 1995;
Heath & O'Hair, 2010).
Risk Communication as a Research Translation Challenge
One dominant perspective on risk communication relates directly to uncertainty
management. As Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) note, "[S]cientific uncertainty about
the likely occurrence and health/safety effects of a hazard can shape the risk perceptions
of key publics—from regulators to affected citizens" (p. 321). Thus, many risk managers
see risk communication primarily as a tool for providing risk-related information,
packaged in an appropriate manner, to specific audiences most affected by the risk,
reflecting a positivist-empiricist approach that relies on the transmission model of
communication (Boholm, 2009). Embedded largely within this perspective, the earliest
iterations of risk communication were rooted primarily in the need to provide affected
populations with relevant scientific information, often to allay fears. As Heath,
Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) note, "The more confident (or certain) individuals are that they
can predict and communicate about a risk, the more control they perceive they have over
the outcome" (p. 322). Armed with this information, some risk communicators inherently
see their work as a form of research translation.
At its base, research translation is defined as the timely and efficient transfer of
basic science research findings into improvements in public health outcomes (Cochrane
et al., 2007). Lomas (1993) views research translation as a three-step process
incorporating the diffusion of information through traditional means, the targeted
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dissemination of information from source to recipient, and the implementation of findings
by the recipient. In terms of risk communication, the media might be considered the
traditional means of communication, targeted dissemination might involve specific
riskbearing populations, and implementation of findings might be the consideration of
probabilistic hazard assessments in decision-making. Parrott (2008), however, asserts that
the mere application of research findings -- or, in our case, risk assessment data -- is not
sufficient for gauging success; rather that "the most important criterion is
whether…findings are implemented in ways that function as pathways to improve lives"
(p. 1).
For such improvements to occur, it is essential that agency personnel have access
to the most up-to-date information possible and that this information be transmitted by
sources that encourage the acceptance of probabalistic hazard assessments. Information
recipients are more likely to base decisions on findings if the recipients "speak with
innovators and with each other [and]…select ideas that they would like to try out"
(Berwick, 2003). Berwick further argues that individuals "learn about innovations best
from local and social interactions with early adopters, [thus] organizations that foster
such social exchanges may see faster dissemination of changes."
In a U.S. DOE risk communication primer produced by the Keystone Center
(2005), the scientific concerns of risk management are clearly paramount. In the
document, risk communication is described as involving "multiple messages related to
the types and levels of the risk, or to the concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk messages,
or to the legal or institutional arrangements for risk management" (p. 18).
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Horlick-Jones and Farre (2010) point out that a key challenge for the research
translation approach to risk communication is its embeddedness in "'deficit' thinking, the
idea that lay audiences would ‘behave sensibly’ if only they were in possession of the
technical facts"; despite numerous studies pointing to the contrary, this model "continues
to figure strongly in areas as diverse as health promotion, emergency planning, and
innovation associated with controversial technologies" (p. 132). The research translation
perspective is associated with additional challenges, as well, including low science
literacy and numeracy levels and the existence of competing data. As Heath, Bradshaw,
and Lee (2002) note, "Information requires interpretation to become knowledge" (p. 325);
in a similar vein, Heath and O’Hair (2010) warn against "data dumps that provide huge
amounts of information in ways that make it difficult to access" (p. 19). Further
complicating issues, a great deal of research indicates that information provided by
government agencies frequently is not trusted by citizen recipients (Fessenden-Raden,
Fitchen, & Heath, 1987; Frewer, Howard, Hedderley, & Shepherd, 1996; Kunreuther,
Easterling, Desvousges, & Slovic, 1990; McCallum, Hammond, & Covello, 1991; Slovic,
Flynn, & Layman, 1991; McComas, 2003; KRCEE, 2011). Thus, the mere provision of
information through standard research translation approaches will be inadequate for
addressing many risk-related situations.
Policy Approaches: Binaries in Risk Communication
According to Boholm (2009), the practice of risk communication "is usually
defined as the intentional transfer of information about the assessment, evaluation, and
management of risk, often integral to governmental steering and policy implementation"
(p. 337). However, as Heath and O'Hair (2010) point out, a policy perspective also
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recognizes that, in risk communication, "[f]acts blend with values and policy preferences"
(p. 18). Thus a second approach to risk communication builds upon the research
translation paradigm while explicitly recognizing that risk perceptions are not necessarily
tied to scientific facts.
Heath and Nathan (1990) note that "risk communication must be founded on
correct principles and political realities" (p. 15). Thus, the policy perspective
acknowledges that risk communication is problematized by public perceptions that
question expert credibility (Heath & O'Hair, 2010). Policy-oriented approaches,
therefore, implicitly situate persuasion as a valid form of risk management. As HorlickJones and Farre (2010) put it, whether specific activities reflect "top-down," "two-way,"
or "consultation and engagement" designs, the processes ultimately "seek to influence the
behaviour of target audiences and gather information useful for the organization" (p.
134).
As indicated in a U.S. DOE risk communication primer (Keystone Center, 2005),
one goal of this policy-oriented approach is increasing public trust of experts, since "with
community trust, tomorrow’s problems can be averted today" (p. 41). This utilitarian
motivation for bidirectional risk communication is clearly delineated in the
aforementioned USPHS risk communication study (Tinker, 1996), which acknowledges
that if "government agencies do not understand and deal effectively with public
perceptions of health risks, public alarm about the risks and hostility toward the agencies
increase" (p. 198). As Tinker (1996) argues, in such situations "agency credibility suffers
and the public becomes skeptical or indifferent to the information about health risks
provided by agency experts" (p.198).
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Many of the established best practices for risk communication, including Seven
Cardinal Rules, fall into this second bidirectional paradigm, which is founded in large
part upon the premise that risk is a function of technical hazard and community outrage
(Sandman, 1993; Covello & Sandman, 2001). This framework helps explain how
multiple risk vocabularies hinder risk-related sensemaking. Sandman (1993)
distinguishes between hazard and outrage as two very different sensemaking strategies.
The first privileges scientific and technical expertise, while the second relies more
heavily upon lived experiences. This divide can be exacerbated by contradictory
messages that lead to confusion among stakeholders about exactly whom to believe. Such
conflicts can make it difficult to achieve entente, or "a shared sense of reality" (Sellnow
et al., 2009, p. 10), through which disputes can be mediated. As Sandman (1993) puts it,
"[T]he overarching problem is that the public cares too little about the hazard, and the
experts care too little about the outrage" (p. 6).
In such situations, it becomes necessary to seek convergence, which Sellnow,
Ulmer, Seeger, and Littlefield (2009) define as "some degree of agreement" (p. 14).
According to Sellnow et al. (2009), such convergence should be "the primary objective in
risk communication" (p. 12). More than two decades ago, the National Research Council
(1989) attempted to bridge the divide between hazard and outrage by calling for a switch
from the dominant one-way model of risk communication to the development of dialogue
among disparate stakeholders.
When Sandman (1993) states that "[a]s long as the outrage goes unmanaged, the
public is unlikely to notice that the hazard is well-managed" (p. 7), he recognizes that
public concerns often are marginalized in the sensemaking processes of technical and

24

scientific experts. Likewise, Sandman’s call for technical and scientific experts "to listen
better, to hear that outrage is high and take action to reduce it" (p. 9) is a plea for greater
intersubjectivity in the process of defining, responding to, and learning from risk and
crisis situations.
While the hazard/outrage paradigm can be useful for helping individuals involved
in contentious situations understand that there are multiple perspectives regarding what
constitutes risk, linguists and semioticians have long pointed out that such binaries are
rooted in an immature view of cultural phenomena (Jackobson & Halle, 1986). As
Sasseure (1983) asserts, a perspective that assumes this type of either/or stance defines a
concept not by what it is, but by what it is not. In this case, risk perceptions that are not
rooted in hazard must be rooted in outrage.
Derrida (1976) elaborates further upon the nature of linguistic binary oppositions,
noting that the two terms are inherently linked as primary and secondary concepts. The
first term in the binary, depicted as dominant and normative, is privileged, while the
second term, depicted as other-than-the-norm, is marginalized. In this case, technical
hazard is normatized, while the more emotionally-rooted outrage is aberrant, effectively
defining community members' responses to risk-laden situations as less valid or
important than statistical risk assessment. Discussing such oppositions, Ellingson (2009)
notes that binaries ignore the universe of possible reactions that exist between the binary
terms, explaining that "when we limit possibilities to only two, one will inevitably be
valued over the other. It is not possible to view the world in terms of equal opposites; one
side is always already privileged" (p. 71). Clarke (2005) goes even further, stating that
"[f]ascism has many faces, and insisting upon binaries is one" (p. 21).
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The binary perspective promoted within the hazard/outrage model ignores that
multiple roles are played by individual stakeholders within risk-laden situations. A
technical expert might live near a contaminated site, be the spouse of a plant employee,
and/or serve on local civic boards. These multiple commitments problematize the
simplistic hazard/outrage categories. Simply drawing a figurative line and placing one
set of people on the hazard side and another set on the outrage side without recognizing
the subjective and mutable nature of the boundary itself -- not to mention the power
dynamics related to who draws the boundary in the first place -- is a distinct shortcoming
of the paradigm. However, as Ellingson (2009) points out, "Dichotomous thinking
remains the default mode of the academy" (p. 6).
Unfortunately, the language of Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication
codifies this division, positioning agency personnel distinctly on the side of hazard and
affected community members on the side of outrage. Although one aside in the Rules
makes mention of multiple "publics", for the most part the guidelines address a fairly
homogenous group, with the caveat that "[r]egardless of how well you communicate risk
information, some people will not be satisfied" (Covello & Allen, 1988). The power of
the binary is clear in this instance, as there is no corollary stating that, regardless of how
well a community member communicates her perspective about risk, some "experts" will
not be satisfied. Similarly, the statement that "[i]f people are sufficiently motivated, they
are quite capable of understanding complex risk information" (Covello & Allen, 1988)
lacks a balancing statement indicating that sufficiently-motivated scientists are quite
capable of understanding the complex value judgments that lead to community members
assessing risk through lenses other than statistical probability.
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By imbuing agency personnel with a binary view of relations before contact has
been made with specific communities, Seven Cardinal Rules and similar best practices
guides contribute to a distinct set of preconceptions about the ability of stakeholders to
understand and respond to hazard-related information. In addition, the Rules could be
perceived as inadvertently establishing an adversarial us/them mindset prior to agency
personnel entering the field. As Weick (1988) notes, an enactment perspective would
recognize that such processes create situations in which "action tends to confirm
preconceptions" (p. 307).
Applying Stakeholder Theory to Risk Communication
Organizational management studies offer yet another lens through which to view
risk communication. Specifically, stakeholder theory can help practitioners understand
both the informational and the process needs of riskbearing parties. As the last three
decades have seen stakeholders become an increasing focus for organizations, the
development of corporate social responsibility models (Carroll, 1979; Wartick &
Cochran, 1985; Clarkson, 1995), the creation of stakeholder theories (Donaldson &
Preston, 1995; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001), and the generation of focused methods for
identifying and classifying stakeholders (Ballejos & Montagna, 2008; Chung, Chen, &
Reid, 2009) have moved to the center of management studies. Shared by all of these
research areas is the importance of stakeholder satisfaction for achieving organizational
goals.
In practice, the maintenance of stakeholder relationships is a key issue for
management, whether corporate or governmental. As Preston (1995) argues, "It is the
responsibility of managers, and the management function, to select activities and direct
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resources to obtain benefits for stakeholders" (p. 85). However, situations requiring risk
communication flip this paradigm on its head; rather than maximizing stakeholder
benefit, agencies must attempt to minimize stakeholder harm. Thompson (2012) notes
that "to mention risk is to imply that people have reason to avoid or at least to be mindful
about the subject at hand... [therefore] they could have something to lose with regard to
the topic under discussion" (p. 637). Such topics can raise stakeholder concerns that cut
across public-private and corporate-nonprofit sectors, with the mediating role of
information transfer from organization to stakeholder at the crux of the relationship.
For an organization, successfully planning and executing information exchanges,
whether risk-related or not, first requires determining exactly who the organization's
stakeholders are. Many criteria for making this decision have been offered through the
years, primarily focusing on how stakeholders support organizational functioning.
Preston (1995) notes that one of the earliest characterizations was put forth in the 1960s
by the Stanford Research Institute, which identified stakeholders as "those groups
without whose support the organization would cease to exist" (p. 72). Preston (1995)
further refines this designation, noting that stakeholders have "legitimate interests in
procedural and/or substantive aspects of [organizational] activity" (p. 67). More recent
classification efforts have attempted to create stakeholder typologies. For example, while
Clarkson (1995) posits that stakeholders are "persons or groups that have, or claim,
ownership, rights, or interests in [an organization] and its activities, past, present, or
future" (p. 106), he distinguishes between primary stakeholders, whose role is essential to
organizational survival, and secondary stakeholders, who are not essential to

28

organizational survival but whose actions, nevertheless, can affect, or be affected by, the
organization.
Whether considered primary or secondary, stakeholders share a need for access to
accurate, timely, and relevant information, particularly in high-risk situations. Managers
therefore must make deliberate determinations about how to fulfill information needs. As
Johnson (1996) notes, information is "a strategic asset to organizations that should be
systematically incorporated in the planning of upper management" (p. 131). In today's
technology-driven world, it is easier than ever to make information available and widely
accessible via the internet (Lopes, 2008; Chung, Chen, & Reed, 2009); however, in
environmental risk situations, unidirectional dissemination only fulfills part of the
organization's responsibilities. As the Keystone Center (2005) notes in its risk
communication primer for the U.S. Department of Energy,
Those responsible for ensuring safety to the public face two key challenges. The
first is to communicate risks in a manner that acknowledges the emotional content
and provides information to assuage concerns. The second is to engage the public
so that they become effective partners in addressing and overcoming risks.
Communication and engagement are key elements of effective stakeholding. (p.
4)
Such a vision of governmental-stakeholder relations aligns with Quinn and Jones
(1995) work, which emphasizes the need for managers to be guided by "agent morality"
in their dealings with stakeholders, situating organizational goals within a framework of
moral principles. Within this paradigm, managers must constrain their actions in relation
to four ethical concerns. According to Quinn and Jones (1995), honoring agreements,
being truthful, avoiding harm, and respecting autonomy must supersede all other motives.
As Basu and Palazzo (2009) note, organizations rely upon three primary approaches to
addressing social concerns: stakeholder-driven, which examines the needs of external
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stakeholders; performance-driven, which looks to expectancy matching for evaluating the
effectiveness of specific actions; and motivation-driven, which evaluates the relative
roles of intrinsic and extrinsic factors in influencing stakeholder relations. These
disparate approaches are key for determining the level of direct organizational
engagement with stakeholder needs.
While many scholars and practitioners see effective management of stakeholder
relations as a function of social responsibility, others see more utilitarian imperatives.
Evan and Freeman (1996) assert that "[t]he very purpose of the [organization] is…to
serve as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholder interests" (p. 254). According to Davis
(1973), organizations must be perceived as responsible to be granted legitimacy. Thus, if
an organization is perceived as irresponsible in its management of the essential function
of coordinating stakeholder interests, legitimacy can be directly threatened and trust
subsequently damaged. Additionally, failure to meet expectations can lead the
organization to lose control of its external relationships (Swanson, 1995). These twin
issues of past responsibility and perceived legitimacy are among the most highly
contested subjects for risk communicators.
The extant stakeholder literature has important implications for describing how
organizations manage and should manage the sharing of risk-related information with
stakeholders. Of particular importance are the ways in which organizational identity
orientation influences perceptions of stakeholder legitimacy, promoting or constraining
an organization’s willingness to share information with its stakeholders. Further, the
ways that organizations approach corporate social responsibility directly affect their
potential for successfully matching stakeholder information needs. Given that meeting
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stakeholder expectations is key for both organizational legitimacy and success, it is
important to delineate explicitly the relationships between perceived stakeholder
information needs and organizational willingness to meet those information needs.
Johnson and Hoover (2013) have argued elsewhere for a coorientation approach
to matching stakeholder information needs. Coorientation models first arose within social
science to depict the ways in which mutual benefit affects psychological balance (Heider,
1946). Later, the field of public relations adapted coorientation approaches to help
understand organization-stakeholder interactions. When discussing the relationship
between stakeholder information needs and organizational willingness to meet those
needs, Johnson and Hoover (2013) identified four states: satisfaction, in which high
information needs are met by a strong organizational willingness to meet those needs;
apathy, in which low needs are balanced with a lack of enthusiasm for information
provision; inundation, in which stakeholders do not perceive strong needs for information
but the organization provides vast amounts; and adversarialism, in which stakeholders
desire information greatly but the organization is unwilling to provide it. All too often,
the history of risk communication – particularly at Superfund sites – has exemplified one
of the latter two imbalances.
Moving Toward a Participatory Perspective
Fischhoff (1995) has described the evolution of risk communication as a shift
from unidirectional and information-driven activities to something more akin to
partnership development. While marking a distinct improvement for stakeholder
relationships, it is possible that governmental risk communication efforts need to go one
step further, embracing even more collaborative approaches. As Fischhoff (1995) states,
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"effective risk communication can fulfill part of the social contract between those who
create risks (as a byproduct of other activities) and those who bear them (perhaps along
with the benefits of those activities)" (p. 144). To meet this challenge, it is increasingly
important for risk communicators to examine the potential contributions of participatory
approaches for the field.
Risk communication does not happen in a vacuum. Rather, as Boholm (2009)
points out, "Understandings of risks, like other experiential phenomena, are informed by
socially and culturally structured and historically conditioned conceptions and
evaluations of the world, what it is like, what it should or should not be like" (p. 340).
Unfortunately, information-centric approaches to risk communication can miss this key
point of social construction. As Heath and O'Hair (2010) note, "The problem [of risk
communication] results from the need to engage others, to bring discourse to bear on
shared subjectivity, the probative force of analysis of the objective and real, to give
effective voice to the concerns that arise from observed and perceived uncertainties" (p.
23). Similarly, Sellnow and colleagues (2009) state that multiple parties involved in the
risk discourse "can and should begin the debate by recognizing and respecting the
opinions of those who hold a different frame of reference" (p. 10).
The inclusion of both complementary and competing voices in risk-related
discussions reduces the opportunities for blind spots to develop. The addition of more
voices from multiple backgrounds increases the capacity for dealing with a risk-laden
situation. The myriad perspectives brought to the fore decrease the possibility of actors
becoming trapped in a single set of expectations. Thus, participatory approaches directly
address Weick’s (1988; 1995) identified constraints on sensemaking.
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To adopt a participatory approach to remedying challenges for risk
communication is to bring the stakeholders themselves explicitly to the center of
decision-making processes. As Heath and Nathan (1990) note, risk communication, at its
core, is about much more than information sharing; rather, communicating about risk
often involves "a rhetorical struggle by parties to decide what levels of risk and regulative
or legislative control are appropriate" (p. 17). The privileging of scientific expertise that
dominates the research translation and policy perspectives stands in stark contrast to the
work of Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson (2005), who have criticized "magical notions of
scientific objectivity" in environmental communication and who consequently have
advocated for non-dualistic approaches.
In other words, by promoting stand-alone research translation and hazard/outrage
approaches, governmental risk communication policies could inadvertently be deepening
relational divides and further damaging trust rather than bringing stakeholders together to
create mutually-acceptable solutions for complex risk-related challenges. As Palenchar
(2005) points out, "Well beyond any communication model that might adequately rest on
what has often been called sharing information, the sides -- and there are many -- engage
in a marketplace of opinion through advocacy" (p. 3). In practice, this conflict often plays
out in public meetings where, as Boholm (2009) points out, communication about risk
"evolves as one long debate between conflicting social constructions of the risk objects
and the values at stake" (p. 344). Explicitly recognizing the power dynamics at play,
participatory approaches mandate and operationalize stakeholder roles in jointly defining,
prioritizing, and solving situated, risk-related challenges.
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Given the central role of communication in such processes, a valuable starting
point for developing new models is participatory communication research, which
"emphasizes the building of trust and rapport among all parties, along with the
empowerment of individuals and communities, toward truly collaborative decisionmaking processes [and] outcomes that resonate with community values, culture and
perspectives about the future" (Anyaegbunam, Hoover, & Schwartz, 2010).
Rooted in action research, participatory communication evolved largely in the
international development realm and is built upon an iterative approach to social science
that includes both researchers and participant-subjects (Lewin, 1946). Although
development research in the mid-twentieth century began largely as an extractive process
in which researchers from outside a community developed research questions and
methods, took data away from the community, and analyzed those data elsewhere,
Lewin's (1946) concept of mutual action and reflection began making its way into
development practice by the mid-1970s. The earliest attempts toward more participatory
processes came with the advent of Rapid Rural Appraisal [RRA], which allowed the
gathering of non-survey data from a community; however, RRA still relied upon analysis
from outside the community (Brown et al, 2002). Development communication
continued to evolve through the creation of Participatory Rural Appraisal and
Participatory Learning and Action, both of which included community members in data
analysis but neither of which was specifically rooted in communication science.
Participatory Rural Communication Appraisal and Community-Based Participatory
Communication [CBPC] then emerged, moving communicative processes to the forefront
of community-based research (Beltran, 1993; Anyaegbunam, Mefalopulos, & Moetsabi,
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2004; Anyaegbunam, Hoover, & Schwartz, 2010; Ommani, 2011). These participatory
approaches have much to offer the field of risk communication.
As Palenchar (2005) notes, risk-related decisions involve "the engagement of
concerned and interested parties," a process he describes as "primarily communicative"
(p. 5). Fischoff (1995) further explains that while community members may not bring
scientific expertise to the table, they do "have some insight into where they go, how
deeply they breathe, what they eat and drink, how long they shower, when they wash
their hands, and so on" (p. 143). Such lived experience can be key for identifying
exposure pathways, possible solutions, and potential roadblocks for implementation.
Whereas risk communication efforts typically are oriented toward more
traditional goals of informing and persuading, participatory approaches utilize
communication as a dialogic process that can empower community members in decision
making. As Boholm (2009) notes, an important critique of information dissemination
models for risk communication lies in their treatment of context as a variable in, rather
than a constitutive element of, communication. One clear example of the context-asvariable perspective is included in a risk communication primer written for U.S. DOE
(Keystone Center, 2005), which states:
When planning the best way to communicate and engage the public, it is
important to not only identify problems by their level of complexity, but also to
understand the different lenses through which stakeholders view problems and
possible solutions. To expand on this distinction, a technical definition of risk
could be written as:
[Probability of a Hazard × Impact of the Hazard Occurring]
[but a] definition of perceived risk has additional factors to the technical
definition, and would look as follows:
[Technical Risk × Nature of the Hazard × Context of the Perceiver].
(p. 14)
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In contrast, participatory approaches emphasize context by foregrounding
community values that ultimately impact the prioritization of challenges and
identification of solutions. Thus, participatory communication not only allows but
encourages stakeholders to give voice to their perceptions of reality and, ultimately, to act
based on these realities (Dagron, 2001; Carey, 1989). In this way, participatory
communication is closely aligned with Community-Based Participatory Research
[CBPR], a methodology already recognized by both U.S. EPA and the National Institute
of Environmental Health Sciences as an important pathway for investigating
environmental health and environmental justice research questions (U.S. EPA, 2013).
CBPR has been described variously as: 1) "inquiry with the participation of those
affected by an issue for the purpose of education and for effecting change" (Green &
Mercer, 2001), 2) "an approach that incorporates formalized structures to ensure
community participation" (Wallerstein & Duran, 2010), and 3) a methodology that
"equitably involves all partners with a research topic of importance to the community
with the aim of combining knowledge and action for social change to improve
community health and eliminate disparities" (Kellogg Foundation, 2013). As such, CBPR
approaches have appealed in recent years specifically to agencies addressing localized,
contextually-driven environmental concerns.
This existing familiarity of governmental entities, and particularly U.S. EPA, with
CBPR is important for the application of participatory approaches to risk communication
problems. As discussed earlier, some within federal agencies continue to see risk
communication challenges as, essentially, gaps in scientific research translation. Often,
such perspectives stand in direct contrast to the views of individuals who would support
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multi-stakeholder participation in risk communication efforts and decision-making.
However, Wallerstein and Duran (2010) argue that community-based, participatory
approaches are key for addressing gaps in current research translation models.
Specifically, by engaging populations who are directly affected by research outcomes -or, in this case, by high-risk environments or situations -- agencies can: 1) improve
external validity and "fit" by engaging stakeholders in context-based adaptation; 2) bring
balance to power dynamics by creating space for "hybrid knowledge" that joins scientific
and cultural insights while also encouraging co-learning and joint decision-making; 3)
promote sustainability through capacity building; and 4) increase trust through the
creation and maintenance of formalized partnerships (Wallerstein & Duran, 2010). Each
of these translational benefits has clear implications for risk communication.
Participatory methodologies directly involve individuals who represent numerous
stakeholder groups. These participants join together for projects in which mutual
teaching and co-learning can occur. Participatory projects involve community members,
organizations, government officials, and researchers, all of whom work together to
develop and achieve mutual goals (Anyaegbunam, Mefalopulos, & Moetsabi, 2004). As
Anyaegbunam , Schwartz, and Hoover (2010) have noted, "Done properly, [participatory
communication] research benefits both community participants and government agencies
by creating bridges that allow all parties to gain knowledge and experience" (p. 4).With
its emphasis on the establishment or repair of trust and rapport among disparate
stakeholders, participatory communication is ideal for helping heal the contentious
legacies of environmental mismanagement by and inadequate or nonexistent risk
communication from potentially responsible parties.
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As Boholm (2009) asserts, "Today, it is often noted that [communicating about
risk] involves a melee of actors engaging as experts and laypeople, decision makers and
stakeholders, regulators and politicians, citizens and NGOs" (p. 336). Within this
sometimes cacophonous setting, participatory communication approaches address the call
of Sellnow and colleagues (2009), who believe that risk discourse should begin with
"both sides...recognizing and respecting the opinions of those who hold a different frame
of reference" (p. 10). As Anyaegbunam, Hoover, and Schwartz (2010) have noted
elsewhere, participatory approaches emphasize "the building of trust and rapport among
all parties, along with the empowerment of individuals and communities, toward truly
collaborative decision-making processes that achieve outcomes that resonate with
community values, culture, and perspectives about the future" (p. 4).
By helping communities become active decision-making partners in promoting
culturally-appropriate, value-matched solutions to shared challenges, participatory
approaches can help redress generations of power imbalances (Anyaegbunam,
Mefalopulos, & Moetsabi, 1999; Wallerstein & Duran, 2006). As Palenchar and Heath
(2007) assert, "Community residents who live near or work at potentially hazardous
manufacturing facilities are neither spurious nor false in their reasons and desires to be
safe and healthy; they are and should be sensitive to the fairness and equality of risk
distribution and the resulting environmental and aesthetic implications" (p. 121).
Incorporating participatory communication methods into risk communication models can
help bring balance to the field, offering an action-based alternative to what Heath and
Nathan (1990) call "the linear, paternalistic information model of risk communication"
(p. 17). The resulting shift toward inclusion and multiperspectivity directly addresses
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several communicative contexts that Boholm (2009) has identified as contributing to
polarization, including
the ontology of risk, that is, how the nature of risk is understood to be constituted
in the real world; an asymmetric distribution of power, where some agents have a
mandate to make decisions affecting others; and the practical rationality of the
actors, deriving from their motives for communicating, their intentions and plans
as embedded in practical life. (pp. 343-344)
Heath and Nathan (1990) argue that "[r]isk communicators must treat trust as a
multidimensional construct intimately linked with how much control an audience sees
itself being able to exert over sources of information and assessment" (p. 19). Alongside
trust-building, participatory endeavors provide opportunities for multiple stakeholders
with varying commitments to work together toward creating more appropriate and
targeted information for the broader groups that they represent. As Sellnow and Sellnow
put it, "The dialogue that is essential to risk communication provides a foundation for
understanding the needs, message preferences, levels of preparation, and overall response
potential of complex or diverse audiences" (p. 124). This is particularly true in Superfund
communities, which may have long histories of conflict among various parties. Gaetke,
Gaetke, and Bowen (2008) advise that in such situations, "[T]he content should reflect
the needs and interests of the affected parties at each site rather than imposing on these
parties our views of what they need to know" (p. 280).
The Politics of Superfund Sites
While risk communication is a challenging endeavor under the best of
circumstances, layers of complexity are added at the nation's Superfund sites. These
hazardous waste sites fall under the oversight of the US Environmental Protection
Agency's Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, which conducts investigations
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and has the authority to add sites with the most pressing needs to the National Priorities
List [NPL]. Clean-up and engagement at NPL sites are assigned to U.S. EPA personnel
from the appropriate regional office (U.S. EPA, 2013). Among Agency personnel who
might be asked to provide risk-related information and/or public participation activities
for NPL site stakeholders are Remedial Project Managers and Community Involvement
Coordinators.
In addition to U.S. EPA, other federal and state agencies also play important roles
at Superfund sites. For example, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry,
a branch of the Centers for Disease Control, "work[s] closely with local residents in
assessing community needs and concerns and then respond[ing] to those needs by
providing timely and accurate information" (Tinker, 1996, 2009). Such agencies as the
U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of Defense sometimes find themselves
listed as potentially responsible parties (PRP), tasked with cleaning up sites contaminated
through Cold War production of nuclear and other waste products (U.S. DOE, 2011). Yet
another federal agency that sometimes has a presence at Superfund sites is the National
Institutes of Health’s National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, which funds
through its Superfund Research Program numerous extramural university and industry
grants related to mitigating the health and environmental effects of contamination. State
environmental protection and waste management offices, as well as state public health
agencies, also actively develop projects at Superfund sites, at times even engaging in
legal battles with federal facilities PRPs (deSaillan, 2008).
Specific federal environmental laws require potentially responsible parties like
U.S. DOE to inform stakeholders about risks related to operations and waste (Palenchar,
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2008). As a result, U.S. DOE, U.S. EPA, and ATSDR frequently see their
communication initiatives overlapping, as U.S. DOE attempts to meet specific statutory
public information requirements at each of its Superfund cleanup sites. These
requirements derive largely from the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA), which contained within it the Emergency Planning and Community Rightto-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). EPCRA provided specific guidance for the
establishment of community advisory boards and local emergency planning bodies to
work with agencies on site-related issues (Palenchar, 2008; Heath & Palenchar, 2009).
Thus, federal agencies have been statutorily compelled to begin transitioning from
traditional communication practices based on either a unidirectional source-receiver
model (Shannon, 1948) or a nominally bidirectional model incorporating a feedback loop
(Weiner, 1948) toward more stakeholder-inclusive, dialogic approaches to risk
communication. The myriad governmental players, complicated legal framework, and,
numerous confusing or even conflicting messages make Superfund sites a particularly
difficult environment in which to engage in risk communication.
The Regulatory Framework for Superfund Site Risk Communication
To begin understanding the unusual challenges of communicating about risk at
Superfund sites, it first is necessary to untangle the knot of statutory roles and
obligations. Both the Superfund program and the Superfund National Priorities List were
established by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act [CERCLA] of 1980. This landmark piece of environmental legislation charged U.S.
EPA (2009) with oversight of
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[l]ong-term remedial response actions...that permanently and significantly reduce
the dangers associated with releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances
that are serious, but not immediately life threatening. (para. 2)
CERCLA -- along with numerous other federal, state, and local laws -- was
enacted partially in response to such high-profile environmental crises as Love Canal,
Three Mile Island, and Bhopal (Belke, 2000; Palenchar & Heath, 2007). According to
Gaetke, Gaetke, & Bowen (2008), "The legislation provided for the prohibition and
regulation of closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites, provided legal liability for
those who allowed releases of hazardous wastes, and created a trust fund to pay for
cleaning up waste sites when a responsible party could not be located" (p. 279). The
Superfund process established by CERCLA involves identification of a hazardous waste
site, followed by cycles of U.S. EPA investigation, hazard assessments, and public
comment. Sites that are deemed priorities after investigation are placed on the NPL (U.S.
EPA, 2010).
During the 1980s, additional environmental crises contribute to the growth of risk
communication as a field; however, the statutory impetus for improved federal and
industrial risk communication came with the enactment of the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act [SARA] of 1986. In part a response to the 1984 Union Carbide
tragedy in Bhopal, India (Shrivastava, 187), SARA contained within it the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 [EPCRA] (Heath, Bradshaw, &
Lee, 2002; Palenchar, 2005; Heath & O’Hair, 2010). Heath and O’Hair (2010) note that
this legislation helped "set the foundation for the concepts of community right to know
and risk democracy" (p. 7).
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As Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) note, "The community right-to-know
portion of the SARA Title III was a direct result of a public cry for control of the risks
associated with the chemical industry" (p. 319). Among SARA’s stipulations, U.S. EPA
received instruction to convene local emergency planning commissions and other citizens
advisory groups that were to serve as forums for dialogue among public stakeholders,
industry, and agencies. Unfortunately, Heath Bradshaw and Lee (2002) find that "much
of the power granted by the Act has been abdicated by its executors" leaving evidence
that these advisory groups "have a way to go in gaining the trust of local residents before
becoming an effective vehicle for two-way symmetrical or democratic risk
communication" (p. 319). As Heath and Nathan (1990) point out, SARA and EPCRA
were intended to take initial steps toward making average citizens "full partners" in
environmental risk management.
SARA was not the only piece of legislation to mandate public meetings or
advisory groups. As one risk communication primer created for U.S. DOE (Keystone
Center, 2005) explains, "government agencies are often required to conduct public
hearings by law, for example, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)" (p. 31). As McComas (2003) notes, the
public meetings promoted through these acts "manifest democratic notions of political
equality and popular sovereignty, referring to the equal right among citizens to exert
influence over political actions, as well as the belief that, since government derives its
authority from citizens, it must respond to the needs of its citizenry" (p. 164).
In practice, however, such meetings often have fallen short of the lofty
expectations. Describing a "typical" public meeting, McComas (2003) depicts a scene in
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which "an audience [is] seated before a panel of experts or officials in some sort of
meeting hall, auditorium, or municipal board room [where] a brief introduction precedes
a presentation, followed by questions or comments from the audience (although some
public meetings do not allow audiences to ask questions)" (p. 166). Such a structure
presents a highly asymmetrical power relationship. As a result, some researchers contend
that public meetings do not align with the democratic principles on which they are
premised and that they actually can damage relationships among those involved
(Heberlein, 1976; Checkoway, 1981; Kasperson, 1986; McComas, 2003). Despite the
inherent problematics, U.S. EPA alone has conducted thousands of public meetings since
the implementation of SARA and EPCRA (McComas, 2003).
Heath and Nathan (1990) assert that despite U.S. EPA’s efforts to position risk
communication as "a subdiscipline committed to open, responsible, informed, and
reasonable discussion of risks" the reality is that risk discussions take place "in an
intensely political atmosphere [where] risk messages blend technical health assessments,
personal and social consequences, and ethics" (p. 15). The subsequent evolution of
statutory risk communication is reflected in Fischhoff’s (1995) Developmental Strategies
of Risk Management, which depicts the development of risk communication through
eight guiding philosophies:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

All we have to do is get the numbers right
All we have to do is tell them the numbers
All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers
All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted similar risks
All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them
All we have to do is treat them nice
All we have to do is make them partners
All of the above
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While the first six of these philosophies have been implemented in risk
communication through the years, arguably the last two are still in the nascent stages of
their development, particularly as they relate to long-term risk communication activities
at the nation’s Superfund sites.
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Located in western Kentucky, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, or PGDP, is
the only operating uranium enrichment facility in the United States (Kaoutzanis, 2011).
Opened for operations in 1952, the plant initially produced fuel for the United States
Department of Defense for use both in military reactors and in the production of nuclear
weapons. In the 1960s, this mission expanded to include uranium enrichment for
electricity-generating commercial reactors, eventually transitioning fully to this function
(United States Enrichment Corporation [USEC], 2011). Owned and operated by the
United States Department of Energy until 1992, PGDP operations currently are leased to
the United States Enrichment Corporation, or USEC; however, U.S. DOE continues to
manage PGDP activities related to site clean-up, infrastructure, hazardous wastes, and
environmental restoration. The combined efforts of U.S. DOE and USEC currently
employ approximately 1200 individuals at the site (KRCEE, 2011).
The PGDP is located in McCracken County, Kentucky, approximately three miles
south of the Ohio River. The plant’s footprint covers 740 acres that are bounded by a
security fence. The fenced area is ringed by an uninhabited buffer zone of approximately
640 acres, which in turn is surrounded by a 2100-acre wildlife management area that U.S.
DOE leases to the Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife
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Management (U.S. EPA, 2011). Beyond the wildlife management area are residential,
business, and agricultural properties.
In 1988, U.S. DOE sampled private drinking wells on properties adjacent to the
plant and discovered traces of the radioactive isotope technetium-99, as well as the
industrial degreaser trichloroethylene. In addition, polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs,
have been found in surface water on U.S. DOE property, as well as downstream of the
facility in Big Bayou and Little Bayou Creeks, both of which run through the surrounding
West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area.
With an estimated 1,400 individuals obtaining drinking water from private wells
within four miles of the facility (U.S. EPA, 2011), U.S. DOE created a Water Policy to
provide municipal water to affected residents at the agency’s expense (U.S. EPA, 2009).
In 2006, the Paducah Sun newspaper (Walker, 2006) reported that "121 plantneighboring households and businesses…have received free municipal water from DOE
since 1994 because of an estimated 10 billion gallons of contaminated groundwater" (p.
1A).
In 1993, the PGDP was proposed for inclusion on the U.S. EPA Superfund
National Priorities List, or NPL (U.S. EPA, 2009). The PGDP was added to the list in
1994 following a period of investigation and public comment (U.S. EPA, 2009).
Consequently, U.S. EPA provides regulatory contamination oversight in partnership with
such state agencies as the Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet’s Department for
Environmental Protection and the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services’
Radiation Control Branch. The Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife also is
involved with PGDP activities due to its lease of the wildlife management area
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surrounding the plant. After almost two decades of clean-up activities, in 2009 U.S. DOE
reported to Congress that it expects remaining cleanup costs at the site to be between $9.5
and $16.4 billion (Paine, 2010).
In compliance with federal law and community right-to-know provisions, U.S.
DOE established a Citizens Advisory Board, or CAB, to "facilitate the flow of various
kinds of technical information from experts to community residents and to open channels
of commentary between them" (Heath & Palenchar, 2009, p. 316). The PGDP CAB
(2011) describes its mission as "provid[ing] informed recommendations on major issues
regarding environmental restoration, waste management, and related clean-up activities
to DOE." The CAB also asserts that "[t]he Board's membership is carefully considered to
reflect a diversity of viewpoints in the affected community and region [and is] composed
of people who are directly affected by DOE site clean-up activities" (PGDP CAB, 2010).
In reality, eleven of twelve 2009 CAB members held bachelor degrees, while half held
graduate degrees (PGDP CAB, 2009). In contrast, Kentucky’s Council on Postsecondary
Education (2007) reports that less than one-fifth of the population of McCracken County
has earned bachelor degrees, with almost 20% lacking even a high school diploma. This
disparity presents a potential site of dissension for CAB relations with the community at
large.
Numerous events since the PGDP’s inclusion on the NPL have affected public
perceptions of the site and, at times, have strained relationships among the many
stakeholders. The siting and contents of waste disposal, for example, have been points of
contention between U.S. DOE and the Kentucky Department for Environmental
Protection, with legal action threatened variously by each party, even as plant neighbors
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have filed suit to recoup lost property values (Short, 2002; de Saillan, 2008). As Gaetke,
Gaetke, and Bowen note, "People, who have suffered harm to their health, their life
expectancies, their property, and the very quality of their lives, are typically and
understandably interested in pursuing compensation for that harm from the parties who
are responsible" (p. 279).
In addition, several residents directly blame PGDP-generated contamination for
the illnesses and deaths of friends and family members; however, a community health
assessment conducted by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry did not
find conclusive support for these assertions, driving some in the community to question
the study’s veracity (KRCEE, 2006; KRCEE, 2011). With newer, more efficient
technologies emerging for uranium enrichment, the economic threat of plant closure also
has loomed over the region for more than a decade (KRCEE, 2011). Further, confusion
over a 2006 U.S. DOE-funded cost-benefit study to determine government expenditures
could be reduced by federal purchase of adjacent residential properties generated
confusion and anger in the community (KRCEE, 2006). More recently, a study of future
stakeholder visions for the site following plant closure identified high levels of
community distrust of U.S. DOE (KRCEE, 2011).
Today Paducah is a community of stakeholders simultaneously trying to make
sense of the environmental risks of continued plant operations and the economic risks of
plant closure (KRCEE, 2011). The PGDP’s NPL status statutorily mandates the
involvement of multiple federal- and state-level government agencies at the site, and both
health and environmental advocacy citizen groups have been active in site-related
matters. Stakeholders, therefore, have been the targets of numerous risk communication
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activities from multiple sources for nearly a quarter of a century, making Paducah a
strong case study for understanding the long-term dynamics of federal risk
communication policies at Superfund sites.
Posing the Problem
This study seeks to understand the impact of past and current U.S. DOE risk
communication practices on stakeholder relationships at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion
Plant National Priorities List Superfund site. Specifically, the study seeks to understand
the constraints that agency risk communication policies place upon enactment, including
the role that specific communicative practices could be playing in provoking or
sustaining adversarial relationships. Thus, I analyze written and spoken communication
from several quarters to address the following research questions:
RQ1: How does the enactment of accepted agency risk communication practices
affect relationships among stakeholders, specifically:
•

how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize
past and present agency risk communication practices, and

•

how do stakeholders (including federal agency personnel) characterize
each other in relation to these communicative practices?

RQ2: What are the related implications for improving agency risk communication
approaches?
Exploring these questions will improve our understanding of whether and how the
risk communication framework currently utilized by federal agencies working at
Superfund sites could be creating new or reifying existing divisions between government
entities and the community. After identifying the nature of the existing framework's
49

impact on relationships, I propose stakeholder-centered amendments to The Seven
Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication, presenting a new model for federal agency
interactions with riskbearing Superfund communities.
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Chapter Three: Methods
Epistemological Paradigm
Because this study seeks to reveal existing phenomena to improve communication
practice, it responds to calls for social science research that focuses on understanding
rather than prediction (Blumer, 1966). Specifically, this study uses intentional analysis,
which "focuses on a concrete experience itself and describes how that particular
experience has been constructed" (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 204). How have agency
personnel's and stakeholders' communicative structures "been synthesized to constitute"
specific meanings (p. 205), and what can we learn from that process that will help us
improve our in- and inter-group communicative abilities?
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant case, like so many in the environmental
risk/environmental health arena, does not present itself as an object of clear-cut risk,
health, media, interpersonal, or participatory boundaries. Rather, the community and its
challenges are lodged within a complex, interdisciplinary context that encompasses
communication, sociology, psychology, and high levels of scientific and policy-related
uncertainty. Therefore, this study is informed by theoretical perspectives that can
improve our understanding of complicated communicative phenomena without
constraining the pursuit of heuristically provocative theoretical avenues. For these
reasons, the study is built upon the complementary metatheoretical perspectives of
sensemaking and symbolic interactionism.
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Sensemaking in Risk Environments
Sensemaking is the process through which human beings interpret and derive
meaning from their lived experiences. Highly contextual in nature, sensemaking is tied
directly to role structures and social interaction. It exists in the sphere of perpetual
enactment and is rooted in the impacts that past experiences have on the
conceptualization of the possible.
According to Blumer (1966), sensemaking is an interactive, situated process
based on three primary tenets: 1) humans ascribe meaning to things and act on the basis
of these ascribed meanings; 2) these meanings emerge from social interactions among
individuals; and 3) individuals utilize an "interpretive process" to manage and modify
meanings (Blumer, 1969). Not only do individuals "take the cue for their identity from
the conduct of others" (Weick, 1995, p. 23), they also "create and maintain
intersubjectively binding normative structures that sustain and enrich their relationships"
(Weick, 2001, p. 106). Within these jointly-created and maintained structures, people
determine what constitutes risk, how to respond to crises, and what can be learned from
past experience. Such meaning-negotiation processes constitute the business of life.
In the course of human interaction, each individual assumes and enacts specific
roles. These roles are defined and interpreted by others, then reflected back at the actor in
an iterative process. The complexity of the process increases with the complexity of
situational factors. According to Blumer (1966),
In the flow of group life there are innumerable points at which the participants are
redefining each other's acts. Such redefinition is very common in adversary
relations, it is frequent in group discussion, and it is essentially intrinsic to dealing
with problems. (p. 538)
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Indeed, Nicholas and Hardy (2006) have found that communication is key for such issues
as role assignment and group membership status, both of which are highly salient in the
frequently conflict-riddled interactions of agency representatives and community
stakeholders.
As Blumer (1966) describes, role definition involves "conveying indications to
another person as to how he [sic] is to act," while interpretation is the process of
"ascertaining the meaning of the actions or remarks of the other person" (p. 537).
Meaning is developed not only through independent assessment of how one is or should
act, but also through reflection about how others perceive one is or should act. In his
analysis of sensemaking in crisis situations, Weick (1995) asserts that "sensemaking
begins with a self-conscious sensemaker" (p. 22) who regularly plays out prescribed roles
that help maintain structure.
When situations threaten roles, structure can disintegrate, leading to what Weick
(2001) calls a "cosmological episode" in which "people suddenly and deeply feel that the
universe is no longer a rational, orderly system" (p. 105). Bryant and Miron (2004) argue
that the complex negotiations of sensemaking "create…temporary relations that are in
constant flux despite the relative stability of the basic institutional framework that
governs social relations" (p. 679). Deterioration of relations can decrease the stability of
role frameworks, which can lead to loss of meaning, which can lead to further
deterioration of role frameworks and on and on.
These processes all occur through constant, day-to-day social interaction. As
Blumer (1966) writes,
human group life takes on the character of an ongoing process - a continuing
matter of fitting developing lines of conduct to one another…through the dual
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process of definition and interpretation… The participants in [human interaction]
have to build up their respective lines of conduct by constant interpretation of
each other's ongoing lines of action. (p. 538)
This process of interpretation contributes to the fluidity of meaning, which is then
supported or challenged through subsequent human action.
According to Weick (1995), people shape their environment, which then
constrains the very people who created that environment. This concept is known as
enactment, and it relies upon a two-step process. In the first step, preconceptions drive an
actor to devote selective attention to specific experiences, while the second step sees the
actor interpreting these experiences through the lens of the preconceptions that initially
drove her or his attention to that experience, thus reinforcing those existing beliefs
(Powers, 1972; Weick, 1988). This cycle creates an iterative enactment structure in
which, as Weick (1988) puts it, "action tends to confirm preconceptions" (p. 307).
Three mediating factors for enactment are capacity, commitment, and
expectations. Capacity constrains sensemaking through the number and diversity of
potential actors. According to Weick (1988), "[P]eople see those events they feel they
have the capacity to do something about" (p. 311). Individuals with a limited range of
experiences upon which to draw, therefore, can recognize and respond to only a limited
number of challenges. Thus, homogeneous groups that share the same set of experiences
necessarily have a smaller range of responses in their sensemaking repertoire. As Weick
states, "Accuracy in perception comes from an expanded response capacity" (p. 311). It
follows, then, that the involvement of more individuals with varied expertise broadens the
range of possibilities for sensemaking.
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Commitment, the second mediating factor, constrains enactment through the
formation of "blind spots" in the "tenacious justification" of particular positions. Weick
(1988) explains that "tenacious justification can produce selective attention, confident
action, and self-confirmation" (p. 310). Thus, the desire to see one’s self – and to be seen
by others – as correct determines how an individual experiences, interprets, and
rationalizes a given situation or set of circumstances. As Weick states, "Once a person
becomes committed to an action, and then builds an explanation that justifies that action,
the explanation tends to persist and become transformed into an assumption that is taken
for granted" (p. 310).
Finally, expectations constrain capacity through the creation of assumptions that
become "self-fulfilling prophecies" (Weick, 1988). As Weick (1988) explains, "People
who act in an organization often produce structures, constraints, and opportunities that
were not there before they took action" (p. 306). Assumptions drive interpretations,
which drive actions, which drive assumptions. For Weick (1988), "the crucial
assumptions focus on themes of competence, importance, and value" (p. 313). Clearly,
these themes are central to risk communication outcomes.
In addition to the three primary constraints on enactment, past experiences can
either enhance or hinder the perception of what is possible. When situations are familiar,
individuals have a repertoire of coping tools available to them; however, when situations
are entirely new or novel, responses become more problematic. Because it is "the feeling
of order, clarity, and rationality" that sensemaking seeks (Weick, 1995, 29), the process is
inherently backward-looking. As Weick (2001) puts it, "The basic idea of sensemaking is
that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and
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make retrospective sense of what occurs" (p. 106). Thus, meaning negotiations in the
present can be impacted greatly by the processes and outcomes of meaning negotiations
that took place in the past.
Symbolic Interactionism
Griffin (1991) notes that symbolic interactionism [SI] is more of a metatheoretical
perspective than a formal theory. SI relies upon sensemaking's interpretive approach to
understanding phenomena, taking as its basic unit of analysis the meaning-making
process between two or more individuals or meaning-making communities. Rather than
focusing upon a specific cognitive state or message content, SI focuses on these
constitutive interactions that (re)create meaning (Blumer, 1966). As Ellingson (2009)
puts it, "[M]eaning resides not in people or in data, but between them" (p. 56).
Since symbolic interactionism posits that meaning is constructed through all
human interaction, the metatheory provides a framework for both micro and macro level
research. Thus, boundaries are not prescribed but can be drawn and re-drawn to
accommodate specific studies. Given that the system state of environmental cleanup is
marked by high levels of scientific, political, and personal uncertainty, this fluidity of
boundaries is an important asset for examining the PGDP case.
Rather than generating hypotheses, symbolic interactionism lends itself to the
formulation of research questions. Essentially, an SI lens assumes that individuals
communicating about environmental and economic risk jointly construct the very reality
of that risk within their community. This study reveals the ways in which current federal
agency risk communication practices inform that process, with a specific focus on how
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different stakeholders perceive both each other and government communication
processes.
Butler-Kisber (2010) directly links symbolic interactionism to methodological
choices, noting that "the nature of interaction, the importance of context and the need to
understand interaction as a process rather than a product [has] forced researchers to turn
to qualitative approaches to…get rich and deep understandings of the particular" (p. 4).
As Blumer (1966) states, "Symbolic interactionism covers the full range of the generic
forms of human association...embrac[ing] equally well such relationships as cooperation,
conflict, domination, exploitation, consensus, disagreement, closely knit identification,
and indifferent concern for one another" (p. 67). All of these communicative situations
are evident in the Paducah case and can, I believe, be explicated clearly through a
symbolic interactionist position embedded within a qualitative research approach.
Research Design
To generate as rich a description as possible of the impacts of federal risk
communication practices within the Paducah community, I conducted textual analyses of
four extant datasets: 85 articles published in the local Paducah Sun newspaper during
calendar year 2005; public comments captured by the Kentucky Research Consortium for
Energy and the Environment [KRCEE] during a 2007 Property Acquisition Study that
analyzed potential purchase of private land in the Water Policy District; focus group
transcripts from the KRCEE’s 2008-2011 PGDP Stakeholder Future Vision Study, which
worked with local constituencies to help identify publicly acceptable uses for the site
following the plant’s permanent closure; and a total of nine blogs written by a local
stakeholder and environmental activist during the KRCEE Future Vision Study. As
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Fursich notes (2009), textual analysis is "a type of qualitative analysis that...focuses on
the underlying ideological and cultural assumptions of the text...to discern latent
meaning...and implicit patterns, assumptions, and omissions..." (p. 240). The use of
textual analysis involves a three-step process: 1) identification of elements, 2)
construction of provisional categories, and 3) meaning deconstruction through the
identification of cultural biases at play (Stern, 1996). By conducting textual analysis of
each dataset, I first broke the texts into their constituent pieces, identified and categorized
emergent themes related to these pieces, and subsequently evaluated the ways in which
these elements inform the broader discourse. Specifically, data were analyzed using
constant comparative analysis (Strauss, 1987) and narrative inquiry (Butler-Kisber,
2010). These complementary analyses were synthesized using an approach known as
crystallization (Ellingson, 2009). Extensive descriptions of these analytic techniques
follow.
Constant Comparative Analysis
To conduct the data analysis itself, I implemented constant comparative methods
(Strauss, 1987). Butler-Kisber (2010) describes constant comparative analysis as "a
thematic form of qualitative work that uses categorizing, or the comparing and
contrasting of units and categories of field texts, to produce conceptual understandings of
experiences and/or phenomena that are ultimately constructed into large themes" (p. 47).
Constant comparative analysis is iterative, involving cycles of data coding, the inductive
creation and revision of categories, the repeated comparison of data to extant literature to
initial conclusions and back to the data, the collection and categorization of additional
data as needed, and the restructuring of categories and conclusions as warranted (Strauss
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& Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2000; Ellingson, 2009). Ellingson (2009) describes constant
comparative analysis as an approach "using theory to explain and contextualize findings
rather than using findings to test the theory" (p. 55); however, she also notes that
"[p]atterns help us to digest information, and as long as we do not labor under the illusion
that a set of patterns constitutes a singular, valid reality, we benefit from systematic
overview of phenomena" (p. 59). Such an approach is particularly suited to this study,
given the need to compare findings and conclusions both within and across datasets to
recognize the broader communicative phenomena influencing -- and being influenced by
– the risk communication situation. As Clarke (2005) notes, when informed by a
symbolic interactionist metatheoretical lens, this type of methodological approach
increases "the capacity for critical analysis...through open coding such that actions,
situated perspectives, symbolism(s), and the heterogeneity of discursive positions and
their relations can be discerned and creatively grasped" (p. 8).
Ellingson (2009) delineates key assets of constant comparative methods when she
notes that "[s]ystematic inductive analysis…lends itself to traditional research report
forms that facilitate documentation of patterns through literature reviews, explanation of
method, careful explication of themes or categories buttressed with data examples, and a
discussion of theoretical and practical implications of analyses" (p. 57). Because of the
systematic nature of the analytic approach, Ellingson (2009) cites constant comparative
methods as "a way to introduce qualitative research in disciplines characterized by
statistical research" (p. 59). This connection is particularly important to make in risk
communication, which involves numerous participants from such fields as engineering
and toxicology. As Ellingson (2009) notes, the potential for convergence between these
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contrasting scientific perspectives exists in part because the use of constant comparative
analysis "enables researchers to articulate concrete arguments, to make claims and
support them with data and with connections to relevant research literature" (p. 60).
Although constant comparative analysis is, perhaps, one of the more accessible
qualitative methods for quantitative scientists, Clarke (2005) argues that conducting such
analyses within a symbolic interactionist framework is inherently a deconstructive act,
since "[o]pen coding connotes just that -- data are open to multiple simultaneous
readings/codes [and] there is no one right reading"; instead, he notes, "[a]ll readings are
temporary, partial, provisional, and perspectival -- themselves situated historically and
geographically" (p. 8). As Ellingson puts it, "[M]eanings of words are not fixed or
predetermined, nor can they be assumed to be equivalent among people" (p. 32).
Constant comparative analysis therefore implicitly recognizes the situatedness and
partiality of the researcher. Rather than seeking to identify a single truth that exists on its
own, this type of analysis attempts to produce what Clarke (2005) calls "distinctive
analytic understandings, interpretations, and representations of particular social
phenomenon" (pp. 8-9). This perspective can be reinforced by "acknowledging the
embodiment and situatedness of knowledge producers" (p. 20), thus embracing the
process’s inherent postmodern leanings. As Ellingson (2009) points out, such "social
constructionist and postmodern frameworks go a long way toward opening up [such
analyses] to be combined with other forms of analysis and representation, because they
highlight the partiality and culturally specific nature of all knowledge" (p. 56).
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Narrative Inquiry
In addition to the more common social scientific methodological approach
provided by constant comparative analysis, I also employed the arts-informed method of
narrative inquiry. Chase (2005) describes narrative inquiry as "an amalgam of
interdisciplinary analytic lenses, diverse disciplinary approaches, and both traditional and
innovative methods [that revolve] around an interest in biographical particulars as
narrated by the ones who live them" (p. 651). According to Butler-Kisber (2010),
narrative inquiry "is ongoing, iterative, and fluid in an inward and outward motion from
the first day in the field...transcribing field notes and interviews into field texts to
construct a ‘chronicled account’ of what is taking place." (p. 69). A narrative approach
thus allows researchers to analyze how accounts are constructed (Riessman & Speedy,
2007).
Having spent more than four years working on matters related to the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant, I have generated a wide array of personal notes, field notes,
analytic memos, and written and recorded reflections regarding my site-related thoughts
and experiences. The extensive materials and datasets I have collected throughout this
study provide the data for the study's narrative segments, informing both the form and
content of the analyses. As Butler-Kisber (2010) describes it, "[Narrative inquiry] has
become a hallmark of qualitative inquiry and a basis for how researchers shape their
studies, carry out the work, and represent it" (p. 79). Ellingson captures the process by
stating that "[n]arratives enable qualitative researchers to show rather than tell, and such
narratives enhance a number of different formats" (p. 65). Put slightly differently,
narratives provide a space for feeling in addition to thinking (Frank, 1995).
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According to Butler-Kisber (2010), "Narrative inquirers who live the story with
their participants are interested in improving individual and social conditions" (p. 66).
My desire to improve risk communication practice in Superfund communities contributed
directly to my selection of narrative inquiry for this study. A specific episode of
miscommunication that occurred while I was in the field particularly lends itself to
narrative analysis and, as such, provided a complementary lens through which to view
communicative phenomena at the site. Because the incident occurred during a focus
group and subsequently was the topic of numerous blogs by one of the focus group
participants, this incident spans two of the four datasets and is integral to my construction
of the Paducah case.
Palenchar and Heath (2007) note that "[p]eople think and act in terms of
narratives, providing form and content to connect and give meaning to events" (p. 126).
Contrasting blogs and field notes provide important data for understanding how
individuals differentially construct the same event. These varying constructions provide
important clues for how enactment is constrained for different individuals who might be
present at the same place and time but who interpret a situation very differently.
Because I was a participant in the events, my narrative analysis necessarily
contains an element of autoethnography through which I provide context and, as Ellis and
Bochner (2000) put it, "make [my] own experience a topic of investigation in its own
right" (p. 733). As Palenchar and Heath (2007) argue, "In the marketplace of ideas there
are many different stories interpreting any one event [and] the acceptance of one
narrative or interpretation leads to the elimination or muting of the alternatives" (p. 126).
Using my own extensive field notes as a reference, I compare and contrast the narrative
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that I constructed with the blog narrative, examining how each consequently mutes the
other’s perspective. As Ellingson (2009) recognizes, "the lines between narrative
ethnography and autoethnography shift continually" with a focus on "social roles and
interactions that imply relationships between the author and others" (p. 12). By exercising
this form of narrative inquiry in this study, I acknowledge both the constructedness of my
analyses and the situatedness of my interpretation of events.
Crystallization
The implementation of these different but complementary analytic approaches
contributes to a mixed-methods strategy based in Ellingson's (2009) assertion that
researchers need to "maximize the benefits of contrasting approaches...while also being
self-referential to their partiality" (p. 10). To bring together the constant comparative and
narrative analytic tools, I employed a methodological framework known as crystallization
(Ellingson, 2009), which
combines multiple forms of analysis and multiple genres of representation into a
coherent text...building a rich and openly partial account of a phenomenon that
problematizes its own construction, highlights researchers' vulnerabilities and
positionality, makes claims about socially constructed meanings, and reveals the
indeterminacy of knowledge claims even as it makes them. (p. 4)
Thus, crystallization is closely related to situational analysis, which Clarke (2005)
describes as utilizing
alternative approaches to both data gathering and analysis/interpretation
[promoting] the analysis of extant narrative, visual, and historical discourse
materials. [to enhance] capacities to do incisive studies of differences of
perspective, of highly complex situations of action and positionality, of the
heterogeneous discourses in which we are all constantly awash, and of the
situated knowledges of life itself thereby produced. (p. xxii-xxiii)
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Crystallization relies primarily on a middle-ground approach outlined in
Ellingson’s (2009) qualitative continuum, with goals of "troubl[ing] the taken-forgranted" and "generat[ing] pragmatic implications for practitioners" (p. 8). This middleground approach generates questions related to how participants understand and coconstruct their world; implements a case study method that includes interviews, focus
groups, and thematic analysis; acknowledges that the investigator’s positionality actively
informs the findings; and grounds studies in social constructionist and postpositivist
vocabularies. However, this middle-ground approach is greatly informed by such
impressionistic questions as what other ways can be imagined and what is unique about
an individual’s experience, as well as by applying autoethnographic methods,
incorporating personal reflections into the text, and situating the researcher’s experience
as an equally valid focus as that of other participants (pp 8-9).
Richardson (2000) describes crystallization as providing "a deepened, complex,
thoroughly partial understanding of the topic" and goes on to state that we "know more
and doubt what we know [but] we know there is always more to know" (p. 934). Such a
perspective aligns well with Clarke’s (2005) argument for research methods "to be recast
in ways that allow the explicit acknowledgement and incorporation of the complexities of
situatedness, variation, and difference(s) rather than promoting their erasure through
various assimilations or hopes for transcendence through shared education or shared
beliefs" (p. xxx). As Ellingson (2009) notes, "Crystallization does not depart radically
from other recent developments in the wide field of qualitative methodology, but rather
offers one valuable way of thinking through the links between grounded theory (and
other systematic analyses) and creative genres of representations" (p. 5).
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Whereas the more traditional social scientific methodological approach of
triangulation rests upon the premise that an independent truth exists that can be revealed
and corroborated by employing multiple research methods, crystallization recognizes
truth as contingent and situated, describing phenomena through the metaphor of a manyfaceted crystal that can never be viewed simultaneously from all angles. As Ellingson
(2009) puts it, "Unlike triangulation, crystallization is informed by postmodernism,
meaning that it presupposes that no truth exists 'out there' to discover or get close to, but
only multiple and partial truths that researchers (and others) co-construct" (p. 22).
Crystallization, therefore, permits researchers to use multiple methods to reveal multiple
truths that help elucidate complex phenomena with the realization that all possible truths
will not be captured by a single situated researcher, thus meeting Clarke’s (2005) call for
"methods…that go beyond 'the knowing subject' as centered knower and decision maker
to also address and analyze salient discourses within the situation of inquiry" (xxix-xxx).
Ellingson (2009) delineates the principles for conducting crystallization, which
include:
•
•
•
•

Offer deep, thickly described, complexly rendered interpretations
Represent ways of producing knowledge across multiple points of the
qualitative continuum
Utilize more than one genre of writing and/or other medium
Eschew positivist claims to objectivity…embracing knowledge as situated,
partial, constructed, multiple, embodied, and enmeshed in power relations (pp.
10-11)

This crystallized approach, coupled with a theoretical grounding in sensemaking
and symbolic interactionism, allows me to use both emic and etic analyses (Lindlof &
Taylor, 2002). As facilitator of the focus groups that comprise one of the four datasets
and as the sometimes-subject of blogs that comprise a second dataset, I bring to this study
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the emic perspective of a participant-observer. I am able to explore this perspective
through narrative vignettes woven around excerpts from field notes and blogs, allowing
me to present my lived experience as an outside communicator in a risk-laden
community, using narrative inquiry to better understand both my own experience and
how a community member perceived my role as Other within his community. As a
researcher, I also bring five years of engagement with Paducah stakeholder groups, a
theoretically-informed analytic lens, and training in the conduct of qualitative data
analysis to this project. These abilities contribute to more traditional grounded analyses
of study data, which work in tandem with the narratives to provide a rich, multi-faceted
picture of communication-related phenomena at the site.
Ellingson (2009) asserts that "[c]rystallization provides one mode
for…reveal[ing] knowledge as fragmentary, contingent, and irreducibly complex" ( p.
30). By contrasting the voice of social science researcher that dominates constant
comparative data analysis with narrative vignettes that reinforce my own positionality, I
remind both the reader and myself that my perspective, although informed by
communication study and practice, is still but one view among many.
Data Collection
Selection and Sampling
This study incorporates four extant datasets: 1) Paducah Sun newspaper coverage
of topics related to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant published during Calendar Year
2005; 2) written and verbal public comments from a 2006 U.S. DOE-funded economic
study of property surrounding the plant; 3) transcripts from focus groups related to the
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U.S. DOE-funded PGDP Stakeholder Future Vision study; and 4) subsequent blog entries
by a local activist regarding the Stakeholder Future Vision study.
Each of these datasets was collected during a three-year U.S. Department of
Energy-funded project designed to assist the greater Paducah community in determining
acceptable and unacceptable future uses for the PGDP environs following the plant’s
eventual closure and decommissioning. Upon learning in early 2008 that I would be
involved as a co-investigator in the Future Vision study, I began gathering background
materials to improve my own understanding of community perspectives about the site. I
subsequently conducted two degree-related studies: 1) a media content analysis of
previous local newspaper coverage and 2) an evaluation of the sensemaking processes
evident in public comments made during a previously-conducted U.S. DOE-funded
study. In addition to these two datasets, this study incorporates as a third dataset focus
transcripts gathered during the Stakeholder Future Vision Study itself. Finally, the fourth
dataset consists of blogs written about the Stakeholder Future Vision Study by a local
stakeholder and environmental activist. Taken in combination, these datasets present a
multiplicity of perspectives about the PGDP, spanning a period of six years. Specific
data collection practices and their rationale for incorporation follow.
Paducah Sun Newspaper Coverage, 2005
The news media plays a complex part in the social construction of individual and
community risk perceptions related to environmental health concerns. Although media
outlets play an explicit role as providers of risk information (McCallum, Hammond, &
Covello, 1991), coverage tends to privilege human interest above detailed analyses of
public health issues (Spencer & Triche, 1994; Ader, 1995). Whether dramatizing stories
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for maximum emotional impact (Kasperson et al., 2000), providing forums in which the
credibility of technical hazard experts is questioned (Mazur, 1981), or relying upon
inaccurate sources (Beckett, 1995), media can amplify risk perceptions within a
community. Journalists' tendency to frame messages on the bases of their own personal
beliefs and commitments further problematizes the media's role in risk construction
(Wakefield & Elliott, 2003). Thus, specific media outlets -- and even specific journalists - can play a complex but pivotal part in the ways in which communities think about
specific environmental and health risks.
Exposure to local media coverage of relevant issues influences both social
interactions and resulting community sensemaking processes. As Blumer (1966)
describes, role definition involves "conveying indications to another person as to how he
is to act," while interpretation is the act of "ascertaining the meaning of the actions or
remarks of the other person" (p. 537). Meaning is developed not only through
independent assessment of how one is or should act, but also through reflection about
how others perceive one is or should act. The media thus can be quite influential by
presenting specific viewpoints of how individuals should react to PGDP issues.
In terms of sensemaking, media coverage can greatly affect individual definitions,
role assignments, and interpretations. To describe this phenomenon, Semmler (2007) has
created a theory of parasocial symbolic interactionism, which examines the ways in
which symbolic interactionist processes and media cultivation inform each other.
According to this theory, individuals extend their own consciousness into the
consciousness of others as presented through media, thus impacting beliefs about norms.
As Semmler (2007) puts it, "The parasocial symbolic explanation of cultivation proposes
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that [media extend consumers'] common sense, understood as one’s taken for granted
assumptions about what is right and what is wrong" (pp. 3-4). Weick (2001) states that
"[t]he basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that
emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs" (p.
106). Thus, meaning negotiations in the present can be impacted greatly by the processes
and outcomes of meaning negotiations that took place in the past, including those that
were presented by the media.
This study analyzes the local newspaper’s contributions to community
sensemaking about the PGDP. Because local newspapers must selectively determine
what topics to cover and how to cover them (Wakefield & Elliott, 2003), specific stories
contribute to the larger community-constructed narrative about the PGDP. As Bakhtin
(1981) puts it, communities are engaged in a "living discourse" (p. 259), which is
heterogeneous, dynamic, and cumulative. In this study, I analyze articles from the
Paducah Sun, the local newspaper of record with a circulation of approximately 25,000,
to determine how PGDP communication efforts are presented by the media, as well as
how stakeholders publicly characterize those communication efforts and each other.
I selected calendar year 2005 as a rich period for analysis due to the occurrence of
several "newsworthy" events that year, many of which required agency-driven public
information exchanges. These events included: 1) the transfer of sick worker health
benefits administration from U.S. DOE to the US Department of Labor, 2) the public
release of a federal report on employee radiation exposure at the plant; 3) negotiation of
new environmental cleanup subcontracts; and 4) Department of Homeland Security drills
at the plant. In searching for 2005 Paducah Sun coverage of the PGDP, I carefully
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examined 364 editions. [The December 13th issue was unavailable through the
University of Kentucky Library archives and therefore was not included in the study.]
Eighty-five articles related to the PGDP were identified and analyzed.
Property Study Public Comments
In 2006, U.S. DOE distributed to the PGDP Citizens Advisory Board, community
stakeholders, and federal and state regulatory agencies a proposed "statement of work"
describing a potential property acquisition study for the PGDP. According to the
statement (U.S. DOE, 2006), the study would "evaluate a range of remedial alternatives,
their impact on protection of public health and the environment, and their cost of
implementation relative to the purchase of properties impacted or potentially impacted by
contamination from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant" (p. 1). The statement of work
further indicated that the study would be conducted in compliance with a dictate from the
Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill, 2006, mandating that U.S. DOE
evaluate whether the potential purchase of property or easements of land near the plant
would be in taxpayers’ best interest. The dissemination of the statement of work was
followed by media coverage (Walker, 2006a; Carroll, 2006; Walker, 2006b), multiple
U.S. DOE project presentations to both the PGDP Citizens Advisory Board and the
general public, and the solicitation of public comments for the record (U.S. DOE, 2007).
Ultimately, the property study itself was carried out through the auspices of the Kentucky
Research Consortium for Energy and the Environment at the University of Kentucky.
This study employs etic analysis (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) of the public
documents generated during the eighteen months of this property acquisition study. The
dataset, much of which was included in the final property report appendices, includes the
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content of study-related mailings and presentations made by U.S. DOE, media coverage
of the study process, public comments drawn from meeting transcripts, and letters,
emails, and other communications exchanged by stakeholders. These data provide
multiple perspectives about the relationships between the agency and its stakeholders, as
well as perspectives about federal communication efforts related to the site.
Focus Groups
Following the conclusion of the property study, the Kentucky Research
Consortium for Energy and the Environment was again tasked with supporting a U.S.
DOE effort that required broad-based engagement activities. The Stakeholder Future
Vision Study, as it came to be known, attempted to identify community values and
preferences related to the final disposition of the PGDP site following the plant's
anticipated closure [KRCEE, 2011]. To achieve this goal, the KRCEE project team
developed a unique methodology that integrated qualitative approaches derived from
Community-Based Participatory Communication with quantitative approaches from the
field of Structured Public Involvement. What ultimately emerged was a four-step process
that involved: 1) iterative stakeholder interviews; 2) stakeholder-specific focus groups; 3)
interactive public information sessions; and 4) large-scale community meetings (KRCEE,
2011).
In this study, I analyze transcripts from Stage Two, the stakeholder-specific focus
groups. Butler-Kisber (2010) points out that "in dialogic exchanges, having verbatim text
is invaluable" (p. 30). This study incorporates such verbatim text from each of eight focus
group sessions that brought together individuals with similar commitments and
perspectives to discuss PGDP-related issues. The eight focus groups were: PGDP/USEC
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Employees; U.S. DOE Employees/Subcontractors; Water Policy District Residents;
Ballard County Citizens; Environmental and Health Advocates; Economic
Development/Local Government; Wildlife/Recreation Enthusiasts/Tourism; and
Healthcare Professionals/Educators.
The IRB-approved focus group protocol [#10-0086-P4S] (see Appendix A)
attempted to elicit community values, perceptions about the plant's future, and
information gaps related to the site’s future disposition. During the course of these
discussions, conversations often turned to stakeholder perceptions of other stakeholder
groups, as well as to their evaluations of U.S. DOE's past risk communication efforts and
overall trustworthiness. Given the diversity of stakeholder groups involved, these
transcripts provide an incredibly rich dataset for analysis.
Blogs
During the Stakeholder Future Vision focus group session with environmental and
health activists, the protocol went awry, with one participant strongly objecting to a
particular visual discussion trigger. This trigger was one of twelve computer-generated
images depicting hypothetical future scenarios for the site. In this instance, the
visualization portrayed a nuclear power plant on the current PGDP site. Attempts to
clarify the image's role as a discussion trigger rather than a proposal were unsuccessful.
Over the course of the two-and-a-half hour session, relations between the participant, the
research team, and other stakeholders taking part in the meeting became increasingly
strained, eventually devolving to the point that police were nearly called to the scene.
Following that session, there was a great deal of communication traffic between the
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participant and the University of Kentucky's legal department regarding demands for the
release of both research materials and the names of other research participants.
The dissatisfied participant regularly writes a blog about local and national
political and environmental issues. He has used this blog as a forum to write extensively
about his perception of the events that transpired that evening. A total of nine blogs to
date have addressed the specific focus group session and/or the project for which the
focus group was created. These blogs provide a wealth of information regarding how the
participant made sense of the research team, the project, and the focus group itself
through the lens of his past interactions with U.S. DOE and its contractors. This dataset
provides an additional perspective on the broader communicative issues related to the
PGDP.
Data Analysis
The analyses of media coverage, transcripts, and blogs began with an iterative
coding process using QSR NVivo 8 qualitative data analysis software. During early
analytic stages, I engaged in individual provisional coding (Saldana, 2009) of each
dataset, identifying first broad topic categories. During secondary coding, I identified
occurrences of sensemaking constructs. In third cycle coding, I examined emergent
within-dataset patterns, grouping related codes into broader categories and examining the
relationships among them. By crystallizing this traditional qualitative analytic approach
with narrative inquiry into my field experiences, I explicitly foregrounded the
situatedness of both my initial interpretations and my subsequent analyses. I then created
a detailed, yet necessarily incomplete, understanding of risk-related communicative
phenomena in Paducah.
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During final stages of data analysis, I explored the datasets as an aggregated set,
identifying where similar themes have emerged across channels and stakeholders and
noting differences that appear. As my understandings of PGDP communicative
phenomena have deepened, I have shared preliminary findings with key Superfund
stakeholders to determine whether my explanations resonated. Among the stakeholders
who have provided feedback on this study are federal and state agency personnel,
community organizers, and members of the community-based pilot stakeholder group
who consulted with the PGDP Stakeholder Future Vision Project research team on
protocol development. While these member checks have provided additional insights into
my conclusions, forcing me to question my assumptions and contributing new
perspectives to the analysis, they have not been used as validity checks in the traditional
sense. Rather, the crystallization framework has encouraged me to embrace the fact that
different stakeholders with different commitments hold different opinions about study
findings. Instead of pointing to a central and indisputable truth, stakeholder responses
have assisted me both in providing thicker analyses and in acknowledging additional
perspectives as they have emerged. The crystallized study findings subsequently have
informed the creation of the convergence-building, community-based model for
governmental risk communication activities described in the final chapter of this
dissertation.
Coding
The development of the codebook closely reflects Butler-Kisber’s (2010)
description of the transition from etic, literature-driven codes to emic, content-driven
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codes. As Butler-Kisber (2010) notes, the first analytic phase of qualitative research
involves
close readings and rereadings…playing with some broad categories in which
different portions of the field texts can be placed, at least temporarily [including]
assigning names to these categories and working back and forth across the
categories expanding and contracting them as the analysis proceeds. (pp. 30-31)
To this end, I read through newspaper articles, written records, transcripts, and blogs
multiple times, both prior to and after entering the data into NVIVO software files for
analyses. Using a grounded theory approach, I then engaged in open coding of data units,
identifying key concepts that appeared within the written data (Strauss, 1987; Lindlof &
Taylor, 2002). I subsequently created a first cycle codebook centered around three themes
that emerged across all the datasets: communication, othering, and U.S. DOE. I created
definitional criteria for placement of data units within each category, as reflected in Table
3.1, and entered this into the project codebook.
Table 3.1. First-Cycle Coding.

Code

Criteria

Communication
Othering

Discusses specific activities or materials related to
agency-provided information and/or public involvement
Instances of us/them binaries

U.S. DOE

Specific mentions of the agency or its activities

After identifying these broad topic areas, I then conducted a secondary analysis of
the data, looking explicitly for constructs previously identified as tied to enactment in the
sensemaking literature. I created codes and criteria for data related to capacity,
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commitment, and expectations. I then added this information, as seen in Table 3.2, to the
codebook.
Table 3.2. Second-Cycle Coding: Enactment

Code

Criteria

Capacity: Number of Actors

Discussion of number of people involved in plant-related
activities and/or decisions
Discussion of homogeneity or heterogeneity of individuals
involved in various plant-related activities and/or
decisions
Language indicating an inability to see alternate
perspectives
Language indicating an unwillingness to consider
alternative explanations
Discussion of who does (or is perceived to do) what
within plant-related activities or decisions

Capacity: Diversity of
Actors
Commitment: Blind Spots
Commitment: Tenacious
Justifications
Expectations: Roles

Finally, I conducted thematic analyses and axial coding, a process of identifying
"connections between categories" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 220) and integrating the
categories into broader themes that run both within and across the datasets. As ButlerKisber notes, an important goal of coding is "moving from a descriptive categorization of
the accessed field texts to a more conceptual and interpretive level" (p. 31). I
subsequently created a third set of codes and criteria, as seen in Table 3.3, and entered
these into the codebook. This third phase was integral in teasing out some of the complex
meaning-making related to the PGDP.
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Table 3.3. Third-Cycle Coding: Themes.

Code
The Government
The Public
Delays
Secrecy, Manipulation, and
Deception
Competing Risk Perceptions

Criteria
Blurring of the lines regarding the roles and/or goals of
various federal- and/or state-level agencies
Blurring of the lines among the roles and/or goals of nonagency personnel
Discussions of postponements and bureaucratic
constraints on action
Discussions of slow- or non-disclosure; related concerns
about misuse or falsification of information toward
unknown ends
Discussions regarding perceived risk levels related to the
site

Challenges for Qualitative Research
Richardson (2000) describes the central dilemma for the postmodernist,
qualitative researcher as claiming a "position [that] allow[s] us to know 'something'
without claiming to know everything" (p. 928). Within scientific inquiry, the choice of
this approach, rather than seeking to develop predictive theories, is sometimes criticized.
According to Butler-Kisber (2010), "Qualitative inquiry [focuses] on what, how, and
why, using participant voices and experiences to interpret and explain (or in other words
to present a small ‘t’ theory) about a phenomenon…" (p. 26). By employing multiple
qualitative methods toward these ends, I situate this study within what Patton (2002) calls
"the pragmatist paradigm," in which the selection of methods is centered around choosing
the best tools for the task. However, this methodological choice brings with it numerous
challenges that are common to qualitative study in terms of my selection of the case study
approach and in terms of meeting responsibilities both to the communication field and to
study participants. Ellingson (2009) expands upon Fitch (1994), noting that "rigor, depth
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of analysis, and reflexivity constitute important criteria for evaluating middle-ground
qualitative research quality" (p. 32).
Transferability versus Generalizability
This project relies upon a case study of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
National Priorities List Superfund site. Although case studies occasionally are cited as
methodological approaches in and of themselves, the case study does not provide specific
guidelines for data collection or analysis and, thus, is not a true method. Rather, a case
study relates specifically to the boundary conditions of the study and, subsequently, to the
kinds of theories and methods that could be applicable within those boundaries. As
Tinker (1996) notes, a case study "defines topics broadly and not narrowly, covers
contextual conditions, and relies on multiple and not singular sources of evidence" (p.
202). VanWynsberghe and Khan (2007) argue that a case study is "a transparadigmatic
and transdisciplinary heuristic that involves the careful delineation of the phenomena for
which the evidence is being collected" (p. 80). Thus, according to VanWynsberghe and
Khan (2007), case studies typically: 1) have a small number of subjects and a great deal
of contextual detail; 2) rely upon natural settings; 3) provide detailed and explicit
temporal and spatial boundaries; 4) utilize working hypotheses; 5) develop lessons
learned; and 6) use multiple data sources for triangulation.
Any approach that recognizes the essentially situated nature of communication
and meaning-creation must value context above prediction. As Cossette (1998) writes,
"[S]ituations must be studied from within, on the basis of the representations of the
individuals concerned" (p. 1368). Therefore, I have selected a case study approach that
permits me to integrate multiple qualitative methods to produce a rich description of the
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target phenomena (Scholz & Tietje, 2002). While the results of such a case study cannot
be generalizable, the insights gained can be transferrable to similar communities and
circumstances (Baxter & Eyles, 1999; Wakefield & Elliott, 2003). Gulbe (1981)
addresses the case study dilemma when he discusses the characteristics of the naturalistic
researcher, who "does not attempt to form generalizations that will hold in all times and
in all places, but to form working hypotheses that may be transferred from one context to
another depending upon the degree of 'fit' between the contexts" (p. 81).
Central to an audience’s ability to make effective determinations about
applicability of findings to other settings is the effective use of "thick descriptions"
(Geertz, 1973), which Guba asserts "will permit comparison of this context to other
possible contexts to which transfer might be contemplated" (p. 86). According to ButlerKisber (2010), "Trustworthiness is enhanced when there is clear evidence that a length of
time has been spent in the field and there are multiple forms of field texts that can help to
corroborate explanations" (p. 14). Thus, case study researchers must commit themselves
to thorough descriptions of the scene, players, and interactions to ensure clear
assessments of case-by-case transferability.
Reliability and Validity
Addressing issues of reliability and validity is sometimes considered the greatest
challenge for qualitative research. However, as Butler-Kisber (2010) notes, "From the
point of view of qualitative inquiry, [the] realist notion of defining and describing a
‘truth’ to demonstrate validity has very little meaning" (p. 14). As Mischler (1990) notes,
"Focusing on trustworthiness rather than truth displaces validation from its traditional
location in a presumably objective, non-reactive, and neutral reality, and moves it to the
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social world – a world constructed in and through our discourse and actions, through
praxis" (p. 420).
Maxwell (1992) identifies three kinds of qualitative validity related to this
construct of trustworthiness: descriptive validity, interpretive validity, and theoretical
validity. Descriptive validity addresses whether an account is factually accurate (ButlerKisber, 2010). This criterion can be met by utilizing numerous sources and conducting
member checks, both with participants in the study and with those who have some
knowledge of the situation itself. My use of multiple datasets, including newspaper
accounts, is one way in which I have attempted to address the issue of descriptive validity
in this study. In addition, I have engaged in direct dialogue regarding preliminary
findings both with citizens of Paducah and with federal and state agency personnel. As
Guba (1981) notes, such "member checks" are the "single most important action inquirers
can take, for it goes to the heart of the credibility criterion" (p. 85).
Interpretive validity is concerned with whether findings reflect a multiplicity of
participant perspectives. As Guba (1981) asserts, "naturalistic inquirers are most
concerned with testing the credibility of their findings and interpretations with the various
sources (audiences or groups) from which data were drawn" (p. 80). I have relied upon
multiple datasets and extensive member checks to address this criterion, as well. This
approach aligns well with Richardson’s (2000) conceptualization of qualitative validity,
for which "the central image is the crystal, which combines symmetry and substance with
an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and
angles of approach" (p. 934).
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Theoretical validity is tied to whether findings actually explicate the phenomenon
under investigation. In the background, rationale, and epistemological commitments
portions of this study, I explicitly set forth the sensemaking underpinnings of the project,
a choice informed both by several years of engagement at the site of study and by a
career rooted largely in conducting research translation and engagement activities at
Superfund sites. I further strove for theoretical validity during second cycle coding by
looking specifically at whether the constructs identified in the literature were reflected
within the transcripts, articles, and blogs themselves.
Credibility versus Objectivity
Butler-Kisber notes that "[a] rigorous or trustworthy study indicates its
persuasiveness by including a coherent and transparent research process and illustrating
an adherence to researcher reflexivity and reflection" ( p. 14). Guba (1981) asserts that
this is brought about, in part, by "triangulation, member checks, providing an audit trail,
and employing researcher reflexivity" (p. 88). As Butler-Kisber states, such
"[t]ransparency permits a clear understanding of the inquiry process which persuades the
reader/audience of the trustworthiness or rigor of the study and allows other researchers
to build on or adapt processes that are revealed in the work" (p. 16).
According to Golden-Biddle and Locke (2007), the construction of a qualitative
account is problematized from the beginning.
The very act of developing theorized storylines from the field story generated
through our engagement with particular social settings automatically raises the
question of whether we ‘were there,’ and while there, whether we were able to
experience and learn enough to allow us to understand and interpret what went
on… Did we engage the research setting sufficiently intensively and extensively
to understand the events, situations, and people we engaged? Did we observe and
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record in sufficiently fine detail to warrant an insightful and competent
understanding of the situation studied? (pp. 76-77)
These questions are central to the credibility of study findings. As Butler-Kisber notes,
key factors that support credibility include "prolonged engagement in the field or
interviews that take place over time; persistent inquiry that produces rich field texts;
triangulation or the convergence of field texts from different sources; the search for and
explanation of negative cases or outliers; referential adequacy or interpretation that is
grounded in the field texts; the inclusion of insider/emic perspectives; and participant
checks and debriefings" (p. 46). To the extent possible, I have attempted to make these
factors central in the design and conduct of this study while also embracing my own
positionality within the scene.
Researcher Reflexivity
Nightingale and Cromby (1999) describe researcher reflexivity as "awareness of
the researcher's contribution to the construction of meanings throughout the research
process, and an acknowledgment of the impossibility of remaining 'outside of' one's
subject matter while conducting research" (p. 228). Thus, it is key for qualitative
inquirers not only to recognize but, as necessary, to foreground their biases in recognition
of the ways in which individual experiences influence all aspects of the research
endeavor. Medved (2011) notes that "[r]igorous and worthwhile qualitative research begs
meaningful and, at times, uncomfortable self-analysis" (p. 109). The extensive use of
such self-analysis is particularly important for studies that employ crystallization. As
Ellingson (2009) notes, "[C]rystallized texts feature a significant degree of reflexive
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consideration of the researcher's self in the process of research design, data collection,
and representation" (Ellingson, 2009, p. 12).
Having spent five years working on site-related issues, nearly three of those
interacting directly with stakeholders in and around the Paducah community, I recognize
explicitly my own positionality in relation to the generation and analysis of the datasets in
this study; however, my interest in the issues I investigate in Paducah was formulated
long before I knew of the PGDP. A native Appalachian, I am familiar both with the
exploitation of local resources by external entities and with the marginalization of local
populations in decision-making. As communication liaison for the University of
Kentucky Superfund Research Program for nearly ten years, I also have had opportunities
to work with stakeholders to address social justice issues professionally. Through these
experiences, I have repeatedly noted high levels of stakeholder distrust of government
agencies and their associates, including universities. Such perceptions can be particularly
problematic in communities like Paducah, where a federal agency has been designated
the potentially responsible party (PRP) in a major contamination incident.
As a communication practitioner embedded within an academic setting, I also
have listened at length to researchers and agency personnel discuss their own work. At
times, these discussions have pushed riskbearing communities to the margins, making
assumptions about what should be most important in a community based almost
exclusively on scientific risk assessments, with little consideration given to the values or
wishes of residents.
Clearly, these experiences have affected my perception of governmental risk
communication policies and procedures, as well as my assessment of their
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implementation in Paducah. During extended periods of formative research and data
collection, I have written numerous reflective memos, have composed personal notes, and
have even made audio recordings of my reflections about field experiences during the
long drives between Paducah and Lexington, Kentucky. These reflections, in addition to
field notes and transcripts, have been valuable in helping me select key events to
incorporate into the narrative inquiry portions of this dissertation. What moments made
the greatest impact upon me in the field? What moments have stuck with me through
time? Why these moments and not others? What can these recollections tell readers about
the contested role of researcher, about field relationships with stakeholders, about
stakeholder perceptions of the complicated relationships between researchers and the
government agencies that fund them? By practicing reflexivity throughout the study, I am
better equipped, as Ellingson (2009) puts it, "to show rather than tell" (p. 65) readers
about PGDP-related communicative phenomena, depicting the multivocality involved
when stakeholder perceptions compete, and ultimately contributing to a richer, more
nuanced picture of the challenges stakeholders face in trying to make collective sense of
the issues.
After more than decade of working in academia, I have come to understand that,
sometimes, the very people who live with risks have been pushed to the periphery of
decision-making processes. While these stakeholders have been informed as applicable
laws require, they rarely are truly engaged in determining their own fates. It is my sincere
hope that this study and the proposed convergence-building, community-based model of
risk communication will help bridge these gaps, providing a starting point for improving
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relations among the numerous stakeholders impacted by environmental contamination.

Barriers
I drove back to Paducah to prepare for the Environmental/Health Focus Group,
stopping to check my email for additional RSVPs. I was very concerned that we had
only one RSVP accepting the invitation; however, I was hopeful that individuals from
the listening tour would attend... Unfortunately, there were no additional RSVPs in my
inbox... When we arrived onsite, the room was arranged with tables and chairs facing
the front, classroom style. To promote dialogue, we immediately set about
rearranging things into a u-shape. We arranged the table so that the opening of the
"u" faced the computer screen. There was a table with a podium in the front left. I
hoped that our team wouldn't use the podium. The last thing I wanted us to do was
introduce real or perceived barriers between ourselves and the participants.
--Field Notes, May 4, 2010
Even before our KRCEE Future Vision research team arrived in Paducah for
the first time, I was keenly aware that some members of the community already held
perceptions of us as "other." Colleagues from the university's Superfund Research
Program had shared stories of some Paducah constituencies -- particularly
environmental and health activists -- angrily opting out of activities. I also knew from
prior public meeting comments, official reports, and our own listening tour that some
stakeholders resented monies being spent on university-led studies rather than on
either site cleanup or compensation for those who felt they had been sickened through
PGDP-related hazardous exposures. As a participatory researcher, I wanted to ensure
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that the voices of these segments of the community were included in our work, but I
feared that our research team would inherit some existing frustration.
My field notes throughout the project depict my internal struggle to dissociate our
research team from these pre-existing frustrations while also achieving specific
personal goals. Because this was my first time in the field, I wanted badly to do things
"right" from a methodological perspective, particularly as my doctoral committee
chair also was a member of the research team. As a long-time university employee, I
also wanted to do my job well, particularly as my supervisor was the project's
principal investigator. Finally, as a native of a community near the Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, Department of Energy facilities, I had deep empathy for the people of
Paducah and genuinely wanted to serve them well. From painstakingly drafting focus
group invitations to laboring over slide content to trying to ensure that the physical
focus group space was as open and collaborative as possible, I nervously tried to
remove any and all barriers to constructive dialogue and full participation. Little did I
know that one of the greatest barriers to effective communication would arise from
blind spots formed through my own commitment to the research.
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Chapter Four: Results
Talking about the PGDP
According to Congressman Ed Whitfield, "From the anticipated closure to public
safety to expedited cleanup, the issues surrounding the [Paducah Gaseous Diffusion
Plant] are complex and endless" (Paducah Sun, Dec. 2005). Such complexity poses
difficult challenges for sensemaking processes that attempt to construct understandings of
a phenomenon, often through simplification to its most basic parts. As Weick (2010) puts
it, "[T]here are...times when, despite or because of that simplification, situations become
less comprehensible, more interactively complex, and harder to control" (p. 538). As
numerous constituencies have attempted, through their own prisms, to understand the
complicated statutory, political, risk, interorganizational, and interpersonal facets of the
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant story, they have interacted with each other, staking out
positions, forming and disbanding alliances, and jointly adding to a body of actions and
events that require additional sensemaking efforts to interpret.
The data gathered through this study exist at the intersection of these sensemaking
processes and help to identify areas in which communicative actions are implicated in the
development of relationships. As Palenchar and Heath (2007) note, "It is becoming
increasingly clear that the main product of risk communication is not informed
understanding as such, but the quality of the social relationship it supports" (p. 127).
Through an exploration of both the sensemaking processes and the relational outcomes of
PGDP risk communication, this chapter directly responds to the study's first research
question, i.e. how does the enactment of accepted agency risk communication practices
affect relationships among stakeholders?
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The strength of building this study's methodological approach on crystallization
lies in the researcher's ability to approach these complex issues from myriad directions, to
continually turn the problem back on itself, and to find new ways of exploring the everemerging angles. While intellectually invigorating, such an approach brings with it the
inherent challenge of knowing that all angles can never be explored fully. Situating the
researcher within this puzzle, determining starting points and -- of practical necessity -ending points, is both time-consuming and doubt-reinforcing. However, the process also
provides numerous opportunities to realize the linkages among data and how they inform
each other.
To begin answering the research questions posed in this and the next chapter. I
examined four extant datasets: 85 Paducah Sun newspaper articles about the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant that were published in Calendar Year 2005; the assembled
public comments collected by the Kentucky Research Consortium for Energy and the
Environment [KRCEE] during its 2006-2007 PGDP Property Study; eight focus group
transcripts generated in 2010 during the KRCEE Stakeholder Future Vision Study; and
nine online blogs published by a local activist during the latter study. Through constant
comparative analysis, I identified emerging themes across the datasets. Throughout this
chapter, these findings are complemented by narrative interludes that depict the ways in
which the themes interact to create communicative barriers that inhibit the possibilities
for convergent communication among site stakeholders.
The findings in this chapter illustrate how the ways in which people and agencies
talk about and describe previous interactions with each other in Paducah point to
sensemaking challenges that have been erected over decades. More specifically, capacity,
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commitment, and expectations are constrained, as exemplified in each of four emergent
themes that dominate the discourse: 1) The Government, 2) The Public, 3) Bureaucratic
Delay, and 4) Secrecy, Deception, and Manipulation. Stakeholder sensemaking about
these themes further complicates existing disagreements about probabilistic risk at the
site, creating a fifth theme, Competing Risk Perceptions.
The Government
In Paducah, as at other Superfund sites, conceptualizations of "the government"
are fraught with complexity. Numerous federal, state, and local agencies take on diverse
roles, most of which are statutorily compelled. Among the federal actors currently or
previously involved in some way with the PGDP site are the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the United
States Department of Energy, the United States Department of Labor, the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, and the National Institute for Environmental
Health Sciences. At the state level, the Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet,
through the Superfund Branch of its Department for Environmental Protection, and the
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, through its Radiation Control Branch,
also have some presence at the site. Locally, both the McCracken and Ballard County
governments are implicated in plant-related decision-making, as are such governmentbusiness coalitions as local chambers of commerce, the Paducah Area Community Reuse
Organization, and the Paducah Uranium Plant Asset Utilization Task Force.
At various times, all of these organizations have issued official statements and
press releases, have conducted or participated in public meetings, and have been featured
in local newspaper coverage of PGDP-related issues. The sheer number and variety of
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organizational actors can generate difficulty for those trying to understand which
agencies or agency-related organizations are responsible for which actions. Thus, plantrelated discourse frequently groups all government-affiliated organizations into one
overarching, monolithic organization, generally referred to as The Government. This
simplification problematizes sensemaking greatly by: 1) reducing the perceived, if not the
actual, number of actors, 2) rhetorically establishing adversarial us/them
community/agency binaries that fail to distinguish roles and positions within and across
groups, and 3) supporting erroneous conclusions about one agency's motives or actions
based on retrospective sensemaking that draws on an unrelated agency's past actions.
Capacity: The Number and Diversity of Actors
As Atkinson (2005) notes, "In the social arena, group identity negates 'that which
it is not,' by creating false unities among group members which deny the complex
multiplicities of which 'the group' is composed" (p. 81). Thus, when diverse organizations
are grouped under a single term like The Government, sensemaking is threatened through
a reduction in the perceived number of distinct actors and viewpoints. In the case of
Paducah, the blanket term The Government is used by a number of sources across
multiple channels as a proxy for diverse agencies. Such rhetoric encourages non-agency
stakeholders to assume that there is, in fact, a single Government point of view on plantrelated issues rather than numerous viewpoints that differ based on a specific agency's or
individual's role. Therefore, stakeholders who view The Government as representing a
lone, distinct perspective may expect little benefit from engaging multiple agencies in
dialogue.
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Examples of this reductionist terminology abound in both local media and
interpersonal discourse. Textual analysis of 85 Paducah Sun articles published in the year
2005 identified 21 instances of the conflation of agencies under The Government
signifier, often with accompanying confusion about agency roles and responsibilities.
One area in which this approach proved particularly problematic was the transition of a
backlogged worker compensation program from the Department of Energy to the
Department of Labor. Although the transition and subsequent program implementation
involved at least three federal agencies, references to a singular Government abound.
An excerpt from a front-page Paducah Sun article illustrates this dilemma.
"Robert Pierce has always believed that exposure to deadly substances while working at
the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant robbed him of his health and livelihood. Now the
government confirms it" (Walker, 2005h, p. 1A). The program under which Mr. Pierce
had first applied for compensation was administered by the Department of Energy. After
a backlog of more than 25,000 claims had built up, with some remaining unaddressed for
more than four years, Congress passed legislation to transfer program administration to
the Department of Labor. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, a
division of the Centers for Disease Control, was charged with evaluating individual
worker exposures and determining whether compensation was warranted. Some of the
data used for those evaluations came from decades-old DOE reports. Thus, a complex
array of agency actors were involved at various stages, from processing to evaluating to
paying specific claims. The Paducah Sun's statement that "the government confirms" that
Mr. Pierce's illness is work-related presents a tidier but far less accurate image of the
process.
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Such simplification contributes to confusion about the number of governmental
actors and the possibilities for varying perspectives among them. In an article two months
later, the adult child of a deceased nuclear worker questioned the motives of all of the
agencies involved, perhaps inadvertently, by stating, "I think the government is trying to
get out of paying what it owes" (Walker, 2005m, 2A). In a follow-up article the next day,
the adult child of another worker appeared perplexed by the claims process. The
newspaper reported that "she doesn't understand how the government can pay some
people and not others in compensation for essentially the same diseases" (Walker, 2005n,
1C). Again, the complex process involving legislation passed by Congress and its
subsequent impacts on policies, procedures, and payments involving three distinct
agencies is clustered under a single motive attributed to a single entity, in this case The
Government attempting to "get out of paying what it owes" by inequitably, perhaps
arbitrarily, making decisions that benefit itself. The resulting connotation is that all
agency employees, regardless of department or division, are working toward a clearly
defined, shared goal that disadvantages a portion of the affected population. Thus, the
perceived capacity for sensemaking dialogue among stakeholders and agencies is greatly
constrained.
At other times, agencies themselves invoke the image of The Government, often
as a means of contextualizing their own actions as driven by forces outside their control.
In one situation, DOE elected to rebid a cleanup contract in response to several
competitors protesting an announced contract award. In justifying its actions, the agency
stated that it was determined to act in "the best interests of the government to take
corrective action and reopen the competition" (Walker, 2005j, 1A). As Brinson and
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Benoit explain, "[W]hen a reputation is threatened, individuals and organizations are
motivated to present an image defense: explanations, justifications, rationalizations,
apologies, or excuses for behavior" (p. 30). For DOE, the involvement of other
governmental entities in site-related decisions has sometimes been invoked to explain or
justify an action, particularly an action that might prove unpopular with various
stakeholders. Thus, in addition to media and stakeholder attempts to simplify the multiactor web, agencies themselves sometimes intentionally blur the lines.
Another example of DOE's use of this strategy took place during a federallyfunded Property Acquisition study to evaluate the costs of buying private property
adjacent to the PGDP. From the earliest stages of the study, the Department of Energy
attempted to define and assert its role in the process: the agency was Congress’s servant –
no more, no less. The initial "statement of work" draft that stakeholders received clearly
stated, "This project will be performed in order to meet the requirements established in
Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill, 2006 (Senate Report 109-084)" (U.S.
DOE, 2007, p. H-10). The first bullet on the first slide of subsequent U.S. DOE
presentations to the PGDP Citizens Advisory Board reinforced that the study responded
to a Congressional mandate (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-32). During two separate public
meetings, multiple introductory slides featured the following statement in boldface type:
"The study is being conducted in accordance with a Congressional Directive to DOE in
the 2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act" (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H53-H-55; U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-129-H-132). Repeatedly, DOE attempted to
contextualize itself as an executor of, rather than a leader in, The Government’s decisionmaking.

93

In other circumstances, The Government is accompanied by a key modifier and
becomes The Federal Government. When this juxtaposition occurs in the Paducah Sun,
the word "federal" becomes almost a pejorative term. Among non-media stakeholders, as
well, The Federal Government is an object of disapproval. The most frequent and fervent
criticisms relate directly to agency communications, with stakeholders citing excessive
use of confusing acronyms. For instance, when asked about the kind of information
stakeholders require to make sound decisions about the plant, one focus group participant
recommended that the Future Vision research team "try not to use those acronyms that
DOE uses -- spell it out." Another participant quickly interjected, "The federal
government is notorious about doin’ that. If you’ve ever tried to read a federal
government document..." Thus, The Federal Government is perceived as an ineffective
communicator, which subsequently colors stakeholder perceptions of all related agencies
and their employees.
The reality, however, is that federal agencies often perceive themselves as
operating at cross-purposes and, therefore, send very different messages. In 2006, as the
Department of Energy discussed the Property Acquisition study during a PGDP Citizens
Advisory Board meeting, Environmental Protection Agency representatives registered
concern about past attempts by other federal entities to use property purchases as a means
of circumventing regulatory statutes. According to one U.S. EPA staff member,
This issue is not new to EPA. It is an issue that we have gone around with various
federal facilities and projects for years. The question is if I never sell this property
then that means I do not have to remediate the plume and the answer is no. You
still have to remediate the plume. This is just a land use control. (U.S. DOE, 2007,
p. H-41)
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Community members directly associated with the plant by employment -- whether
through DOE, USEC, or a contractor -- espouse a more nuanced view of government that
recognizes multiple players. In one Future Vision focus group, a contractor described his
experiences trying to influence Congressional action: "I spent a year and a half working
on Capitol Hill with legislation to try to re-feed a large segment of those higher asset tail
cylinders... And we could not get Congress to move those... [T]here were just too many
competing interests as to who was gonna get the money, and what—how the money was
gonna be dispersed..."
Within the PGDP discourse, Congress holds an interesting position as a potential
bridge between the perceived conformity of The Government and a diversity of
state/local interests. While Congress, as a whole, often is rhetorically grouped within The
Government, individual elected officials frequently are portrayed as separate and distinct,
thus expanding the perceived field of participants for sensemaking activities. Whether a
function of the geographic proximity of congressional field offices or attributable to close
political alignment with the Paducah Sun's editorial board, Senators Mitch McConnell
and Jim Bunning, along with Congressman Ed Whitfield, tend to be portrayed favorably
by the local newspaper as public servants who are doing their best to control the
perceived shortcomings of The Government. For example, the newspaper asserts that
Kentucky's "congressional delegation has been scrutinizing the elongated Paducah
contract situation" (Walker, 12/28/2005, p. 12A). Bunning is explicitly recognized for
convening Senate oversight hearings to investigate PGDP cleanup delays; he is quoted as
saying that "those living and working in and around Paducah deserve a better
environment" and that he wants to "bring accountability to the process" (Walker, 2005x,
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p. 12A). Similarly, Whitfield is acknowledged for his "ongoing concerns about cost
increases and delays in Paducah plant cleanup" (Walker, 2005c, p. 8A).
While newspaper coverage tends to present the involvement of the Kentucky
Congressional delegation as positive, other constituencies in the community disagree. A
blog authored by a participant in a Future Vision focus group noted, "At the beginning, it
was explained that this study was the result of a 'federal earmark facilitated by Sens.
McConnell, Bunning, and Rep. Whitfield.' That said a lot to me" (Donham, 2010a, para.
2). Regardless of the way in which these elected officials and their actions are framed,
both the newspaper and the blog rhetorically separate these specific actors from The
Government.

Similarly, the newspaper sometimes segregates state government from federal,
often depicting state officials as criticizing The Federal Government, whether for its poor
environmental practices or for attempting to avoid its cleanup responsibilities. For
example, in an article about the Property Acquisition study, the Paducah Sun notes that
"[t]he proposal has critics, including those who say a buyout would limit the
government's future liability for cleaning up the contamination"; the article then quotes
an assistant director of the Kentucky Division of Waste Management, who says that he
cannot see how a federal government land buyout would be "fitting into any type of
remedy" for getting rid of the contamination" (Associated Press, 2005, p. 12A).

Whether depictions of individual government officials at either the federal or state
level are positive or negative, segregation of the actors points to important implications
for sensemaking. When the "The Government" is broken down into its constituent parts,

96

a convergent space is made in which individual efforts can be acknowledged and
appreciated, as well as criticized. For example, the sick nuclear worker who "doggedly
called and wrote government officials about his case" also "thanked the local Labor
Department claims staffers for their help" (Walker, 2005h, p. 14A). Thus, while
increasing the number of perceived actors available to participate in joint sensemaking,
the rhetorical separation of The Government into its component parts also personalizes
the actions of the individuals working to implement agency policies and procedures.
Commitment: Adversarial Binaries
Unfortunately, the depersonalization that occurs through the use of blanket terms
like The Government can exacerbate already-tense situations by contributing to binary
thinking. Were a stakeholder to make negative public statements about an individual or
agency, that public commitment could contribute to blind spots and tenacious
justifications about that specific targeted individual or agency. However, when the
negative public statements extend to The Government, numerous actors involved in site
decisions are rhetorically implicated, thus creating the possibility that negative opinions
of one actor are transferred to others. This is particularly problematic when the negative
opinion relates to distrust of an agency, as often happens at Superfund sites.
During the Future Vision study, the research team asked the same basic question
of eight focus groups: who is considered a credible source of information for issues
related to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant? While answers varied across the groups,
a common response was that the Department of Energy is not a trusted information
source for many stakeholders (KRCEE, 2011). While such a perspective is
understandable in light of DOE's historic role in site contamination and, according to
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some, subsequent cover-ups, the distrust at times extended beyond the agency to
encompass all governmental entities engaged at the site. As one focus group participant
put it, "I would not want [information from] anybody affiliated with the government in
any way... I wouldn’t trust anything that people that have been connected with that place
have to say." In this way, use of the phrase The Government extends distrust of DOE to
negatively affect relationships among stakeholders and other agencies, as well.
Local newspaper coverage also plays an important role in the creation and
reification of an adversarial view of The Government, and particularly of federal entities.
The editorial page provides a key venue for promoting animosity, whether explicitly or
implicitly. In one instance, a letter to the editor raises questions about the motives for
delayed payments to sick nuclear workers by stating that "the federal agencies continue to
miss the point…or do they" (Sparkman, 2005, 4A)? The author describes a situation in
which those deserving of compensation die before receiving it, leaving their adult
children ineligible for benefits. Her implication is clear: The Federal Government values
cost savings over fairness.
In addition to such stakeholder acrimony toward The Federal Government, the
Paducah Sun (2005) editorial board also promotes an intergovernmental adversarial
relationship by rhetorically pitting state and federal agencies against each other,
particularly on the editorial page, where it credits state officials with forcing federal
cleanup action. "Over the past six years," the editor writes, "the federal cleanup
operation has moved in fits and starts [but the] cleanup seems to have gained momentum
since the state imposed timetables in the 2003 cleanup agreement" (p. 4A). The editor
adds that the site cleanup agreement is the state's "legal club in holding DOE to its
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cleanup commitments" and urges Kentucky state officials not to "hesitate to take DOE to
court, if the agency doesn't follow through on its obligations to Paducah" (p. 4A).
Through such statements, the Paducah Sun reifies existing tensions between state and
federal entities -- tensions that previously had threatened to erupt into multiple lawsuits
and countersuits (Short, 2002; de Saillan, 2008).
The newspaper also promotes intergovernmental hostility between Congress and
the executive branch, often along party lines. For example, a series of articles frames
federal policies that restrict contaminated nickel recycling as detrimental to both cleanup
and the Paducah economy. The paper's editorial page discounts the restriction and places
the blame squarely upon the executive branch under the leadership of former President
Bill Clinton who was "swayed by such Democratic interest groups" as organized labor
and environmentalists. However, one editorial anticipates "light at the end of the tunnel"
for overturning the restriction, as "[i]t’s a logical assumption that the agency eventually
will lift the politically motivated ban, given that a Republican administration is calling
the shots in the executive branch of federal government." (Walker, 2005a, p. 4A).
Ironically, the newspaper is joined in its reinforcement of negative images of The
Government by stakeholders who hold vastly different political commitments. Local
environmentalists, in particular, have a strained relationship with The Government. In
one Future Vision focus group, a local activist expressed his anger by proposing that an
acceptable future for Paducah would meet one key criteria -- it would "just get the
government the hell out… I think Washington, D.C. would be a good place to store [the
hazardous waste]." He continued, "I think we were doing a really good job before they
came…in and disrupted everything." Another activist expressed his doubt about the
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motives and potential outcomes of the Future Vision study, relating it directly to his
dismay at existing stakeholder-governmental relations by stating, "I have spent a good
deal of the last twenty-five years of my life going through the process with the
government on environmental issues, so you know, I know some things about the
process." Again citing his past interactions with The Government, he asserted, "I don’t
feel like I’ve ever really had any real influence on a governmental decision unless I took
some really strong action, like got involved in a lawsuit," before again questioning the
research team's "real" motives.
In this case, a stakeholder's very public distrust of governmental processes
extends beyond agencies to include university-based researchers who had received passthrough funding from an agency. The subsequent suspicion illustrates a central challenge
related to rhetorical groupings of multiple entities under The Government construct.
Specifically, stakeholders who have taken high-profile stances, and thus are deeply
committed, against specific organizational actions can have tremendous difficulty
separating the perceived at-fault agency from other entities that they also perceive as
falling under The Government umbrella.
This lack of organizational distinctions points to a significant shortcoming of
Seven Cardinal Rules and other best practices approaches to risk communication. While
encouraging cross-organizational collaborations, these guidelines do not explicitly
recognize that, from a stakeholder sensemaking perspective, an individual organization
may be perceived as part of a larger entity that comes with its own baggage. Rather than
understanding that a particular agency is addressing its specifically mandated activities in
fulfilling its own defined role, independent of or loosely collaborating with other
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agencies in the scene, some constituents see only a puzzling web of federal and state
entities, making it difficult to parse just who is responsible for what -- a dilemma that has
important repercussions for managing expectations.
Expectations: Retrospective Sensemaking
The depiction of The Government as a single entity in the Paducah discourse
seriously constrains agencies that are new to the scene. Such constraints are particularly
challenging for organizations whose roles involve assuming responsibilities formerly
belonging to another entity. A particularly stark example of this type of difficulty in
sensemaking arose in 2005, when the U.S. Department of Labor [DOL] assumed
administration of a workers' compensation program previously managed by the
Department of Energy. This program was designed to provide benefits to workers who
had become ill due to work-related exposure to hazardous chemicals. Under DOE
management, a backlog of approximately 25,000 claims had built nationwide, with some
applicants waiting more than four years for responses. To address the situation, Congress
passed legislation transferring program administration to DOL. According to the
Paducah Sun, the law "gave the department 210 days to May 26 to issue regulations and
have staffing and procedures in place to compensate workers sickened from toxic
exposure" (Walker, 2005l, p. 1A).
Unfortunately for the Department of Labor, the time required to set up these new
policies and procedures became conflated with the long waits applicants had already
experienced under DOE management of the program. In this way, the same sensemaking
strategies that conceived of both entities as part of The Government quickly promoted the
transfer of existing stakeholder frustrations from DOE to DOL. This relationship was
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reified through numerous Paducah Sun articles featuring such headlines as "Frustration
Grows as Sick Workers Wait for Benefits" (Walker, 2005s) and "Sick Workers Seek
Responses to Their Claims" (Walker, 2005t), along with articles profiling the illnesses of
both living and deceased claimants (Walker, 2005h; 2005m; 2005n).
The Department of Labor responded to this situation with a letter to the editor in
which it acknowledged frustration over previous U.S. DOE management of worker
claims but stated that DOL was, in fact, ahead of schedule on many aspects of payment.
"We honor the dedication of those who gave their service to our nation, and fully
appreciate the frustration they may feel over the past years of delay," the DOL official
wrote. "And that’s why we are working hard – and achieving great progress – in getting
help to these workers and their families" (Lipnic, 2005, 4A).
Another agency that dealt with problematic understandings of its specific site role
was the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. After the PGDP was added
to the U.S. EPA Superfund National Priorities List, ATSDR began developing a work
plan and conducting its Public Health Assessment, visiting the community multiple times
between 1994 and 2000, including participating in six DOE public meetings. The
Agency's final report concluded: 1) that the site "currently poses no apparent public
health hazard to the off-site community"; 2) that a future rupture of any of the more than
33,000 depleted uranium cylinders on site "would create an urgent public health hazard
for anyone" nearby; 3) that previous TCE exposure through consumption of water from
four of the contaminated private wells had been "a public health hazard for children"; 4)
that "future exposures to maximum concentrations of contaminants in the groundwater
plumes" through new private wells would constitute a public health hazard; and, finally,
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5) that the Agency did not have enough information to determine the levels or impacts of
past acute uranium hexafluoride exposures. The Public Health Action Plan included
recommendations for continued clean-up, emergency preparedness planning, and
monitoring of the site, also offering the community ATSDR's support as a source of riskrelated information.
As Tinker (1996) explains,
ATSDR is faced with challenges in health risk communication in...subject
[communities] on two major fronts: (a) explaining to local residents the complex
nature of the health studies of their community; and (b) changing strongly held
assumptions and attitudes in the community about alleged government
malfeasance, the role of big business and environmental racism, the right to health
and health care, and a host of related concerns. (p. 209)
Entrenched distrust of the Paducah Public Health Assessment in some corners supports
this contention. As one community member mentioned during the PGDP Future Vision
research team's listening tour, "[T]here’s been recent testimony that the ASTDR [sic]
report was biased. These people were intimidated by the past administration." Another
community member further highlighted the ways in which role confusion can feed
distrust by asking, "[W]hy didn’t ASTDR [sic] do an epi study? They [i.e., ‘the
government’] never do any honest stuff."
According to Tinker (1996), this type of reaction is not uncommon in Superfund
communities responding to ATSDR health assessments. He cites a specific case in which
both a preliminary ATSDR Public Health Assessment and a follow-on second study were
met with community skepticism, largely because the investigations "were based primarily
on environmental information provided to EPA by the manufacturer of the wood
preservative" (p. 209). Even when the second study attempted to partner with the state
department of health, distrust continued.
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Despite distrust of the report itself, some local activists have found value in the
ATSDR report, primarily in the Agency's collection of community comments during the
Public Health Assessment process. Confirming McComas's (2003) assertion that
"individuals sometimes base their opinions about government agencies on other people’s
experiences" (p. 169), one focus group attendee who expressed some of the strongest
doubts about the ATSDR report's accuracy also cited as fact an anecdotal comment that is
archived on Agency's website. "[I]t’s all on the ATSDR/CDC site," he said. "And we
even had a sick worker get up at one of the meetings and talk about some of this stuff.
They never told anybody anything. And they’re still not doing it."

Government People
There were…7 or 8 government people in attendance. They had all kinds of fancy
technical stuff set up, and supposedly the entire evening was recorded. They had the
process all planned on how they were going to guide us through getting our opinions.
--Rural Thoughts Blog, May 5, 2010

As I set the room for the May 4th Future Vision Environmental/Health Focus
Group, I was aware that this set of stakeholders, in particular, might be somewhat
distrusting of our research team. We were, after all, academics from a different part of
the state with no direct vested interest in the site's future. The same qualities that could
make us seem unbiased to some constituencies also could render our motives suspect
to others. However, in considering our outsider status, it did not occur to me that
someone might think of us as direct government operatives. After all, weren't we
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opening every session reviewing detailed, IRB-approved informed consent documents
that, I thought, clearly delineated our roles as university researchers?
When I saw a focus group participant's blog on the morning of May 5th, I
knew how wrong I had been not to consider the possibility that our work would be
conflated with that of government agencies already at the site. Our team's commitment
to the research -- our very embeddedness in the process of creating informed consent
documents and promoting what we thought was an inclusive, participatory project -had contributed to the development of our own gaping blind spot regarding how we
might be perceived. When that blind spot collided with the focus group participant's
tenacious justifications about The Government based on prior Department of Energy
activities at the site, the stage was set for confusion and antagonism.

The Public
If The Government constitutes the first piece of a problematic rhetorical binary in
Paducah, the other piece is The Public. Comprising myriad local and state interest groups
and individuals, the concept is both omnipresent in site-related discourse and codified in
risk communication best practices approaches like Seven Cardinal Rules. In fact, two of
the first three Rules explicitly address agency relations with The Public: "accept and
involve the public as a legitimate partner" and "listen to the public's specific concerns"
(Covello & Allen, 1988).
It is worth noting that a single bullet point embedded within the Rules narrative
states that "[t]here is no such entity as 'the public'; instead, there are many publics, each
with its own interests, needs, concerns, priorities, preferences, and organizations."
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However, this statement exists as one of several "Points to Consider" in the document
and is both graphically and textually marginalized in relation to the bright, bold rules that
employ language specifically addressing The Public as a single entity. Further, while the
Rules do include this lone mention of multiple publics, the singular phrase "the public"
appears nine times, both in the rules themselves and in the accompanying narrative. The
rhetorical balance, therefore, clearly points to The Public as a single audience.
As with the blanket conceptualization of The Government, the whole-cloth
grouping of numerous constituencies under The Public banner contributes to a number of
challenges for sensemaking. These challenges have played out in various ways over the
years in relation to the PGDP, further embedding The Public as the primary audience for
risk-related information. An examination of interpersonal talk about and media coverage
of the plant implicates this rhetorical simplification in three areas of sensemaking
constraint: 1) contested membership in and responsibility to The Public that creates
challenges for capacity; 2) adversarial binaries and resulting commitments that foster
blind spots; and 3) expectations rooted in a discourse of deficiency.
Capacity
In contrast to the homogenized depiction of The Public outlined above, the
KRCEE (2011) PGDP Future Vision research team identified at least 16 groups with
distinct stakes in plant-related decisions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Water Policy District Residents
Economic Development Representatives
United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) Employees
Environmental/Health Advocates
Healthcare Providers
Educators
Media
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Religious/Spiritual Community Members
Wildlife/Recreation Enthusiasts
Tourism Interests
Ballard County Stakeholders
U.S. DOE
U.S. DOE Subcontractors
McCracken/Paducah Government
PGDP Citizens Advisory Board
Regulatory Agencies

With the possible exceptions of U.S. DOE, McCracken/Paducah Government, and
Regulatory Agencies, all of these groups could be seen as components of The Public;
however, real-world communications belie such an assumption and indicate disputes over
both the make-up of The Public and the construct’s implications for PGDP decisionmaking.

For some local activists, inclusion in The Public seems to relate inversely to one's
perceived economic status in the community. One environmentalist who participated in a
Future Vision focus group later blogged that he had requested a list of project "advisory
board" members and that he was certain it consisted of "a bunch of names of 'influential'
folks in Paducah. I certainly wasn't on it. But I think it's important for the public to know"
(Donham, 2010d, para. 1). As expressed, the author's assumptions about "advisory
board" membership implied that group was other-than-public, a conclusion underscored
by his belief that The Public was in need of information about the board. In this way, the
sentence structure seems to support a vision of "influential" members of the community
as being outside of, rather than members of, The Public.

A similar issue of authenticity in relation to membership in The Public arose
during two separate studies funded through DOE. The Property Acquisition study, which
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evaluated potential costs and benefits of DOE purchasing private properties adjacent to
the plant, was recommended to the Kentucky congressional delegation by local business
leaders during an annual Chamber of Commerce visit to Washington, D.C. (KRCEE,
2007). Similarly, the Stakeholder Future Vision study was first recommended by the
PGDP Citizens Advisory Board to support decision-making related to the site's future
(KRCEE, 2011). In both cases, local stakeholders exhibited concerns about the
origination and expense of the studies. During a public meeting for the property study,
one attendee submitted the written question, "Who started all these studys [sic] and went
to Congress to ask for these studys [sic]" (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-67), while another
attendee asked, "Don’t you think it is a waste of taxpayers [sic] money to study the
studies that has [sic] already been done by DOE" (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-67)? Later,
during the Future Vision study, a local activist complained on his blog, "God only knows
how many hours, paid for by the public, went into these graphics" (Donham, 2011b, para.
6).

Such concerns about public monies often are included in Paducah Sun coverage
of site-related matters, particularly through various government officials' repeated
invocation of a subset of The Public -- The Taxpayers. Frequently, The Taxpayers and
their "interests" provide a rhetorical foundation upon which to justify or explain specific
agency actions. For example, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman defended changing plant
cleanup plans as representing "a reasonable stewardship to the taxpayers' money that
we've been given to spend" (Walker, 2005d, 1A); he subsequently commented that DOE
would make contract decisions that "provide value to the taxpayers and contribute to the
cleanup of our Cold War legacy" (Walker, 2005g, 11A). This stance was adopted across
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the agency, as illustrated by a DOE spokesman's comment that the agency continued "to
believe that this contract represents the best value for both the taxpayers and the
community" (Walker, 2005k, 1A).

Later attempts by the agency to situate the Property Acquisition study similarly as
an activity designed to benefit taxpayers, however, were rejected by some local
stakeholders. One resident interviewed by the Paducah Sun (Walker, 2006b) called the
study "another example…of a waste of money" (p. 11A), while the vice-president of
Taxpayers for Common Sense remarked to Louisville's Courier-Journal that "[the study]
sounds…like cut and run" (Carroll, 2006). In a letter to the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, the Active Citizens for Truth
president flatly rejected the taxpayer-as-client construction, reminding members of
Congress that

I am a taxpayer along with other families who are United State citizen’s [sic] and
have been living on top of these plumes for over 50 years, paying tax dollars for
companies and federal agencies that were allowed to dump hazardous waste down
drains, through the air, and operate in a shroud of secrecy. When you talk about
best interest of tax payer dollars, then we need to consider the enormous amount
of monies that the tax payers have paid for clean-up of contaminated groundwater
at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, which cannot be cleaned up. Let’s talk
about the $300,000 the University of Kentucky received to do this study which
shows there was never any intention to buy private property that the PGDP
contaminated… So you see monies are not being wasted on the residents, but
millions have been wasted by the DOE to contractors knowing there was not an
effective technology that would clean-up contaminated groundwater. (U.S. DOE,
2007, p. H-160)
Nearly identical concerns were raised during the Stakeholder Future Vision Study.
In a blog post that followed one of the focus group meetings, a local participant wrote,
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They sure know how to spend money. And let's not forget, this money came from
one of those infamous 'earmarks' by non-other than now 'earmark' killer U.S. Sen.
Minority leader Mitch McConnell. This is public money - not private money funnelled through DOE. (Donham, 2011b, para. 3)
Such arguments concerning both which individuals may claim membership in The Public
and how The Taxpayers' money should -- or should not -- be spent constrain the
possibility for dialogue among those with competing perspectives, thus reducing the
capacity for joint sensemaking.
Commitment
As in-group/out-group lines get drawn in reference to membership in The Public,
stakeholders commit themselves to very distinct positions related to their perceived
inclusion or exclusion. For example, one USEC staffer reminded the Future Vision
research team that they were "not talking to the public right now. We all work here, and
we know what’s out here, but the general public still has a very vague idea of what’s out
here." He continued, "The general consensus is it’s already at nuclear power plant levels
of contamination. That’s what the general public already thinks. So no matter what
scenario you go with, that’s going to be a factor with the general public." In this way, the
employee not only separated himself and his colleagues from The Public, he also
committed a key act of othering by defining The Public as a group that tenaciously clings
to misinformation. However, he failed to recognize his own blind spot about nonemployees' ability to understand and interpret relevant risk information.
Non-employees also make this distinction regarding The Public. During a
different focus group, a plant subcontractor and an environmentalist engaged in dialogue
about the site. In a subsequent exchange in the comments section of an online blog, the
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environmentalist firmly drew membership lines for The Public: "I found you in the know
about things that have public interest, and I think you should make more efforts to share
what you know with the public in general" (Donham, 2010c, para. 6). Thus, in the
environmentalist's view, the subcontractor's relationship with the plant precluded his
inclusion in The Public construct.
Interestingly, the environmentalist in this case falls into the same rhetorical trap as
Seven Cardinal Rules and other best practices-oriented guidelines. He portrays The
Public as ignorant of particulars and in need of information it does not have. Just as The
Public needs protection from misspending of The Taxpayers' dollars, so The Public needs
outside entities to educate it about key facts that it lacks. Both assertions build
expectations of The Public that are based, by definition, on its perceived deficiencies.
Expectations
The portrayal of The Public as lacking both control and information is pervasive
in the PGDP discourse. Rather than promoting an image of stakeholders as diverse actors
within the situation, this construction situates The Public as an object. In some situations,
it is depicted as an audience for information. In others, it is described as a group to be
persuaded. Often, The Public indicates a faction to be protected, whether from The
Government or from itself. These images arise through a discourse of deficiency.
The Department of Energy's approach to public communication is grounded in
best practices guidelines that strive to fulfill statutorily-mandated responsibilities. This
often is done by hosting public meetings at which information is shared with The Public.
Such meetings are designed to help address suggestions that agency personnel
"[d]emonstrate your respect for the public and your sincerity by involving the community
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early, before important decisions are made, and return to the public often" (Keystone
Center, 2005, p. 21). The statement that DOE should "return to the public" underscores
an asymmetry in which the public involvement process is led entirely by the agency,
which chooses the points of communicative intervention.
Some stakeholders feel that this process is flawed, with the agency sharing only
the information it absolutely must and citizens having little to no input in decisionmaking. As one Future Vision focus group participant stated,
Those meetings they had two or three years ago, I felt like I was just sitting there
waiting for them to put a big ol’ pacifier in my mouth. That’s all in the world they
was doing. We had to stare at the goofy guy from up yonder. Whatever his name
was. I just felt like a total idiot because he was up there doing that, sticking that
pacifier in my mouth, and I’ve been out of that stage for a long time.
This assertion echoes the concerns of social scientists who note that most public meeting
implementation strategies actually minimize stakeholder influence on agency decisions
(Berry, Portney, Bablitch, & Mahoney, 1997; McComas, 2003; Bailey, Blandford,
Grossardt, & Ripy, 2011; KRCEE, 2011).
Such public meetings often are conducted in adherence to Seven Cardinal Rules
or similar best practices documents. As Heath and O'Hair (2010) note, "Prescriptive
guidelines such as those by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Chemical
Manufacturers Association [seem] to feature what the source in the risk communication
process wanted to say rather than what the receivers wanted to know and say" (p. 13).
When participants recognize this dynamic at play, their frustration grows. As the
Keystone Center (2005) notes in its risk primer for DOE personnel,
In the United States, government agencies and private companies tend to anger
the public by not involving them in decision making when the stakes or impacts
are perceived to be high... However, there is one thing that is guaranteed to anger
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the public even more than not involving them—involving them with no real
intention of listening. (p. 31)
An upshot of public involvement activities that are not perceived as truly
engaging stakeholders has been the popular conceptualization of The Public as a target of
persuasion and grudging appeasement. This portrayal echoed throughout the PGDP
Stakeholder Future Vision focus groups. In evaluating a particular hypothetical scenario
for the site's future, one participant stated, "This [scenario] seems to be one of the easier
ones for the public to swallow," while a participant in another focus group remarked,
"We thought it was one of the easier ones for maybe the public to accept." During another
session, a local business leader remarked that the addition of recreational facilities to the
site would "be a tough sell for the public." Again, The Public plays a passive role, but it
also is vulnerable to persuasion under the correct set of circumstances.
This perceived vulnerability is, perhaps, one of the driving motivations behind
discourse about protecting The Public. Following a Future Vision focus group, one
participant depicted himself as offering just such protection. In the comments section of a
blog entry, he wrote,

A heck of a lot of public money has been spent out there, but the biggest, most
expensive problems still remain. A lot of people in the community know that I
had paid attention to these issues for decades, and they count on me to give them
an oversight view of what I think is going on. (Donham, 2010c, para. 5)
He also used the blog to assert that "[p]eople who deal with the public need to know the
laws and regulations. You can't just make them up as you go, and you better be able to
answer relevant questions that the public has" (Donham, 2010a, para. 14). By
homogenizing stakeholders as The Public and rhetorically positioning that Public as
being in a chronic state of deficiency, the discourse lowers governmental expectations of
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stakeholders' ability to interpret complex information and, consequently, places these
same stakeholders in a defensive position that further constrains sensemaking.

Demarcating The Public

There was only one other person from the "public" who turned out not really to be
from the public... He was from one of the DOE cleanup contractors, Paducah
Remediation Services, who, according to his own statement, was there "at the request
of the congressional delegation." He had some interesting comments over the course
of the evening, but he spent a lot of the night texting, especially when I was talking. I
wonder what was going over those text messages.

--Rural Thoughts, May 5, 2010

Whether an actor is recognized as a member of The Public has important
implications for his or her credibility with others in the room, and the identities of the
others in that room matter tremendously. If The Public is widely seen by government
officials as lacking information or the ability to sufficiently process information, then
not being perceived as a member of The Public can be beneficial for those dealing
with agencies, legislators, and other government personnel. Thus, explicitly
connecting one's self to such entities can be important for building credibility in those
interactions. During the Future Vision Environmental/Health focus group, a PGDP
contractor did exactly this, offhandedly mentioning his connection to Kentucky's
congressional delegation and later describing lobbying activities he had undertaken on
behalf of the plant.
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This governmental connection, which might have helped establish his
credibility in a focus group for employees, regulators, or even economic development
officials, had the opposite effect in the Environmental/Health focus group session. It
marked him as an object of distrust and suspicion, as other than The Public, for one
local environmentalist. Despite the contractor's roles as a citizen of the community
and a former labor union officer, his acknowledged relationship with elected officials
fed directly into the Government/Public adversarial binary that dominates PGDP
discourse and contributed to further devolution of the meaning-making process.

Delays
Although contaminated private wells near the plant were first discovered in 1988,
the subsequent investigation and public comment process lasted almost six years, ending
with the site's addition to U.S. EPA's National Priorities List of Superfund sites in 1994.
In the nineteen years since, the community has continued to see numerous delays -delays in providing process-related information to stakeholders, delays in awarding
contracts, delays in cleanup activities, and delays in compensating sick workers. Such
delays have helped create and sustain a pervasive narrative of governmental sluggishness
and disinterest in the Paducah community. Consequently, the embedding of this narrative
within the discourse has negatively affected sensemaking in three distinct ways: 1) the
lack of timely information has limited the number and diversity of truly informed
stakeholders available to jointly make sense of process-related challenges; 2) contract
setbacks have created confusion for numerous constituencies within both the community
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and the government, leading to very public criticism of DOE; and 3) cleanup and
compensation delays have prompted both stakeholder frustration with the agency and
doubt about its motives.
Capacity
Delays at Superfund sites affect a variety of stakeholders. While postponement of
contract execution creates uncertainty for individual employees and can negatively
impact the broader economy, prolonged cleanup also causes environmental groups to
question an agency's commitment to repairing past damage. Such cleanup delays also
contribute to longstanding health concerns among residents who live near sites. Similarly,
slow or non-existent compensation for sick workers can put families in difficult financial
and emotional binds. Unfortunately, all individuals affected by such delays do not
necessarily receive timely or adequate information about causes or potential remedies,
thus reducing the number and diversity of knowledgeable stakeholders available to help
identify actionable solutions.
According to the Paducah Sun, DOE delays in bidding and awarding contracts
"baffled public officials and local firms competing for the contracts" (Walker, 2005a, 2A).
These confused officials were not restricted to local or state government offices. Even
Kentucky's Congressional delegation found itself in the dark, prompting Senate, House,
and public hearings to help understand and address the causes of the holdups. At one
point, Senator Jim Bunning acknowledged that official policies and procedures can
negatively impact timelines but also attempted to personalize the problem. He reminded
DOE, "I have a community, workers and an environmental cleanup program that have
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been waiting in limbo for over two years for something to happen. I want this fixed
quickly" (Walker, 2005j, 1A).
Concern about lack of available information related to delays also existed within
the sick workers compensation program, which was transferred from the Department of
Energy to the Department of Labor in 2005. Just three months after DOL established new
policies and procedures for administering the program, local workers who had waited
years for DOE to address their claims expressed concern that DOL was continuing the
pattern of slow response without explanation. As the Paducah Sun reported, "Bill
Boucher and other sick former Paducah nuclear workers are still waiting, three months
after the U.S. Department of Labor announced it was ready to start processing toxic
exposure claims. 'I haven't heard a thing,' said Boucher, of Paducah" (Walker, 2005s, pp.
1A, 15A).
Commitment
The compensation delays were accompanied by public expressions of high levels
of claimant frustration. Some continued to question the motives of the original program
administrator, the Department of Energy. As the Paducah Sun reported, one claimant
battling bone cancer "said he’s glad the Energy Department was replaced because it had
no reason to expedite claims, considering that the agency owns the plant and covered up
past worker exposures" (Walker, 2005i, 1A).
As the Department of Labor worked to assemble staffing, policies, and procedures
to begin processing the existing backlog of more than 25,000 claims, the newspaper
continued to cover "sick worker" frustration, as expressed in public meetings (Walker,
2005t) and through media interviews (Walker, 2005h). Most of these articles were
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accompanied by photos of elderly, ill claimants, further personalizing the disappointment
and concern. Such coverage prompted DOL leadership to defend the agency's efforts in a
September letter to the editor, noting that the Department not only had met all deadlines
since assuming program administration but also had completed some tasks ahead of
schedule (Lipnic, 2005, 4A). In response, the adult daughter of a deceased worker
submitted her own letter, in which she remarked that "[t]he delay and transfer to a more
efficient agency still results in workers dying before anyone looks at their claims"
(Sparkman, 2005, 4A). Thus, through retrospective sensemaking about an incredibly
time-sensitive issue, the Department of Labor's efforts were conflated with years of DOE
compensation delays.
The same year, another media narrative was driven by Department of Energy
delays. In this case, the long-awaited awarding of a multimillion dollar cleanup contract
experienced a setback when numerous bidders protested the process's outcome. By filing
complaints with the Government Accountability Office, these potential contractors set in
motion bureaucratic procedures that included extensive process reviews by both GAO
and DOE, led to the re-bidding of the contract, and ultimately held up transfer of cleanup
responsibilities for nearly a year.
Although these events were instigated by private companies who filed formal
protests, Paducah Sun coverage laid the blame squarely at the feet of the Department of
Energy, publishing such headlines as "DOE Again Delays Plant Cleanup" (Walker,
2005j). In light of such tenacious justifications, DOE struggled to mount a defense.
Battling a media narrative that portrayed the agency as overly-bureaucratic and prone to
delays, DOE asserted that it was, in fact, expediting the process by rebidding the contract.
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According to agency spokesman Mike Waldron, when faced with a formal GAO hearing,
the Department "decided to re-evaluate the bids in an effort to make a selection as
quickly as possible...to ensure that quality cleanup continues" (Walker, 2005j, 1A).
Despite this assertion, frustration with the continued delays eventually led Senator Jim
Bunning to protest a nomination for the agency's new undersecretary from the Senate
floor (Walker, 2005k, 10A).
Businesses and elected officials were not the only stakeholders angered by the
cleanup delays. In a March 2007 letter collected during the public comment period of the
Property Acquisition study, one resident wrote to U.S. DOE:
We need this fiasco over with. I personally, [sic] do not wish to leave my
daughter a contaminated piece of crap… I’m old, uneducated and perhaps don’t
comprehend all that’s being considered, but I do recognize gobbledegoop when I
hear it. (U.S. DOE, 2007, pp. H-195-H-196)
Such statements reflect the high levels of distrust and anger that had accumulated during
years of delays.
Expectations
The cleanup contractor procurement protests exemplify the ways in which lack of
information can combine with frustration and negative prior experiences to affect
sensemaking. According to the Paducah Sun, bidder protests provided only "the latest of
several delays since DOE announced in 2003 that it would seek bids... With little
explanation, the bid process was twice delayed before [the contractor] was selected"
(Walker, 2005b, 1A). As the newspaper pointed out, such postponements can "breed
[economic] uncertainty" (Walker, 2005v, 1A); however, the Sun also noted that prior
cleanup contract changes had resulted in employees from the old contractor simply
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transferring to the new, indicating that the same outcome would be probably occur when
a new contract was finally awarded. In this way, the newspaper explicitly promoted
retrospective sensemaking to help readers make determinations about the employees'
future.
Of course, the Sun also was careful to point out that the procurement delays did
not occur in a vacuum. One editorial flatly stated, "For the bureaucrats at the U.S.
Department of Energy, time is a very elastic concept," further explaining that "[i]n the
world of DOE, a time frame could last for years, perhaps even decades." The author
based this conclusion on a history of slow cleanup progress at the PGDP site. He went on
to explain the context:
Officials at DOE clearly are in no hurry to help Paducah or to remove
contaminated material from the plant. In the late 1980s, DOE began studying and
categorizing contaminated waste at the plant. A decade passed before the agency
removed a single barrel of waste... The Paducah area is trapped in DOE’s
bureaucratic time zone, which is years behind even the normal pace of
government work. (Paducah Sun Editor, 12/28/2005, 4A)
Interestingly, this hard-hitting editorial was published in response to a news article that
had run the previous week in which state regulatory officials remarked that DOE's
cleanup efforts had markedly improved during the preceding two years (Walker, 2005v);
thus, the Sun editor invoked prior experiences to discount public reports of more recent
agency progress.
Similar levels of frustration were expressed by claimants awaiting compensation
through the federal sick workers program. With information slow to reach individual
applicants directly, some relied on anecdotal evidence to determine the extent of
continued delays. In one example, a claimant suffering neuropathy induced by exposure
to lead-based industrial cleaners told the Paducah Sun, "I talked to someone at the union
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hall and he said he knew of four or five [employees] who have lead poisoning and haven't
been paid" (Walker, 2005s, 15A). At public meetings, a number of program applicants
expressed additional concern that their claims were being evaluated through exposure
reconstructions developed by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health,
which relied on old, inaccurate, or incomplete DOE records. After years of waiting for
compensation under DOE administration, one sick worker remarked, "I'm really going
downhill and all they can do is think up different ways to postpone things" (Walker,
2005s, 15A).

Problems Still Remain
I'm not worried at your view of my credibility. But if I was a "cleanup contractor" at
PGDP, I'd be very careful about statements of credibility. A heck of a lot of public
money has been spent out there, but the biggest, most expensive problems still
remain... [Q]uestions about my credibility from one of these "cleanup contractors"
rate really low on my scale of concerns.

--Rural Thoughts, May 9, 2010

As the tension between the environmentalist and the plant contractor in the
Environmental/Health Future Vision focus group spilled over into the blogosphere,
the activist raised the specter of delays in plant cleanup to further question the
contractor's credibility. By constructing his argument around the incomplete plant
cleanup process and a history of delays, the environmentalist attacked the contractor's
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competence directly. By invoking the expenditure of public money without adequate
results, he also implied that the contractor was complicit in wasting taxpayer dollars.

Positioning himself as the hero of his narrative, the author took a stance
directly opposing ongoing cleanup delays and the perceived misuse of public funds.
Unfortunately, this also laid the groundwork for personal animosity with the
contractor, whom the author rhetorically implied was directly involved in the negative
aspects of the cleanup process. Rather than establishing a basis for building
convergent discourse, this adversarial relationship became part of a broader narrative
that centered on incompetence and dishonesty.

Secrecy, Deception, and Manipulation
According to Heath and Palenchar (2007), "Research has demonstrated that
industry and government regulatory officials are not considered the most trusted sources
of risk information" (p. 124). In the face of long-term adversarial binaries pitting The
Government against The Public, relational deterioration therefore should not be
surprising. However, lengthy delays coupled with a history of slow- or non-disclosure by
DOE and other agencies have created additional opportunities for accusations of secrecy,
deception, and manipulation to become embedded in the PGDP discourse. Such
accusations are deeply problematic for risk-related sensemaking. As Heath and Nathan
(1990) note, "When publics believe they lack access to information, they are prone to
seek it and interpret it idiosyncratically as well as evaluate risk conditions negatively" (p.
18).
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Lack of disclosure can adversely affect trust in ways that are difficult to
overcome. As Fischhoff (1995) puts it, "[I]n risk (or other) communication, the damage
can be irreversible if relations with one's communicants are poisoned. A shadow of a
doubt can be difficult to erase" (p. 137). Low levels of accessible information over a
prolonged period of time can combine with minimal lay expertise in technical areas to
reduce sensemaking capacity within a community. Continuous exposure to angry
comments about both agency motives and competence can create blind spots that
promote assumptions of duplicity while impeding communicative convergence. Past
experiences indicating an agency's reluctance to disclose can leave stakeholders
wondering what is being "hidden" from sight. As Dunsby (2004) puts it, "[T]he shortterm benefit of suppressing negative information may be outweighed by the long-term
costs of a loss of trust in the institutions" (p. 286).
Capacity
In a situation fraught with high levels of uncertainty, PGDP stakeholders are
aware of their need for information to support decision-making. As one Future Vision
focus group participant put it, "I’m not a nuclear physicist or an engineer; you know.
What’s the life expectancy of that stuff? How is it affecting the environment? [I]s there
severe contamination out there?" Recognizing the potential sensitivity of site-related
information for national security, a participant in another session noted that

you don’t have to get specific, but give generals -- hey, this is what you’re really
dealing with in actuality, you know... Just a better idea of what’s there, so you
know better what they could and couldn’t do with it. Physically, what’s there?
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Many stakeholders, however, feel that even such general information frequently is
unavailable, with one focus group attendee asserting, "DOE’s not very good at keeping
you informed."

Distrust of the Department of Energy is compounded in some sectors by distrust
of local media. Numerous Future Vision focus group participants from the environmental,
health, and education sectors emphatically criticized the Paducah Sun for promoting a
distinct editorial stance that, they felt, stood in direct opposition to the free flow of
information. Skepticism about the newspaper's credibility bubbled over when one focus
group participant remarked, "There’s memos that prove that local media would not allow
[exposure-related] information to get out until it finally broke in the, was it the
Washington Post or something?"

With a limited number of sources perceived as credible, some stakeholders have
elected to disengage entirely from formal communication processes. At one point, several
members of the statutorily-mandated PGDP Citizens Advisory Board -- including the
chair -- resigned, "claiming DOE was not listening to members and was withholding
information" (Walker, 2005d, p. 12A). Later, members of the local advocacy
organization Active Citizens for Truth also opted out of both the Property Acquisition
and the Future Vision studies. By disengaging from the formal discourse, these
constituencies have further reduced the number and diversity of perspectives available to
jointly make sense of site-related matters.
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Commitment
As more and more stakeholders have withdrawn from communication activities,
perceptions of DOE and other agencies have continued to deteriorate in some segments
of the community. Newspaper coverage has described a federal whistleblower lawsuit in
which former DOE contractors were charged with deliberately underreporting employee
exposures to maximize contractor performance fees from the agency. Many sick workers
and their families thus have laid blame for the incomplete and erroneous exposure data
primarily at DOE's feet. According to the Paducah Sun, claimants felt that the NIOSH
exposure assessments on which compensation decisions were based were "flawed"
specifically because they relied "heavily on exposure data, or lack of it, from the U.S.
Department of Energy and its partner contractors that ran the plant until six years ago"
(Walker, 2005e, pp. 1A, 10A).

The newspaper reported that claimants attending a NIOSH-led public meeting
described the DOE documentation as "incorrect, inaccurate, and incomplete," citing
recently-declassified memos that describe such previously-unreported events as the 1974
dumping of worker radiation-monitoring badges into a landfill. Such reports prompted
emotional responses in some corners of the community, with one public meeting
participant calling the exposure of workers to hazardous substances without their
knowledge "a human rights violation" (Walker, 2005e, 10A). This anger was echoed by
a local educator who participated in a Future Vision focus group and remarked that
"[t]hose responsible for doing this should be held accountable. So far I don’t think
anybody’s ever been held accountable for what went on out there." The educator
explicitly linked DOE's perceived culture of secrecy to negative environmental and health
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impacts from the PGDP, saying, "When it was built, it was a top secret facility. It was
built. Never mind the contamination and the disease and everything else that facility’s
caused."
Discoveries of agency non-disclosures have continued to fan stakeholder concerns
about deliberate exposure-related misinformation and the consequences for
environmental and public health. Some individuals have attempted to allay these fears
through the use of humor. As one Future Vision focus group participant remarked, "[T]he
local joke around here is all the deer and animals on that wildlife refuge glow in the
dark." However, other stakeholders see no humor in the situation. Instead, they see a
troubling pattern indicating that both DOE's motives and its information should always
be questioned. According to one local environmental activist, "DOE has a sordid history
of experimentation on people without their knowledge or consent. Who knows what is
really going on" (Donham, 2005b, para. 7)?

Once committed to a perception of DOE as duplicitous and manipulative, some
stakeholders extend that assessment to any organization or individual seen as connected
to the agency. Even university-based research teams are not immune to this guilt-byassociation phenomenon. For example, the "real" motives behind the Stakeholder Future
Vision Study were questioned extensively and repeatedly by one local activist, who
believed that the hypothetical site scenarios were designed to trigger and document
support for pre-determined options that served DOE's secret "plans" for future site use.
Upon contacting the university's Office of Research Integrity to register his concerns, he
was read an excerpt from the narrative that the team had submitted to the Institutional
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Review Board describing, in part, the Community-Based Participatory Communication
[CBPC] methodology on which portions of the project protocol were built:

CBPC thus favors decentralization and democracy, people involvement and
dialogue, interpretative, horizontal, and bottom-up perspectives. It posits an
alternative and, to some, a complementary conceptualization of communication
that does not model the process as a linear, one-way, top-down transmission of
information and persuasive messages. (Appendix A)
Already believing the study to be corrupt and deceptive, the activist tenaciously grasped
on to one word in the description: "persuasive." He later wrote a blog asserting that a
staff member at the Office of Research Integrity had told him that the study "was about
using these 'visualizations' and how they worked in persuading people, at least that's how
I remember it" (Donham, 2010b). He went on to argue that

one thing is clear - this is an attempt to get a lot of momentum to build a nuclear
power plant at the PGDP site - without making much of an effort to involve the
community at large. And, Mitch McConnell's name is all over it. But it's all over
now, because they have been "outed." So, the best thing these folks can do is
come clean about what they are really up to in their so-called "study" in Paducah.
I'm pretty sure that the whole project is based in serious deception, secrecy, and
manipulation. (para. 5)
Thus, existing negative perceptions about and distrust of DOE were extended to include
even newcomers to the scene.
Expectations
When Paducah and the nation learned about DOE's lack of disclosure regarding
past worker exposures, both at the PGDP and nationally across the nuclear complex, the
agency's credibility was seriously damaged (Bruce & Becker, 2007). Even after
Department of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson issued a public apology on behalf of the
agency in 1999, investigative articles in the New York Times and the Washington Post
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continued uncovering evidence of prior DOE bad acts, including refusal to compensate
former employees for their work-related illnesses. It is on this shaky foundation that
stakeholders must engage in PGDP-related sensemaking.

In such an atmosphere, anecdotal evidence can be very important for making
credibility judgments, and public meetings have provided opportunities for workers to
share such anecdotes. At one NIOSH meeting, a former employee described using "white
lead" lubricant at the plant, saying,

It slung the oil all over everything, including the operators. You might as well say
we took a bath in it... But they didn't tell us it would cause health problems.
(Walker, 2005l, 11A)
In late 2005, breaking news seemed to confirm suspicions about continued DOE
secrecy when a memo from the agency’s Inspector General's Office warned that the
hazardous chemical phosgene could be present in some depleted uranium cylinders stored
at the PGDP site. This news was particularly troubling to many in the community as
construction had just begun on a uranium hexafluoride recycling plant that would be
charged with reopening the cylinders. According to the Paducah Sun, the memo notes
that the "introduction of phosgene into the recycling process could be 'catastrophic'";
however, DOE had not advised the recycling facility of the issue, although the
department had been aware of the potential problem for five years (Walker, 2005u, pp.
1A, 10A). Yet again, the agency seemed to have put its own interests ahead of health and
safety concerns.
In view of such developments, low agency credibility in the community is
understandable. During the Future Vision study, the research team asked participants in
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eight different stakeholder focus groups to identify trustworthy organizations and
individuals who could serve as sources of site-related information. With the exception of
one session conducted with PGDP employees, the answer almost across the board was
"anyone but the Department of Energy" (KRCEE, 2011). A participant exchange during a
focus group for residents who live near the plant perhaps best captures the feeling, as one
attendee stated that she would accept "[n]othing from DOE because the community
around here isn't going to trust a single solitary thing they say." Another participant
commiserated, "Well, we’ve been lied to a lot over the years. We don’t know who we can
trust."

One of the Worst Abuses of Government Manipulation

[A]fter over 2 ½ hours of discussion...the meeting started to come to an end. I picked
up a notebook which had been provided, a couple handouts, and the white envelope
with the three graphics of scenario 2, build a nuclear power plant at the site, and
started to turn to walk out of the room.

At that point, a large government/university man...stood up and physically blocked me
from leaving. He asked me for the envelope with scenario 2. I said, politely, no, I want
to take it with me. He said, no, that I had to give it back, that it was a "research
instrument." I said, "but this is a public meeting, funded by federal dollars, and you
have given out this document in a public meeting, and I want to take it with me." He
said, very threateningly, still blocking my way, that I couldn’t take it, and if I tried to,
they would call the police. I said, "are you claiming this is a privileged document?
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Documents lose their privilege when they are handed out in public." He said that they
needed it for their research...

[A]fter thinking about it over night and after having been physically intimidated and
basically mugged for the documents which were rightfully mine, I have to say that this
process is one of the worst abuses of government manipulation of the public that I
ever experienced in my 25 or more years of public involvement in environmental
issues.

--Rural Thoughts, May 6, 2010
Weick (2001) has written extensively about what he calls "cosmological
episodes" that occur in crisis situations. During these episodes, "people suddenly and
deeply feel that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system" (p. 105). As
structures and role frameworks deteriorate, a cascading effect occurs in which
meaning is lost, causing additional deterioration of role frameworks, which leads to
further loss of meaning, and on and on. It can be incredibly difficult to re-establish
order in the midst of such a spiral.
On May 5, 2010, I learned first-hand that the principles of cosmological
episodes not only apply to forest fires and terrorist attacks but also can wreak havoc
within an event as seemingly simple as a research focus group. The existing
Government/Public binaries, and the manner in which others situated our research
within that discourse, destabilized role structures in a way I did not foresee. At the
beginning of the evening, I simply could not have envisioned a situation in which
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committed participatory researchers would be perceived as threatening governmental
puppet masters. However, our team found itself in the midst of a cosmological episode
without the necessary contextual knowledge to escape.
Our attempt to protect focus group discussion triggers from being
misrepresented and biasing the study was perceived as just another Governmentsupported manipulation. As subsequent exchanges between the activist and the
university’s legal department dragged on for months and expanded to include requests
for the release both of visualizations and of the names of research participants,
institutional barriers ensured that the study – at least for this activist – became
embedded in the existing discourse of delays and secrecy. While we had entered the
field with a tremendous amount of knowledge about PGDP-related technical and
statutory matters, our research team lacked insight into the communicative context
that might have helped avoid this cosmological episode before it spiraled out of
control.

Competing Risk Perceptions
In the midst of role confusion promoted by adversarial binaries, frustration
regarding slow-moving processes, and anger related to absent or erroneous information,
individuals can find it difficult to make sense of technical risks. Further complicating
matters at Superfund sites, the risks are chronic and often multi-faceted. National
Priorities List sites can require decades for thorough cleanup. In addition, the
environmental, public health, and economic risks often compete in decision-making.
Paducah provides a prime example of just such a site. First posted to the NPL in
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1994, the site is years – if not decades – from being thoroughly remediated. As the
Paducah Sun noted in 2005, "The cleanup will take at least 14 more years and additional
work will be needed after that to make the site suitable for reuse" (Walker, 2005w, p.
4A). DOE site management has publicly recognized the challenges and has tried to
manage remediation expectations, describing extensive groundwater cleanup efforts by
saying that "[y]ou can't guarantee treating every nook and cranny"(Walker, 2005r, p. 1C).
Some in the community doubt that the PGDP environs can ever fully be
remediated. One Future Vision focus group participant argued for complete site closure
and the implementation of institutional controls, stating,
It doesn’t matter what you do to it. It’s going to be contaminated. It can’t be
cleaned up… You’re not going to be able to remove those materials in any way
that will leave it clean… I think we ought to admit we’re never going to be able to
clean this up. I don’t know what you do to it. Glass, concrete, iron, lead.
Whatever you have to do to try to just hold it there.
At the same time, some plant employees hold a very different perspective that
heavily weighs such recommendations against the economic risks of implementing them.
These individuals cite the plant’s history as a major regional economic driver as reason
either to continue operations or to remediate the site for future industrial use. According
to one employee focus group participant, people need to
learn the history of what’s been done here, gaseous diffusion. There’s not just
negative spin towards that. I think generally most people think that’s negative… I
think also they need to understand the billions of dollars that’s put into the
economy here, and the homes and families it’s created here... It started as the
secret city behind the fence, and that secret city’s now a lot of nice homes. So I
think they need to understand the history, positives and of course the negatives, of
why this is no longer virgin dirt.
Such competing perspectives, often expressed in the pages of the local newspaper
or verbally in public meetings, further problematize risk-related sensemaking across the
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community and leave some stakeholders confused. As Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002)
note, "Scientific uncertainty…exacerbates risk communication problems, creates conflict,
and heightens cognitive uncertainty" (p. 321). In Paducah, the lack of opportunities for
convergent discourse, high levels of public anger and animosity, and a history of
balancing and addressing different kinds of risk have left the communicative space
dominated by competing risk perceptions.
Capacity
A key challenge for sensemaking can occur when individuals choose to
communicate only with those who have similar opinions and commitments to their own.
This form of self-selection not only reduces an individual’s direct access to conflicting
information but also deprives other sensemaking groups of his or her perspective.
According to Weick (2001), "A partner makes social construction easier [and] enlarges
the pool of data that are considered" (p. 114). However, the development of sensemaking
factions encourages polarization and, depending on the context, can marginalize some
points of view. One Future Vision focus group participant alluded to such a situation in
Paducah when she declared that the ideal community would be "a city or town where all
the communication…was not controlled by one group of people."
One sensemaking group in Paducah assumes general ignorance about technical
hazards and places its focus on better defining such hazards for others. These individuals
typically are more directly connected to the plant, to local government, or to the
economic development community. When asked about the kinds of information other
stakeholders need to make the best decisions about the site’s future, many members of
this group cite education. One plant employee participating in a Future Vision focus

133

group stated that the community needs "an educational process of what has or has not
been done out here through the years," while another noted the need
to have a very clear and very frank statement of the absolute worst level of
toxicity and…maybe even get into just letting people know the difference…that
it’s not the radiation that’s gonna get ‘em, it’s the toxicity of things. You know,
maybe folks can handle some level of conversation about that.
When federal agencies have attempted to provide such technical information,
however, some community stakeholders have questioned their findings. The ATSDR
Public Health Assessment has particularly come under fire. During the Future Vision
study listening tour, one local health activist remarked that,
What you’re seeing in their ASTDR [sic] reports is a lot of good information, and
they do capture a lot of things in the buildings. But then it’s almost like I’ve got
the real facts of the workers, and it’s not matching what you’re assessing here…
When one of the investigating officials, a federal level investigator, looked at this
very issue he said, "There’s something weird here." He goes, "There’s just too
much sickness in this area."
In this way, technical information provided by federal agencies is trumped by anecdotal
evidence from other constituencies. This phenomenon was made explicit in a Paducah
Sun letter to the editor in which the surviving child of a deceased plant employee
remarked, "During public meetings, sponsored by DOE and DOL, the most informative
data came from workers or family members who relayed stories of exposure. Meetings
were a reunion for many and validation of the exposure-related illnesses" (Sparkman,
2005, 4A).
Such conflicting sources and types of information render sensemaking
challenging for those stakeholders who sit in the middle. As one local physician noted in
a Future Vision focus group,
You hear all kinds of war stories around here. I hear them in the emergency room
about the contaminated water out there and the amount of cancer that we see, and
we do see a lot of cancer in the Paducah area. I think it’s kind of a high risk area
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for cancer. To say that’s causing it, I’m not sure we can say that, but it certainly
makes you nervous about it.
In a community that sees myriad plant-related public meetings conducted by
numerous federal, state, university, and local actors, such confusion may reflect what one
PGDP employee calls "low turnout and public involvement" regarding site issues.
Several stakeholders have noted that only individuals directly invested in making a
specific argument participate in most of the meetings. Consequently, the foregrounding
of discord at public meetings has encouraged some more moderate community members
to opt out of the process, leaving them to note, as the physician did, "I guess I’m not
really aware of how dangerous all that stuff is out there, except I just hear the scuttlebutt
around the community about it, and I hear…talk about how it’s just awful, and it may be
just awful."
Commitment
As disputes about risk levels have continued through the community over more
than two decades, some stakeholders have very vocally asserted that hazard levels are
higher than reported assessments have indicated. Via interpersonal interactions, blogs,
and community meetings, these individuals have acted as modern town criers, trying to
keep the community informed of perceived threats to its well-being and to urge protective
and compensatory actions. Meanwhile, other interests have been equally vocal in
promoting perceived economic advantages provided by the plant and in attempting to
avoid feared fiscal devastation from its pending closure. Such tenacious public
justifications of positions have potentially contributed to blind spots that ignore
competing perspectives, particularly in the areas of environmental stewardship, public
health threats, and economic risks.
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According to some stakeholders, billions of dollars and more than twenty years of
cleanup activities have yielded little in terms of environmental restoration. As one local
activist and blogger notes, "Unfortunately, the worst problems at the site, which are
numerous, are yet to be addressed" (Donham, 2011a). Another local activist is equally
concerned about plans to dispose of future site-related waste, stating in a Future Vision
focus group discussion,
Twenty million to build a hole—to dig a hole, and get it ready for waste. So, even
the waste of the federal government, if they can’t make a hole safe for radiation
with twenty million dollars, you gotta wonder.
In addition to waste disposal, this stakeholder also expressed concern about suggestions
by some in the community that, upon ceasing operations, the PGDP be replaced with a
nuclear power plant. "When God built a nuclear reactor, he put it 63 million miles away,"
he said, adding, "That’s where they ought to be."
Stakeholders who live near the site have questioned whether government agencies
or their contractors can ever truly understand the nature of the site’s environmental
impacts and the associated resident anger. One public meeting attendee during the
Property Study put it this way:
I’m just tired of people being run over in this area. And you know all of you other
people you come in from other places. You all don’t live out here. Come and live
in our houses. Come and live in our spots. Get out there for 35 years and drink
and walk over the stuff that we’ve walked through. Then you go back and you
bring your families. Would you…build a house out here and bring your family
down here to live knowing what contamination is out here? Be honest. I know
you wouldn’t… [N]one of you all. (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-157)
Clearly, concerns about environmental cleanup are closely linked with concerns
about the contamination’s potential effects on human health. During a March 2007 public
briefing about the Property Acquisition study, one attendee explicitly linked health
problems experienced by members of the community with DOE environmental practices:
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"[A] lot of you people that I know have medical problems. I have medical problems…
We are no closer to the plumes being cleaned up now than it was in 1988" (U.S. DOE,
2007, p. H-157). Another attendee at the same meeting asserted, "All of us that live on
Metropolis Lake Road, there’s, I would say, 80% all have cancer of one kind of [sic]
another" (U.S. DOE, 2007, H-157). Such concerns have spilled over into litigation, with
the filing of a class action suit against U.S. DOE (Walker, 2006a). As Gaetke, Gaetke,
and Bowen (2008) note, such litigation can greatly constrain Superfund community
members’ involvement in educational and capacity-building activities that could support
improved sensemaking processes.
As the media have pointed to the potential for higher-than-reported risk levels at
the PGDP, some stakeholder fears have continued to grow. For instance, a 2005 report
was filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Nuclear Information and
Resource Service, "a networking center for citizens and environmental activists
concerned about nuclear power" (NIRS, 2013). This report stated that "uranium may
cause or contribute to genetic mutations, tumors, birth defects, neurological damage, and
cellular level toxicity" (Walker, 2005f, p. 1C). Although PGDP personnel responded that
the uranium stored at the plant "poses no risk to employees or nearby residents," the
statement did little to allay the concerns of some stakeholders.
Community members have continued to voice both these concerns and their
dissatisfaction with previously-conducted health assessments. During a June 2006 public
meeting, one attendee asked why "a health study of this area" had not been conducted
(U.S. DOE, 2007, H-69). A former Citizens Advisory Board chair elaborated when he
asked the Courier-Journal (U.S. DOE, 2007),
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How do you value two decades or more of living in a toxic environment, having
family members getting ill, and seeing the value and heritage of your property go
downhill? (p. H-80)
In response to the ATSDR health assessment, fifteen residents of the Water Policy
district signed a statement to U.S. DOE that the report "lacks human health data. Even
worker health data was not available at the time the document was published. Confidence
in the document is very low" (U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-202). The letter angrily asks,
Who – is – kidding – who? Eloquent requests for Congressional funding to
protect the health of residents immediate to PGDP are delivered on a near annual
basis. Huge amounts of money is allocated [sic]. Studies abound, Removal [sic]
actions (dumping their junk on others) ‘make it pretty and seem nice and clean.’
Congress should be as enraged as we are! WE WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT
WE ARE SICK AND DYING OUT HERE AND NO RELIEF IS IN SIGHT.
(U.S. DOE, 2007, p. H-201-H-202)
Such skepticism about government risk assessments and subsequent cleanup
actions bled over into Future Vision focus group meetings, where one participant
remarked, "The government is payin’ the families a hundred and fifty thousand dollars a
piece for workin’ in these jobs, so I guess there is some risk... You know, they’ve got
these illnesses." He further asserted, "[I]t’s hard for me to listen to [former employees]
telling those kinds of stories and not get emotional about it," adding,
My God, I hate that that thing’s there, but what do you do? It’s there. I think the
site ought to be made into a memorial, something like Auschwitz. It ought to be a
reminder to hopefully prevent anything like that from ever happening again.
Such emotional commitment and strong metaphors underscore the deep commitment of
some stakeholders to an image of the PGDP as a lethal threat to their community.
In contrast to these stakeholders, others see the plant primarily as a community
economic asset that is being threatened with closure. With approximately 1,200
employees and a $121 million payroll, plant operations play an important role in the
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regional economy (KRCEE, 2011). Local business leaders have long recognized the
importance of recruiting new industry to replace the employment vacuum that will be
created when the plant closes, while also noting the danger of allowing blind spots to
prevent such strategic planning efforts. As a former director of the Greater Paducah
Economic Development Council told the Paducah Sun, "I, for one, would hate to think
we just sat here and let these next five years go by on the basis of, 'well, that'll never
happen’" (Walker, 2005p, p. 1C).
One U.S. Senator, Jim Bunning, actually promoted this blind spot within the
community by asserting that the PGDP "may well stay open longer than the projected
five years" (Walker, 2005q). A subsequent Sun editorial warned the Senator and others
against tenaciously justifying the plant’s continued operations in light of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. The Sun’s editor wrote,
Sen. Bunning's assessment of the situation simply is not persuasive enough to
sidetrack the community's efforts to prepare for the closing of the plant in 2010 or
2011… No one in this area relishes the thought of losing such an important regional
employer. But pragmatic concerns should take precedence [and] leaders should resist
the understandable temptation to indulge in wishful thinking when they contemplate
the eventual demise of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. (p. 4A)
Expectations
Risk-related expectations at the PGDP NPL site are rendered problematic on a
number of levels. The Government/Public binary has constructed a legacy of
confrontational communication concerning the plant. Delayed information and actions
related to cleanup and compensation have confused and frustrated many stakeholders.

139

Historic lack of disclosure about exposures and risk has fostered a discourse rooted in
suspicion and anger. It is in this environment in which people must make risk-related
judgments to inform key decisions.
One Future Vision focus group participant expressed his concern about trusting
government and related assessments of technical hazard, stating there has been "an
attitude about the environment, like, basically, that the risks that were real didn’t really
exist, and so people were thrust into really high-risk areas and there wasn’t consideration
given to it." However, the compensation of nuclear workers for job-related illnesses,
along with the fact that the Department of Energy has spent approximately $70,000 a
year providing free municipal water to residents who live near the plant, have proven this
attitude erroneous in the past, leading stakeholders to question current DOE assurances
about risk levels. As the Keystone Center notes, "Fear of potential dangers is a
completely rational response to our survival instinct" (p. 17).
On one level, U.S. DOE personnel have accepted responsibility for the agency’s
lack of credibility with the public, with one plant manager telling the Paducah Sun that
previous PGDP groundwater contamination "doesn’t speak well of DOE’s past practices"
(p. Walker, 2006b, 11A). Rank-and-file employees, however, have expressed some
concern that the ways in which previous cleanup management has contributed to
erroneously-heightened risk perceptions. As one plant worker said in a Future Vision
focus group,
[B]y putting controls you’re giving the whole area such a stigma that, I mean we
already see it already. We’ve got institutional controls and outlaws that to me
greatly exaggerate the risks involved with them anyway when you go up Little
Bayou and Big Bayou…You’re holding the stigma.
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The communicative devolution from such drastically competing risk perceptions
can occur in two stages. First, discord arises through legitimate disagreement about risk
levels, which sometimes relate to the differential prioritization of personal and
community values that help determine risk tolerance. Secondly, these disagreements can
further escalate when "risk" becomes a secondary construct through which other battles
are waged. As Fischhoff (1995) notes, "Often controversies over risk are surrogates for
concern over process. People feel that they have been treated shabbily. However, they
discover that being disgruntled does not have legal standing, while complaining about
risks does" (p. 143)

When the sensemaking environment has been constructed on adversarial binaries,
frustration about bureaucratic delays, and anger over perceived secrecy and manipulation,
the foundation is laid for conflict. As the Keystone Center (2005) notes, "[T]he causes of
the controversy are often not the facts of the risk exposure, but rather what is being done
(or not being done) to safeguard the public, and who is taking responsibility" (p. 26). In
Paducah, threats to capacity, commitment, and expectations have made it difficult to find
communicative space in which the joint identification of problems and the coconstruction of solutions can occur. To improve sensemaking at this and other Superfund
sites, new processes are needed that increase the number and diversity of actors,
minimize the effects of blind spots, and better define roles, responsibilities, and
expectations in ways that promote communicative convergence.
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Real Priorities

I believe that this is a DOE funded study of how they can manipulate "public opinion."
It is a mind control experiment in the guise of a scientific study. They are seeing if
they can create these computerized images of the future and then get people to push
certain buttons on their remote controls right after looking at these images.

...Back when Hazel O'Leary was Sec. of Energy under Pres. Clinton, before 911, there
was a push to open up the DOE and lots of information was released about things that
DOE had done in the past. Among other things they had done, revealed by documents
obtained by the Louisville Courier Journal, they had purposefully released UF6 gas
on our region to see what it would do in the environment, among other things. I
pointed out to the CAB that once again DOE is experimenting on our community...

As I drove home, I thought, what an absurdity that this ridiculous, meaningless, nontransparent, manipulative so-called "study" is getting well funded while actual on-theground clean-up of the environment is being significantly cut. But that's DOE for you.
It shows what their real priorities are.

--Rural Thoughts, March 20, 2011

Nearly a year after the cosmological episode in the Environmental/Health
focus group, the local activist had become even more entrenched in his beliefs about
study motives. As human subjects protections prevented the naming of research
participants, he was even more certain that the project was managed by U.S. DOE,
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along with other governmental and economic interests. Even as the research team
prepared to move into the final phase of the study, which included public meetings
featuring the scenarios that he had previously deemed the team deceptive for not
releasing, he doubled-down on his assertion that the project was manipulative and
designed to reach a predetermined outcome.

For my part, I learned many important lessons during the Paducah Future
Vision Study, but perhaps none more important than the complicated ways in which
sensemaking strategies are negatively affected by capacity, commitment, and
expectations. During the cosmological focus group episode, I found myself
constrained by the homogeneity of my own life experiences; my commitment to my
roles as researcher and employee blinded me to the idea that I could be seen as
anything else; and my expectations of a positive, engaged experience rendered me
tongue-tied as the events unfolded. I left the field asking myself two questions: If such
a disintegration of relations can occur during an explicitly participatory process, what
must more traditional communicative venues be like, and how can we improve
communicative processes for Superfund communities to reduce the chances of this
type of incident occurring elsewhere?

Copyright © Anna Goodman Hoover 2013
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Chapter Five: Toward a New Model
Synthesizing the Evidence
By implementing sensemaking theory as a diagnostic tool, this study extends our
ability to identify and address key challenges for sustained communication in chronic risk
communities that require the intervention of multiple governmental actors. At this
writing, agencies have relied upon The Seven Cardinal Rules and related best practices
for more than two decades. During this time, the implementation of these practices has
played an important role in the ways in which those most affected by contamination make
sense of risk, not only through the explicit sharing of information but through ongoing
interpretation of the processes by which that information is provided. Therefore, it is
increasingly necessary to evaluate not only whether the approaches have been effective
for information sharing but if, in fact, they have had consequences in terms of
relationships among site actors. The novel application of sensemaking theory through this
study provides one avenue through which such evaluation might occur.
The myriad risks -- including environmental, health, and economic -- associated
with the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Superfund site have affected numerous
stakeholders for decades. These stakeholders rely upon complex sensemaking strategies
that contribute to and are reified through enactment, an ongoing, iterative process through
which people create and reify the very environments that then constrain them. As Weick
(1988, 1995, 2001) points out, enacted sensemaking is constrained in three key areas:
capacity, commitment, and expectations. When capacity is limited due either to a small
number of individuals or to a homogeneity of perspectives, sensemaking is challenged.
Further, an individual's or group's commitment to a specific perspective constrains
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sensemaking through the formation of blind spots, which can contribute to attempts to
tenaciously justify the correctness of the existing perspective, even in the face of
evidence to the contrary. Finally, when prior experiences inform interpretations of current
actions, retrospective sensemaking can lead to confusion regarding the motives of
specific actors or the efficacy of potential solutions. In the case of the Paducah Gaseous
Diffusion Plant, all three of these sensemaking constraints are implicated across five
themes: 1) The Government; 2) The Public; 3) Delays; 4) Secrecy, Deception, and
Manipulation; and 5) Competing Risk Perceptions.
Within each identified theme, capacity is constrained in one of three ways. First,
the perception of capacity is constrained by the reduction of diverse perspectives into
overarching constructs, such as The Government or The Public. Second, actual capacity
is constrained through the withdrawal of constituencies from the collaborative
sensemaking field, as when activists opt out of public processes after making accusations
of secrecy or deception. Third, capacity is constrained when the number of
knowledgeable stakeholders is lessened due to lack of necessary information to support
decision-making. Each of these capacity-lowering mechanisms reduces the number and
diversity of actors available to contribute to the collective sensemaking that could
promote convergent understandings of previously discordant concepts. Consequently,
siloed sensemaking groups reaffirm their own distinct sets of risk perceptions, which then
come into conflict in the broader discourse.
Commitment is a sensemaking constraint that similarly appears across all five
themes. Stakeholders sometimes commit to depictions of all agency personnel, and even
those with only tangential relationships to agencies, as members of the monolothic The
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Government. Conversely, agency officials – and even community members themselves -sometimes group all non-agency stakeholders together as members of the homogenized
The Public. Personal commitment to one or the other of these roles can contribute to
blind spots regarding the motives of others. In addition, delays and lack of information
can lead stakeholders to very publicly justify their specific stances for or against certain
risk perceptions, which can make it difficult to engage in the kinds of convergent
communication that could encourage stakeholders to build "some degree of agreement"
about risk-related concepts (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009, p. 14).
Finally, expectations constrain sensemaking across the five themes by influencing
perceptions of roles, responsibilities, motives, and actions. Past activities by The
Government, including perceived delays and secrecy, have promoted distrust among
some PGDP stakeholders. Similarly, stakeholder expressions of fear and anger, as well as
risk perceptions rooted in values other than technical hazard, have colored agency
interpretations of The Public. When combined across themes, these constraints contribute
to a discourse that often is rooted in frustration and distrust, rendering convergent
communication extremely difficult.
In many ways, the constructs of The Government and The Public closely align
with the Seven Cardinal Rules approach to risk communication, through which an agency
must help a public fill some perceived gap, whether that gap is based in lack of
information or lack of understanding. By conceptualizing the numerous governmental
and community risk perspectives as simply The Government and The Public, the
language encourages each "side" to view the other as having a far more limited range of
points of view and potential responses than actually exist. Delays and perceived secrecy

146

subsequently are cited as affirming this relational divide, further inhibiting the possibility
for multiple stakeholders to work together to create shared understandings.
In light of these findings, this chapter directly addresses the study's second
research question: what are the related implications for improving agency risk
communication approaches? I suggest that a reconceptualization of risk communication is
needed that moves stakeholders to the center of the paradigm. By acknowledging the
multiplicity of stakes in site-related risks and decisions, this model increases the capacity
for shared sensemaking while decreasing the likelihood of adversarial interactions that
contribute to the formation of blind spots. Over time, this model should promote
increased levels of trust, which would improve expectations and create a more positive
framework within which to make retrospective sense of risk-related issues.
This paradigmatic shift needs to occur on two levels: linguistically and
processually. First, the language of Seven Cardinal Rules should be amended to highlight
agencies’ collaborative roles as fellow stakeholders rather than asserting their dominant
roles as regulators or potentially responsible parties. Second, the context-specific
operationalization of these new guidelines, along with subsequent risk communication
activities, should take place within a new framework that builds specifically upon
processes promoting convergent communication. To this end, I propose a stakeholderdriven model that encourages participatory processes for designing, implementing, and
evaluating risk communication activities at Superfund sites. This chapter closes with a
discussion of model limitations and the identification of future research directions.
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Implications
Adapting Seven Cardinal Rules to Increase Sensemaking Capacity
As Weick (1988) notes, "If action is the means to understanding, then the number
and quality of actors available to do that acting and interpretation become crucial
variables" (p. 312). Thus, increasing the diversity of sensemaking participants can help
agencies avoid situations in which "[s]mall events are carried forward, cumulate with
other events, and over time systematically construct an environment that is a rare
combination of unexpected simultaneous failures" (Weick, 1988, p. 309). Unfortunately,
the current language through which the Seven Cardinal Rules are explicated constrains
the perceived number and diversity of actors available for sensemaking.
Atkinson (2005) notes that "[i]n the social arena, group identity negates 'that
which it is not,' by creating false unities among group members which deny the complex
multiplicities of which 'the group' is composed'" (p. 81). Thus, when diverse individuals
and organizations are grouped under a single term like The Public, sensemaking is
threatened through a reduction in the perceived number of distinct actors and viewpoints.
In the case of Paducah, the blanket term The Public is used by a number of sources across
multiple channels as a proxy for diverse stakeholders. Despite a small aside within the
Seven Cardinal Rules, the dominance of The Public phrasing encourages agency
personnel to perceive a single non-agency point of view rather than recognizing that
numerous viewpoints differ widely. Therefore, officials who view The Public as
representing a lone, distinct perspective may anticipate little benefit from engaging
multiple groups and individuals in dialogue.
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In addition to decreasing sensemaking capacity, the binary of The
Government/The Public that is reified through the Seven Cardinal Rules also promotes
adversarial relationships through acts of othering. Johnson et al. (2004) have described
othering as an identity construction device through which "one magnifies and enforces
projections of apparent differences from oneself," further noting that "persons who are
treated as other often experience marginalization, decreased opportunities, and exclusion"
(p. 254). McCarthy and Dimtriades (2000) go even further, stating that by engaging in
othering a "social actor consolidates his identity by a complete disavowal of the merits
and existence of his social other. Here, one becomes 'good' by constructing the other as
'evil'" (pp. 173-174). The Paducah case provides numerous examples of such processes at
work, with The Government frequently portrayed as slow, bureaucratic, secretive, or
even deceptive, while The Public is often depicted as lacking either technical knowledge,
the ability to adequately apply technical information to decision-making, or the control
that would allow The Public to bear real influence on governmental decisions. Such
depictions underscore McCarthy and Dimitriades's assertion that "[r]esentment enters
normatively into" such spaces, where alignment- and realignment-commitments are made
(p. 174).
To directly address this problematic binary, I suggest that the language of Seven
Cardinal Rules be adapted to situate an agency as one among many stakeholders, along
with residents, employees, activists, the media, and others. Such a change would
foreground the diversity of perspectives rather than referring to a singular The Public. On
the surface, this goal could be accomplished rather easily, simply by changing all
appearances of The Public to "stakeholders," thus diversifying the frame within which
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non-agency participants are viewed. In practice, however, potential implementation
challenges will need to be addressed, as discussed later in this chapter.
In addition to breaking down the existing Government/Public binary, the Rules
should go beyond advising honesty to promoting transparency through participatory
processes. As the data in this study reveal, agencies’ actions and public statements are
interpreted through complex sensemaking techniques that color perceptions regarding the
veracity of individual and organizational actors. Thus, the communication process that
agencies support should be considered as part of the organizational messages being
interpreted, in much the same way that non-verbal communication is recognized as
central to the interpretation of verbal messages. To this end, the Rules should explicitly
provide for engaged, participatory communicative processes that provide sufficient
information for stakeholders to judge for themselves the levels of honesty and openness
an agency is providing.
Revised to reflect these adjustments, the Seven Cardinal Rules would become
Guidelines for Superfund Site Communication and would read:
1. Accept and involve other site stakeholders as legitimate partners in both
the operationalization of these guidelines and the creation and evaluation
of subsequent communication-related activities.
2. Jointly plan and evaluate specific risk communication efforts with other
stakeholders.
3. Listen, respond, and incorporate stakeholder-specific concerns into
messages and engagement protocols.
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4. Engage diverse stakeholders to develop and implement open, transparent
processes that affirm honesty and multiperspectivity as central tenets for
communication activities.
5. Coordinate and collaborate communication and engagement activities with
relevant groups, including community-based, governmental, and media
stakeholders.
6. Work with stakeholder groups, including the media, to meet information
needs in appropriate, targeted ways.
7. Engage in clear, compassionate, respectful dialogue with diverse
stakeholders.
Operationalization
Boholm (2009) has called for risk communication researchers to "stop bracketing
context and systematically account for the role and importance of context in how risk is
defined and communicated, and in how this communication is received" (p. 349).
Similarly, the data in this study point to a need for agencies to engage those with the
greatest contextual knowledge – i.e., a diversity of local stakeholders -- directly in the
definition and evaluation of risk-related communication efforts. To involve disparate
voices in this process, however, will require agencies to engage in formative research
upon entering a Superfund community.
As Palenchar and Heath (2007) note, such formative efforts allow "program
planners to hear and learn from a myriad of stakeholders and stakeseekers, including
local residents, employees, health care providers, government officials, emergency
personnel, and vendors and contractors to name some major categories" (p. 123). During
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the initial stages of the PGDP Stakeholder Future Vision Study (KRCEE, 2011, p. 18),
the research team met with more than 80 individuals to help identify the multiplicity of
distinct stakeholder groups in the area, ultimately recognizing sixteen distinct stakeholder
clusters for the site:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Water Policy District Residents
Economic Development Interests
United States Enrichment Corporation Employees
Environmental/Health Advocates
Healthcare Providers
Educators
Media
Religious/Spiritual Community
Wildlife/Recreation Enthusiasts
Tourism Interests
Ballard County Stakeholders
U.S. DOE
U.S. DOE Subcontractors
McCracken/Paducah Government
PGDP Citizens Advisory Board
Regulatory Agencies

The research team then recruited a representative from each of these
constituencies to serve on a community consultation panel, helping ensure the relevance
and context-appropriateness of subsequent communication efforts for their specific
targeted groups. This panel pre-tested all focus group and public meeting protocols, as
well as all specific communication instruments, working with the research team to create
targeted activities that met the information needs of a variety of stakeholders. Ideally, a
revised Superfund risk communication infrastructure would include just such formative
activities, from listening tours to ensure that all constituencies are at the table to the
recruitment of representatives to help inform both process and message development to
the multi-level evaluation of subsequent activities. This formative work would result in
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the establishment of a Stakeholder Consultation Core. Minkler (2005) notes that such
groups are commonly used in community-based research projects to "improve
measurement instruments by making sure that questions are worded in ways that will
elicit valid and reliable responses" (p. ii3); In this case, the Core would play an even
more central role in risk communication efforts, supporting context- and stakeholderappropriate activities at every stage.
Among the first convergence-building duties for this Stakeholder Consultation
Core should be the operationalization of specific terminology contained within the
Guidelines for Superfund Site Communication. In its present form, Seven Cardinal Rules
includes taken-for-granted terminology that can be problematic when expectations differ
among stakeholders. For example, what do the words "accept and involve" mean to
different individuals? Although existing mechanisms, such as agency-sponsored public
meetings and PGDP Citizens Advisory Board activities, ostensibly support public
participation and bidirectional communication between community members and
agencies, these mechanisms do not appear to have been fully effective in Paducah. In
some cases, these mechanisms instead have been used as evidence of exclusion, as when
one local blogger wrote, "The thing that really is awful is they try to make it seem like
they want your opinion, when in reality, it's the last thing they want" (Donham, 2011a,
para. 5).
Fischhoff (1995) argues that "[p]eople want to be treated respectfully, in addition
to being leveled with" (p. 142). Moving stakeholders to the center of the risk
communication process – making them an integral part of defining terminology and
setting expectations – indicates such respect. For instance, the current Rules state that an
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agency should "[a]ccept and involve the public as a legitimate partner"; however, the
expectations for partnership are set by the agency itself, ignoring a key question – what
are the qualitative and quantitative expectations for such partnerships? By working with a
Stakeholder Consultation Core, the members of which simultaneously engage in dialogue
with their own constituencies, agencies can better set both the parameters and the
expectations for partnerships, thereby generating a more transparent, engaged process
that promotes shared understanding. In addition to promoting convergent communication,
such a process could help reduce the Arnstein Gap (Bailey, Blandford, Grossardt, &
Ripy, 2011) between citizens’ ideal levels of public involvement, which participants in
the Stakeholder Future Vision Study identified as partnership, and their actual
experienced levels of participation, which the same participants identified as between
being informed and being consulted (KRCEE, 2011).
Further, through this process of participatory operationalization, the Stakeholder
Consultation Core will play a key part in designing and implementing context-specific
evaluation plans. As Heath and Nathan (1990) note, "[F]actors of evaluation entail power,
uncertainty, understanding, and agreement" (p. 19) Thus, it is essential for stakeholders to
be included in both process and outcome evaluations. During the Stakeholder Future
Vision Study (KRCEE, 2011), two distinct, Likert-like evaluative tools were used. The
Arnstein Ladder (1969) provided an instrument through which all project participants
could gauge their desired levels of public involvement against their actual experiences,
while a standard process evaluation presented an opportunity to assess the study itself.
Other studies and efforts have used different evaluative tools. For example, the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (2012) recommends the use of logic models
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for community engagement to help "understand the expected goals and the activities that
will move…toward those goals" (p. 6). By introducing stakeholder-centered language,
the new Guidelines specifically provide space for negotiation regarding the most contextappropriate evaluation strategy – or combination of evaluation strategies – for each site.
Finally, by providing equal footing for all site-related stakeholders, including
agencies, the new language explicitly supports increased coordination and collaboration
among constituencies. As currently structured, agency-specific Superfund site risk
communication efforts at times create confusion in affected communities. In addition to
the various messages and activities generated independently by the myriad agencies
involved at a site, agencies sometimes create challenges for themselves through their own
competing messages and activities. For example, while the Future Vision Study worked
with local communities to help define acceptable future uses for the PGDP site, part of
which involved delving into questions regarding future waste disposal, U.S. DOE also
conducted unrelated public meetings specifically addressing future site waste disposal
issues, often without notifying Future Vision researchers of the activities. Some
community members consequently became confused by the similarities and differences
between the two sets of activities (KRCEE, 2011). Thus, by encouraging frequent,
horizontal communication among a variety of stakeholders at all stages, the new
Guidelines language reduces the possibility of commitment to an agency’s own activities
creating a blind spot that negates the existence of simultaneous activities being conducted
by other stakeholders, thereby creating opportunities for greater collaboration and clarity.
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Implementation: Toward a New Convergence Model
To implement the newly-formed Guidelines for Superfund Site Communication,
agencies need to work with stakeholders to create a process that improves upon the
current, largely siloed risk communication approach frequently taken at Superfund sites.
While ad hoc approaches to risk communication might be more appropriate for
addressing quickly-emerging risks, a more robust communicative infrastructure is needed
to support stakeholders facing the kinds of long-term, chronic risks present at Superfund
sites. As Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) note, "When risk communication
infrastructures are not in place, citizens will have less knowledge, as well as feel less
control, higher cognitive involvement (concern), lower behavioral involvement
(information seeking and concern voicing), more problem recognition, and more
uncertainty" (p. 346). In the long term, such lowered involvement and heightened
uncertainty can problematize sensemaking through reduced capacity and tenacious
justifications.
In its present form, Seven Cardinal Rules encourages a fairly traditional, messagecentered approach to risk communication that relies largely upon the first three
unidirectional models of public relations identified by Grunig and Grunig (1992): press
agentry and two-way asymmetrical, both of which focus on persuasion to achieve
organizational goals, and public information, which simply distributes organizational
information to an identified audience (Grunig & Grunig, 1992). Such approaches often
begin with the identification of information needs, progress through the prioritization,
design, testing, and implementation of specific messages or communicative interventions,
and end with an evaluation of the effort (see Figure 4.1). With this approach’s focus on
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the message or intervention, individual actors – along with their disparate perspectives
and commitments – are removed from the equation.
Figure 4.1. Traditional Communication Process Model.

Palenchar and Health note that "both the process and content of communication
are integral factors in increasing awareness, knowledge, positive attitudes and positive
behavioral intentions" (p. 123). Thus, a process is needed that promotes iterative,
multilateral engagement among stakeholders, ensuring that the transparency of the
process itself becomes embedded in understandings of specific messages. As the
Keystone Center (2005) notes in its risk communication primer for U.S. DOE employees,
"Participants should feel that they were adequately consulted and that they had adequate
opportunities to offer concerns or ask questions" (p. 22).
By pointing to challenges in sensemaking capacity, commitment, and
expectations, this case study indicates a need to increase the number and diversity of
perspectives at the table, to encourage constructive dialogue that informs while reducing
blind spots, and to build trust among the numerous parties affected by Superfund sites.
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Through dialogue, deliberation, and action, such a convergence-building approach would
work toward constructing shared meanings by co-creating, implementing, and evaluating
both risk messages and communication protocols. By moving stakeholders to the center
of the process, the new model would help address the call for boundary spanning,
collaboration, and shared management of risk knowledge (O'Hair, 2009).
In practice, adapting the existing communication process to include stakeholders
is deceptively simple, a matter of adding just one component, in fact. The new model (see
Figure 4.2) moves toward Grunig and Grunig’s (1992) fourth model of public relations,
two-way symmetrical, by placing the Stakeholder Consultation Core at the center of the
process and providing for its input at every stage of risk communication. Under such a
model, the Stakeholder Consultation Core would influence the development of needs
assessment tools, help prioritize identified information needs, play a key role in designing
and testing specific messages and engagement protocols, collaborate in adapting and
disseminating messages or implementing protocols, and be central to both process and
outcome evaluations.
Admittedly, the recruitment, establishment, and maintenance of the Stakeholder
Consultation Core could prove challenging, as agencies already are required to fulfill
myriad statutory obligations with very limited staff and resources. Under most
circumstances, an outside party deemed neutral by the majority of stakeholders, including
agencies and community members, might best develop and facilitate the site-specific
Consultation Core. This individual could serve as a catalyst communicator, whose
primary role White (1999) describes as "[c]reating an environment for dialogue, learning
and transformation" (p. 39). Given the complex statutory and fiscal constraints present at
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Superfund sites, whether this embodied communicative bridge among stakeholders was
recruited from a local college or university, an outside consulting firm, or another entity,
she or he would need to meet the many competencies required of a catalyst
communicator (White, 1999), including interpersonal communication, investigative
reporting, facilitation, problem-solving, participatory action, mediation, and educational
skills, while also holding particular expertise in the field of risk communication.
Figure 4.2. Convergence-Building Communication Model.

While this catalyst communicator would be charged with long-term coordination
of the Stakeholder Consultation Core, a lead organization would be charged with
requesting the Core’s involvement for specific areas of concern. For example, assistance
with the design of cleanup-related information activities might be requested by U.S. EPA,
while support for the development of engagement protocols concerning future site
disposition might be requested by U.S. DOE; however, regardless of the specific area of
informational need or the organization most able to fill that need, the Stakeholder
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Consultation Core would be a central resource engaged for the design, implementation,
and evaluation of the specific communicative projects.
As Palenchar and Health note, "An organizational culture of transparency
acknowledges and respects the information, communication and decision-making
expectations and demands of all its stakeholders and stakeseekers, and does not stagemanage them by limiting access to, propagandizing information about or manipulating
decision-making regarding risk" (p. 124). By ensuring a multiplicity of constituencies is
engaged in the risk communication process, the new model promotes exactly this kind of
transparency. Such an approach breaks down the Government/Public binary. It provides
broader understanding of processes related to bureaucratic delays, along with the distinct
roles of specific agencies involved in such delays, which could reduce frustration levels.
It supports open and honest communication among multiple constituencies, thus
promoting regular information sharing and reducing perceptions of secrecy.
Fischhoff notes that "avoiding all conflict is not a realistic, or even a legitimate,
goal for risk communication," continuing that, "[t]he best-case scenario for risk
communication (and, indeed, risk management) is having fewer, but better conflicts" (p.
144). Similarly, while no process will ever create a situation in which all participants
share a single perception of risk, a stakeholder-centered process can increase mutual
understanding of differing risk perceptions, thus opening up a convergent space for
dialogue, debate, and joint decision-making. By involving numerous participants with
diverse perspectives at every stage, this model increases capacity for sensemaking while
also building upon an iterative, dialogic approach intended to defuse adversarialism. As
the Keystone Center (2005) notes, such "collaborative dissemination of knowledge helps
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assuage fears that a particular locality is somehow being hoodwinked" (p. 25), thus
decreasing distrust and laying the groundwork for improved future sensemaking. This
model directly addresses Heath and O’Hair’s (2010) concern that "dialogue regarding
risk sufficiently include all interested parties and deal productively with their concerns
and suggestions" (p. 20). Thus, the model is designed to help stakeholders identify and
develop points of convergence (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009).
Linking Risk Communication Approaches
In addition to building communicative convergence among site stakeholders, this
model brings together the four approaches to risk communication: research translation,
policy-oriented, stakeholder-centered, and participatory. Each of these perspectives adds
value to the process. Research translation promotes the sharing of information and the
education of stakeholders, while the policy perspective acknowledges both emotions and
political realities present in the discourse. Stakeholder theory provides suggestions for
ensuring that the people who most need information receive it on their timetables, while
participatory approaches emphasize the establishment or repair of trust and rapport, thus
helping heal the contentious legacies of environmental mismanagement by and
inadequate or nonexistent risk communication from responsible parties.
With agencies included as fellow stakeholders, this convergence-building model
provides directly for access to needed technical and scientific information. Explicit
recognition of and respect for differing values and their impacts on risk perceptions
provides an environment for productive risk policy discussions. By including
representatives from a multiplicity of stakeholder groups in the Stakeholder Consultation
Core, the model provides mechanisms for determining which stakeholders are most
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affected by or most desire specific types of information and through which channels, thus
opening avenues for distinct, targeted communication efforts. By involving stakeholders
directly not only in the design, implementation, and evaluation of specific
communication efforts but also in the operationalization of the Guidelines for Superfund
Site Communication itself, the model provides transparent, open mechanisms to help
build trust and rapport among diverse constituencies.
Weick (1988) notes that "[a]ccuracy in perception comes from an expanded
response capacity" (p. 311). When individual stakeholders engage in communication at a
Superfund site, they bring to the table their own specific perceptions; however, when a
multiplicity of stakeholders participate, each representing a different point of view, the
capacity for diagnosing and solving emerging communication problems is increased. As
Weick (1988) puts it
If more people are in constant touch with the system, this will make it easier to
detect and correct anomalies and also to implant more reliable environments.
These outcomes should be especially likely when the people doing the enactment
have diverse experience, novel categories and justifications, and diverse activities
at which they are skilled and in terms of which they perceive the world. We are
not talking about specialists isolated from one another. Instead, we are talking
about heterogeneous teams of diverse people with sufficient mutual respect that
they maintain dense interaction with one another. (p. 313)
During the Stakeholder Future Vision Study, the importance of diverse
perspectives for sensemaking was brought into relief following a particularly contentious
focus group session. The meeting began with just two attendees, a plant employee and an
environmental activist, both of whom were very knowledgeable about different aspects of
the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Shortly into the meeting, the group was joined by a
third participant, a newcomer to the community who knew very little about the plant. For
more than two hours, the employee and the activist debated the pros and cons of future
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site uses for the plant, at times agreeing on key points and at other times disagreeing.
Generally speaking, the discussion between the two was respectful. At the end of the
evening, the late-comer told the research team, "I just learned a whole bunch." Thus, the
back-and-forth between those with different site perspectives had been instructive,
providing someone less familiar with the site with both facts and diverse opinions and
helping him build a broader base on which to make sense of site issues. Providing support
for such dialogic, collaborative sensemaking is the ultimate goal of this convergencebuilding model.
Limitations
The many challenges of drawing conclusions and making suggestions based upon
a case study are exacerbated when these conclusions and suggestions have been derived
through a crystallized framework that "presupposes that no truth exists 'out there' to
discover or get close to, but only multiple and partial truths that researchers (and others)
co-construct" (Ellingson, 2009, p. 22). I recognize that, as a communication researcher
and practitioner working at Superfund sites, my own positionality is implicated
throughout this work. In fact, I have attempted to make this recognition explicit through
the use of narrative inquiry to complement constant comparative analysis.
However, given that one of the goals of this study is to develop an improved
model for communication at these sites, I have attempted to ensure that study findings
resonate with the people most affected by them. During the development of this
dissertation, I have engaged in lengthy dialogues about emerging results and my
subsequent conclusions with a number of constituencies, including participants in the
Stakeholder Future Vision Study, personnel from both the U.S. Environmental Protection
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Agency’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and the National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences Partnerships for Environmental Public Health, leadership
of the Kentucky Environmental Quality Commission, and university-based community
engagement and research translation directors at other Superfund sites around the
country. At each step, I have been reassured that the communicative dynamics identified
within this study are experienced frequently at numerous sites, and I have received
important feedback, including requests from multiple parties that the model explicitly
involve stakeholders in developing and implementing communication evaluation
activities.
In addition to questions about the transferability of these findings to other
Superfund sites, additional limitations relate to statutory and fiscal constraints for the
model’s implementation. As has been noted, a number of governmental actors are
involved at Superfund sites, including U.S. DOE, U.S. EPA, and ATSDR, along with
state departments for environmental protection and health and family services. Under
complex existing Superfund laws, which agency – if any -- should take the lead in
formulating a Stakeholder Consultation Core? Would U.S. EPA’s Community
Involvement Coordinators be best positioned to begin this work through the agency’s
initial site investigations? Would it be a logical – or even sanctioned – role for the
ATSDR site representative? Or would it be best to identify a local or regional
stakeholder, such as a college or university, to undertake the necessary formative
research? Are there specific statutory limitations that would stand in the way of model
implementation? From where would the funding to support the prescribed interactions be
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derived? These are questions that, in and of themselves, require extensive dialogue and
negotiation to answer.
A third limitation for model implementation relates to the significant amount of
time it can take to engage stakeholders directly and to conduct the formative research
necessary to ensure inclusivity. While the expanded timeframe might prove problematic
in crisis situations, the long-term, chronic risk environments at Superfund sites provide
more temporal flexibility for work that could reap long-term relational dividends.
Although time-intensive, the effort put into ensuring both transparency of process and
participation of multiple constituencies in the risk discourse could play an important role
in increasing trust among diverse stakeholders.
Future Directions
This study raises numerous questions about complex risk communication
processes at Superfund sites, and as such, it opens many doors for future studies.
Superfund sites are heterogeneous in terms of contaminants, demographics,
socioeconomic factors, and many other relevant components, all of which feed into
varying communicative dynamics across different sites. Thus, an analysis comparing
sensemaking in communities that feature some participatory communication mechanisms
with sensemaking in communities that rely primarily on more traditional risk
communication activities could help elucidate the potential efficacy of the proposed
convergence-building model, as well as identify areas of concern prior to model
implementation.
A second area of particular interest is the community-based development of
evaluation processes and instruments. While the Arnstein Ladder (1969) used in the
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Stakeholder Future Vision Study provides a useful heuristic through which stakeholders
can think about public involvement, the Ladder itself was created by an academic for use
by academics. As such, the terminology has not always proven clear to stakeholders, with
constructs like "therapy" particularly problematic for shared understanding. In the future,
I hope to work directly with Superfund stakeholders to adapt and validate an evaluation
instrument that more closely resonates with both their own experiences and language.
Finally, a key area for applied research would involve working with federal
agencies to determine the extent to which the convergence-building model could be
implemented and tested at Superfund sites. How would agency communicators make
sense of their own and Superfund stakeholders’ evolving roles within the new model? To
what extent might agency personnel be constrained by their own organizational capacity,
commitments, and expectations? Such potential research questions hold promise for
future studies.
Sensemaking at Superfund sites is a complex process that involves many actors
representing diverse perspectives, at times leading to adversarial relations that render
convergent understanding extremely problematic. Only by engaging in systematic
research and evaluation of existing communicative constraints can we help site
stakeholders move toward shared understandings of risk-related phenomena. I hope that
this study has contributed, in some small part, to this process.

Copyright © Anna Goodman Hoover 2013
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Focus Group Discussion Protocol

PGDP Future Use Vision Project
Expected Knowledge/Info Outputs
1. The preferred and the unacceptable future use scenarios/combinations of scenarios for
the PGDP and its environs among various community groups.
2. How the various groups in the community name and frame the following issues related
to future use scenarios/combinations of scenarios for the PGDP and its environs:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Opportunities,
Strengths,
Challenges,
Weaknesses,
Threats,
Fears,
Risks,
Concerns, and
Solutions.

3. The overall quality of life goals, values of the community and, specifically, the priority
quality of life goals and values that influence the decisions of various groups in the
community regarding future use scenarios for the PGDP and its environs.
•

What is valuable to the community?

4. Any additional information the various community groups need to make the best
decisions about the future use scenarios for the PGDP and its environs.
•

The most accessible and trusted channels for receiving such information.

PREPARATION

Checklist of items to bring:
To prepare facility for focus group:

To conduct focus group:

_

Digital Tape recorders

_ Form A: Why are we here: Format for oral
presentation of informed consent

_

Blank name tents

_ Form B: Informed consent form/project description

_

Markers (various colors)

_ Form C: Demographic survey forms
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_

Food

_ Form D: Scenario preference polling questions
(using keypads)

_

Signs (directions to room)

_ Form E: Evaluation of Focus Group Discussion
process (using keypads)

_

Pens/pencils

_ PGDP Future Use Visualization packets & trigger
questions

_

Tape (to post signs)

_ Copies of the executive summaries of "The Politics
of Cleanup" and DOE "Risk-Based End State"

_

Laptop, LCD projector, screen

_ Keypads

_

Minimum of 5 flip charts

_ 2 easels for flip charts

Prior to Arrival of Participants
Arrive 20-30 minutes early to assure that the facility will be ready on time (you may be in the
position of using the room directly after someone else) and to prepare the facility for your group.
For instance, you may need to make adjustments to make the best use of the room and furnishings
to facilitate discussion. (1) Put out signs to help the respondents find the appropriate room. (2)
Arrange furnishings for discussion format, place blank name tents and writing materials for
participants, reserve moderator and note taker locations with name tents. (3) Arrange how food
service should take place. (4) Set up tape recorders. (5) Set up laptop, screen and LCD system.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR RUNNING THE GROUP

A. As Participants Arrive
(1) Welcome participants and invite them to select some food/beverage and take a seat. (2) Tell
them where the restroom is.
(3) As soon as all the participants are done eating, explain the project and the Informed Consent
form using Form A: "Why Are We Here?" Reiterate that participation is voluntary and that any
participants who do not want to continue the study can leave
(4) Distribute FORM B: The Informed Consent and Project Description
(5) Briefly describe the project for participants using a PowerPoint of the Project Description in
FORM B.
(6) Ask participants to write their nicknames, first names or pseudonyms on both sides of the
tent so that all participants can see each other's names or nicknames--this encourages
discussion.
(7) Ask participants to introduce themselves,
(8) Request participants fill out FORM C: The Demographic Survey.
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(9) Administer the first page of FORM E using key pads; describe the Arnstein Ladder
conceptualization of public involvement and ask participants to anonymously register where
they feel their past levels of public involvement in PGDP-related issues has fallen.
(10) Begin the discussion.

B. Warm up
1. First, please ensure that you’ve written your first name or a nickname on both sides of the
tent so we all can see everyone's name. Thanks. I'd like to begin by finding out what you like
and what you dislike about living in the Paducah area with PGDP as your neighbor. For example,
what is your favorite thing about living in the area?
Sometimes, you’ll need to prompt further by offering alternatives. This is a discussion training
exercise. Call on people by first name, and ask one follow-up question about whatever they say.
The follow-up question can be anything that makes it clear that you have been listening and that
encourages the respondent to add something more. This helps get the respondents used to the
idea of probing for more info. As you conduct this exercise, also look for information that
naturally leads into our discussion.
Call on people in a seemingly random order, rather than moving around the table, because the
randomness better approximates how discussions happen. Moving around the table sets a
different tone and could lead to people patterning their comments only after their neighbor has
spoken.
2. If you go outside this building and ask someone "what is the temperature right now at this
spot?" there is a right answer and a wrong answer that you can check with a thermometer.
However, what we are discussing today is how you and your friends feel about things, and there
could be as many different opinions as there are people in this room. Guess what? Every one of
those opinions is right! Remember, we aren't here to convince anyone of something in
particular or to change anyone's mind. We are here to discuss things and to hear what each and
every one of you has to say.
Sometimes, you will find that many people in the room have your opinion, and other times you
will be the only one with that opinion. But it is important for us to learn about all the opinions
because even if you are the only one in this room who holds that opinion, there may be
thousands of other people in your community who feel just as you do. Most importantly, every
opinion counts -- so please feel free to share your thoughts.

C. DISCUSSION OF PARTICIPANTS’ OVERALL QUALITY OF LIFE GOALS AND VALUES
Participants’ descriptions of their ideal city of residence
This activity is designed to elicit the overall quality of life goals and values of participants
OBJECTIVE
1. Identify what is valuable to participants
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HOW TO CONDUCT THIS ACTIVITY
Facilitator explains the objective of this activity.
Now that we have discussed what makes this area a desirable place to live, let’s carry that a bit
further and imagine the ideal place to live. Try to visualize a community that would meet all of
your needs and wants. Now, let’s try to describe that community in as much detail as possible.
Ask participants to describe in as much detail as possible three factors that would influence
his/her choice of an ideal city of residence. These factors are written out on a flipchart.
After listening to the individual descriptions, the facilitator asks the following questions to
generate discussions:
1.
2.

How does this region measure to these ideal regions we’ve heard about today?
Which of the ideal city characteristics are the most important to you and why?

D. Discussion of Visualizations of Sample future use scenarios
The preferred and the unacceptable future use scenarios/combinations of scenarios for the
PGDP and its environs among various community groups
Visualizations of Sample Scenarios
This activity uses computer-generated visualizations of sample future use scenarios.

Objectives
Seeing and discussing these visualizations can help the community members:
•
•
•

Think about the various possible future use scenarios.
Share their knowledge and experiences about additional possible scenarios.
Evaluate and appreciate the various issues related to various possible future use scenarios.

The activity is most effective if focus group participants work in small groups to examine and
discuss the visualizations that they receive. After each small group has examined their
visualization, they should explain to the whole group what they think the visualization represents
and the issues related to the visualization such as opportunities, strengths, challenges,
weaknesses, threats, fears, risks, concerns, and solutions. The group presentations can help to
engage participants in a dialogue about various scenarios and their possible effects on their
community. This activity is also an icebreaker that immediately engages the participants in
sharing their ideas and perceptions at the beginning of the focus group.

Materials: Visualizations of Sample future use scenarios (four scenarios to be Selected
Randomly from among eight unmarked visualization packets)
How to conduct this activity
Introduce the activity by asking the participants to form small groups of 3 to 4 people.
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Then assign one visualization packet to each small group. Display the three questions listed
below on an easel pad that is visible to all participants:
1. What do you think this represents?
2. Do you think this is a good or bad future use scenario for the PGDP site? Why?
3. What do you think the consequences of this scenario may be for you, your family and your
community? Explain.
Explain the scenario visualizations as just a sample of what is possible for the future use of the
plant site. Give the following instructions to the participants
"Please look carefully at the visualization that has been assigned to your team. Then discuss the
questions listed on the easel pad. Make sure everyone in your group has a chance to look at the
visualization and has an opportunity to express his or her ideas. When you finish, your group will
be asked to make a two-minute oral report about your observations and ideas, while the
visualization is shown to the rest of the group."
After a maximum of ten minutes, ask each group to tell the whole group what they think the
visualization represents and what the consequences will be for the community. As each group is
presenting their visualization, you should also display the same visualization for the entire
group.
Probes:
After each group has made its brief report, engage all present in a whole group discussion using
the following probes
1. What do these scenarios mean for the community?
2. How do these scenarios relate to your lives? Your families? Your communities?
3. What are the most important issues related to these scenarios: opportunities, strengths,
challenges, weaknesses, threats, fears, risks, concerns, and solutions?
4. What are the barriers to implementing these scenarios?
5. In what ways can these barriers be overcome?
6. What other scenarios/combinations of scenarios can we consider for the plant site and
why?
7. Think back to our earlier discussion about what makes this area a special place to live and
what characteristics would define the ideal place to live. (Review these on the flip chart.)
Now, which of the scenarios discussed today would reinforce what makes this area special?
Which would bring this region closer to the ideal characteristics described by participants?
Why?
Use keypads to poll participants’ scenario preferences.
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E. Identifying knowledge gaps and community trusted information channels
OBJECTIVES
This activity should help us to understand participants’ information-seeking behavior and
information use, both of which are crucial to effectively meeting their information needs. This
activity may also lead to the discovery of novel information behavior and user profiles that can
be used to enhance existing information models or even develop new ones.
HOW TO CONDUCT THIS ACTIVITY
Use questions and probes to discover participants’ information needs and their sources of credible
information about issues in general and specifically about the plant and its operations.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. What types of information do you usually seek about the PGDP and its operations?
2. What sources do you consult for this type of information? [Let people volunteer responses
first then probe with these choices.] Do you ask friends, neighbors, go to the library, watch
television, read it in magazines, go on the Internet?
3. Why do you use these sources? What problems have you had getting information that you
want (examples: hard to find, too technical, didn't relate to my situation, confusing navigation
online etc.)?
4. Which is the most credible source of information about PGDP?
5. Which sources of information about PGDP are the easiest to understand and most helpful to
you?
6. Which sources of information about PGDP are the hardest to understand and least helpful to
you?
7. What information do you think is most important to the community about PGDP and its
activities?
8. What are the best ways of delivering information about issues related to PGDP to your
community? [Let people volunteer responses first then probe with these choices.] Printed
materials like brochures? Video? Extension officers? Etc.
9. If we could develop a web site where you could obtain information about the PGDP, what
type of information would you like to have? How would you like to see the information
presented?
Use keypads for evaluations of the focus group process Using Forms D and E (use both
sides)
Conclusion
We have had a great discussion and you have offered very valuable insights and opinions.
Is there anything we missed during this discussion on the future use of PGDP you would like to
add?
I want to thank all of you for coming and participating in our discussion. Please remember that
we agreed at the start of our discussion that everything that was said in this room is confidential.
Once again, thank you.
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Informed Consent Procedures for the PGDP Future Use Vision Meetings
We are doing an interesting study for which we need your help. In order to proceed we need
your verbal consent.
I am going to ask 10 questions to explain the purpose of the study. I will then answer each of
these questions. We will get into more detail about the project as we go through the evening;
however, the University of Kentucky Institutional Review Board, which guides research projects,
mandates that we cover this material and gain your consent to participate in this focus group
prior to discussing the project in more depth. Please feel free to ask questions about the focus
group process at any time. Your questions about the overall Future Vision process will be
addressed later in this presentation.
1. Who are we?
We’re a team of researchers from the Kentucky Research Consortium for Energy and the
Environment located at the University of Kentucky. We are conducting this study to assist the
local community in identifying a vision for the future use of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion
Plant site.
2. Why are we here?
We’re here to explain the study to you and to ask you to be involved in this important
project. If you agree, you will participate in a discussion about what should be done with the
plant and surrounding areas when the plant is decommissioned and about the best means of
achieving the objectives for the greater benefit of your community. The information you
provide to us today will help us learn more about what the community thinks and wants for
the plant and its surrounding areas and how best to achieve these wishes. We also want to
find out what additional
information you need about the process and what the best
means of getting that information to you is. During this meeting, we will discuss the
concerns and major issues that are important to your community in relation to PGDP and the
best use of the plant in the future. I will guide the discussion, listen to, and record your ideas.
3. What are we asking you to do and why?
During the past few years, several groups of people from your community and from many
organizations, including the DOE, have suggested numerous future uses for the PGDP and
the land surrounding it. We’ll show you a sample of these suggestions and ask you to
evaluate them based on what you think will be in the best interest of your family and the
community
• Which suggestions do you think make sense, are worth doing, and would you
support and why?
o Which suggestions do you think don’t make sense and why?
o What are your recommendations and why?
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4. Why were you asked to participate in this study? (ADAPT FOR OTHER CLUSTERS, e.g.
EMPLOYEES OF THE PLANT)
You are members of the Paducah community and you and your family live close to the
Plant. You and people like you are the group most affected by the plant and its
operations.
5. Why do we need your permission and how will you grant us permission to participate?
All studies of this type require that the participants be told what the study is about and what
they are being asked to do. That is what we are doing now. We will also give you a two-page
description of the project goals and your role in the project. If you agree all you need to do is
to take part in a discussion.. During the discussion you can choose to participate or not
participate at any time, or to leave at any time.
6. What are the risk/benefits for you if you decide to participate in this study?
As far as we know there are no risks from participating in this study. There are a number
of benefits. By participating in this study, your views may affect the decisions about what
should be done with the plant and its environs, when current operations end. By sharing
your ideas and experience with us, you will be part of a sample of about 90 community
members from Paducah and surrounding counties who are working with the project
team to ensure that the voice and opinions of all community segments are taken into
consideration when a decision is made about the future of the plant and its
surroundings.
7. Will you receive any rewards for participating in this study?
You will receive no rewards for participating in this study other than a free meal. You will
receive the free meal whether of not you chose to participate in the study.
8. What will it cost you to participate in this study?
The only cost to you is the time required to travel to and from the meeting and the time
involved for the discussion.
9. Will your identity and statements remain confidential?
Yes. No one outside of our group will know exactly what you said. We never use names
when we review your comments. We will also ask you to complete a two-page questionnaire
about your connection to the PGDP. Do not write your name on the questionnaire. That way
your comments and identity will remain anonymous.
10. If you have questions, whom do I contact?
If you have questions about the study you can ask them now or at any time during the
meeting. You can also call Dr. Lindell Ormsbee, the principal investigator of this study at any
time at 859-257-1299, or email Dr. Ormsbee at lormsbee@engr.uky.edu. You can also call
the University of Kentucky Office of Research Integrity at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866400-9428.
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Consent to Participate in a Focus Group Discussion of PGDP Future Use Vision
You are invited to take part in this study that will assist the local community to identify a vision for
the future use of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant site. A Federal earmark facilitated by Senators
McConnell and Bunning and Representative Whitfield supports the Study. The person in charge of
this study is Dr. Lindell Ormsbee from the Kentucky Research Consortium for Energy and the
Environment, located at the University of Kentucky. The other people on the team are Drs. Ted
Grossardt and Chike Anyaegbunam, Ms. Anna Hoover and Mr. Mitchael Schwartz, all from the
University of Kentucky.
You were selected to take part in this study because you are in some ways connected to the PGDP
either because you live in Paducah, near the plant or work in the plant. You are one of about 90
people to participate from the communities in Paducah and nearby counties. The group discussion
will take about two hours of your time.
By doing this study, we hope to learn what the Paducah community thinks should be done with the
plant and surrounding areas when the plant is decommissioned, as well as the best means of
achieving these objectives to the greater benefit of the community. The information you provide us
today will help us to learn more about what the community thinks and wants for the plant and its
surrounding areas and how best to achieve these wishes. We also want to find out what additional
information you need about the process and the best means of getting that information to you.
During this meeting, we will discuss the concerns and major issues that are important to your
community in relation to PGDP, along with the best use of the plant in the future.
The discussion will be audio recorded so that the researchers can review all of the comments more
thoroughly. This recording will be kept secure until information can be collected from it and then
the recording will be destroyed. You are encouraged to voice your opinions; however, your
participation in the discussion is voluntary. Your opinions are very valuable to us, but you are free to
leave the discussion at any time. Your responses will be added to the responses of other participants
for reporting purposes, and every effort will be made to protect your confidentiality. All the
information you give us will be kept secure and will only be accessible to project personnel. Several
faculty members at the University of Kentucky will listen to the recording of this discussion. Of
course, the other individuals participating in today’s focus group will know what was said and by
whom during the session.
There are no known risks to you or your family if you participate in this study. By participating in this
study, your views may affect the decisions about what should be done with the plant and its environs
when current operations cease. By sharing your ideas and experience with us you will be part of a
sample of about 90 community members from Paducah and surrounding counties who are working
with the project team to ensure that the voice and opinions of all community segments will be taken
into consideration when a decision is made about the future of the plant and its environs. You will
not be paid for your participation although a meal will be provided. There are no costs to participate
other than the two hours you will spend with others in the discussion.
If you decide to take part in the group discussion, it should be because you really want to volunteer.
You will not lose any benefits or rights that you would normally have if you choose not to volunteer.
You can stop at any time during the study. If you do not want to be in the study, you may choose not
to participate in the study.
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If you have questions about the study, you may contact Dr. Lindell Ormsbee at 859-257-1299, or
email lormsbee@engr.uky.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this
research, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky at 859257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428.
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FORM C: DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY FOR PGDP FUTURE VISION FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS
You are invited to take part in this study that will assist the local community to identify a
vision for the future use of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant site. The information you
provide us today is very crucial and will help us to learn more about what the community
thinks and wants for the plant and its surrounding areas, as well as how best to achieve these
wishes.
1) In what ways are you connected with PGDP? Check all that apply
Live in Paducah? ____
Live near the plant? ____
Work in the plant? ____
Have relatives who work/worked in the plant? ____
Have clients or customers who work in the plant? ____
Others (Describe) ___________________________________________
2) Your age _________
3) Your sex
____ M
____ F
4) Ethnicity/Race?
__Hispanic or Latino
__White
__ Black or African American
__American Indian/Alaskan Native
__Asian
__Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
__ More than one race
__ Other
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5) Occupation _________________________________________
Form D: Sample Scenario Preference Polling Questions (using keypads)
Please make brief one or two line comments after each item below.
1.
Which scenario makes the most sense to you? Why?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
2.

Which scenario makes the least sense to you? Why?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
3.

Which parts of the scenarios would you support? Why?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
4.
This fourth question is something we’ll like you to discuss with us now and also take
home and share with people in your community. Here is the question: What would you and
others in your community need to move forward on identifying the most optimal future use
scenario for the plant site you feel should be implemented?
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FORM E
(DRAFT)

The Arnstein Ladder: Degrees of Citizen Participation in Planning
(Arnstein 1969)
8

Citizen Control

7

4
3
2
1

Partnership
Degrees of tokenism

Placation

___________________________________
___________________________________

Consultation
Informing
Nonparticipation

Therapy

___________________________________
___________________________________

Manipulation

Where are we now?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

___________________________________
___________________________________

Delegated Power

6
5

Degrees of citizen power

COMMENTS

Manipulation
Therapy
Informing
Consultation
Placation
Partnership
Delegated Power
Citizen Control

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________

Where should we be?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Manipulation
Therapy
Informing
Consultation
Placation
Partnership
Delegated Power
Citizen Control

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
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How Satisfied Are You With the
Meeting Processes Used Here?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Very Unsatisfied
Unsatisfied
Somewhat Unsatisfied
Slightly Unsatisfied
Neutral
Slightly Satisfied
Somewhat Satisfied
Satisfied
Very Satisfied

___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
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